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**The Reign of Manuel II Palaeologus
in Thessalonica, 1382-1387**



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FOREWORD

In the stifling heat of mid-summer 1387 Manuel II Palaeologus, Emperor of the Romans, sat in his tent on the barren shore of Lesbos and composed a letter to his friend Cabasilas. Briefly he recalled the past five years since that day in autumn 1382 when he had secretly left Constantinople and sailed to Thessalonica. Although barred from the succession to the throne of Byzantium, he had ruled as emperor in Thessalonica and had waged war against the Turks. Despite some striking initial successes, however, he had been unable to stem the Ottoman advance. Finally in April 1387, after a long siege, his own subjects had compelled him to leave and had surrendered the city to the Turks. To Cabasilas Manuel wrote of the ambitious hopes he had entertained and of the bitter disappointment that had followed. When he finished the letter he put down his pen and never again took it up to write about those five years. For Manuel it was a closed chapter in his life. And so it has remained ever since — a closed chapter.

It was in hopes of opening up that chapter once again that I began this work, for it constitutes one of the most stirring chapters in the life of Manuel II. This Thessalonian episode was not simply the attempt of a disgruntled younger son to carve out an independent domain for himself. In the mind of Manuel as in that of his friends, such as Demetrius Cydones, it was rather a struggle for independence against the ever-expanding Ottoman Empire, whose emir was, in fact if not in name, the overlord of "the emperor of the Romans". Although this rebellion was brief and destined to failure, it is worth noting that it was in Macedonia under the leadership of Manuel II that, for the last time in four hundred years, Greek troops put a Turkish army to rout.

Yet, there is scarcely a word about this significant episode in the standard histories of Byzantium⁽¹⁾. The reason for this lies chiefly in the scarcity of reliable sources and in the difficulty of utilizing those which do exist. Patient scrutiny, however, of all the documents, to glean and piece together whatever positive information is to be found there, might at least fill in a few of the missing pages. This book offers the results of such a quest. It aims at presenting a history of the reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica from 1382 to 1387, thus constituting a brief, but indispensable, contribution to the history of the Byzantine Empire, of the Greek Church and of the relations between East and West. In historical research questions must be asked, and in the course of this study I have asked many questions. Some of these I have been able to answer; for others — perhaps most — I can do no more than offer suggestions; there still, however, remain some problems for which I can find no satisfactory solution.

In order to be appreciated aright, the activity of Manuel II from 1382 to 1387 must be viewed in its proper setting. Two preliminary chapters are meant to fill this need. The first examines certain problems connected with the source material and the second gives a summary account of the events leading up to the autumn of 1382, thus placing Manuel's Thessalonian adventure in its true historical perspective.

For help and encouragement generously given to me while I was engaged on this book I am grateful to many people. To Fr Joseph Gill, S. J., I am deeply indebted both for his patient and thorough reading of the manuscript and for his many fruitful suggestions, particularly in the translation of the Greek texts. Even a hasty glance at the bibliography will reveal that my debt to Fr Raymond J. Loenertz, O. P., is an immense one. It would indicate, however, merely a very small portion of that debt. For it was he who first suggested that I investigate the present subject

(1) Cf. G. OSTROGORSKY, *History of the Byzantine State*, English transl. by J. Hussey (Oxford, 1956), 484-485; A. A. VASILIEV, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, Wisc., 1958), II, 624; L. BRÉHIER, *Vie et Mort de Byzance* (Paris, 1947), 459-460; C. DIEHL, R. GUILLAND, L. OECONOMOS, R. GROSSET, *L'Europe Orientale de 1081 à 1453* (Paris, 1945), 339-340.

and, if this investigation has been at all successful, it is only because he has made available to me many of his notes and much of his time. For all of this I am sincerely grateful and it is to Fr Loenertz that I would like to dedicate this book.

Rome, 30 May 1960

GEORGE T. DENNIS, S. J.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- B. X. = *Βραχέα Χρονικά*, ed. S. LAMPROS - K. AMANTOS, Athens, 1932.
- B. Z. = *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*.
- CANTACUZENUS = *Ioannis Cantacuzeni imperatoris historiarum libri IV*, ed. J. SCHOPEN, 3 vols., Bonn, 1823-1832.
- CHALC. = *Laonici Chalcocandylae, Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. E. DARKÓ, 2 vols., Budapest, 1922-1927.
- CYDONES, Letters = *Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance*, ed. R. J. LOENERTZ, I (= *Studi e Testi* 186), Città del Vaticano 1956; II (= *Studi e Testi*), Città del Vaticano, 1960. (The letters are cited according to their numeration in this edition.)
- D. O. C. = *Diplomatari de l'Orient Català*, ed. A. RUBIÓ I LLUCH, Barcelona, 1947.
- DUCAS = *Istoria Turco-Bizantină*, ed. V. GRECU, Bucharest, 1958; *Ducæ Michaelis Ducæ nepotis historia Byzantina*, ed. I. BEKKER, Bonn, 1834.
- E. E. B. Σ. = *Ἑπετηρίς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*.
- E. O. = *Echos d'Orient*.
- HALECKI, *Un Empereur* = O. HALECKI, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome*, Warsaw, 1930.
- M. M. = *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana*, ed. F. MIKLOSICH and J. MÜLLER, 6 vols., Vienna, 1860-1890.
- MANUEL, *Fun. Or.* = *Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος* (Funeral oration for his brother Theodore), ed. S. LAMPROS, *Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*, III, Athens, 1926, 11-119.
- MANUEL, Letters = *Lettres de l'Empereur Manuel Paléologue*, ed. E. LEGRAND, Paris, 1893.
- MURATORI = L. A. MURATORI, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 25 vols., Milan, 1723-1751.
- N. E. = *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*.
- O. C. P. = *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*.
- P. G. = *Patrologia Graeca*, ed. J. P. MIGNE, Paris, 1857-1866.
- RAYNALDUS = O. RAYNALDUS, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, VII, Lucca, 1752.
- R. E. B. = *Revue des Études Byzantines*.
- THIRIET, *Régestes* = F. THIRIET, *Régestes des Délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Roumanie*, I, Paris - La Haye, 1958.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Sources

Perhaps the least known period of Byzantine history is the second half of the fourteenth century and the explanation for this lies in the striking paucity of reliable sources, in particular, of narrative sources ⁽¹⁾. We are relatively well informed on the first half of the century up to about 1360 by the writings of Nicephorus Gregoras and John Cantacuzenus. The later historians, Laonicus Chalcocondyles, George Sphrantzes and Ducas, present a fairly full picture of the last decades of Byzantium, but their treatment of events before the beginning of the fifteenth century is brief and frequently confused. The historian must, therefore, employ a variety of other sources; short chronicles, Greek and Western diplomatic documents, lives of saints, Venetian chronicles, sermons and letters. Both because of this diversity of material and because some of it has not yet been exploited by historians, a detailed discussion of the more important sources seems necessary. For the period of Manuel's reign in Thessalonica (1382-1387) the primary sources fall into three categories:

(1) Cf. G. OSTROGORSKY, *History of the Byzantine State*, English transl. by J. Hussey (Oxford, 1956), 415-424; P. CHARANIS, "The Greek Historical Sources of the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century", *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America* 2 (1944), 405-412. Short accounts of the individual historical works with rather complete bibliographies are given in Gy. MORAVCSIK, *Byzantinoturcica*, I (Berlin, 1958²), and M. E. COLONNA, *Gli Storici Bizantini dal IV al XV secolo* (Naples, 1956). The references, however, in the latter work are not always exact; cf. MORAVCSIK, *B. Z.* 50 (1957), 439-442.

1) chronicles and other narrative sources, 2) official documents of state and church, 3) literary works such as sermons, discourses and private letters.

a) CHRONICLES AND OTHER NARRATIVE SOURCES

Laonicus Chalcocondyles

Laonicus Chalcocondyles (or Chalcocondyles; both forms occur in the manuscripts) composed his history, *Ἀποδείξεις Ἱστοριῶν*, in the decade 1480-1490, a hundred years after the events dealt with in these pages⁽²⁾. To a large extent his work is modelled on the ancient Greek historians, Thucydides and Herodotus, and his humanistic education, probably received from Gemistus Plethon while he was at the court of the despots in Mistra (1435-1460), manifests itself throughout his writings. For example, he reverts to the ancient forms for proper names: instead of *Ῥωμαῖοι* the Greeks are called *Ἕλληνες*, a name which they have applied to themselves in ancient and in modern times, but not during the Byzantine period when it conveyed the meaning of 'pagan'; he refers to Thessalonica and Adrianople by their classical names, *Θέρμη* and *Ὀρεστιάς*, and the Scaligeri family of Verona become the *Κλιμάκιοι*.

As far as the historian is concerned, a more disconcerting aspect of this neo-classical style is the absence of precise chronological data. In his imitation of the ancient historians Chalcocondyles dispenses with dates and is not overly concerned with such an exact sequence of events as is found in the medieval chronicles and annals. Rather, he employs a literary grouping at times leading to an unhappy amalgamation of events which,

⁽²⁾ A good general account with an extensive bibliography is provided by MORAVCSIK, *Byzantinoturcica*, I, 391-397. To his references there should be added the remarks of R. J. LOENERTZ, *R. E. B.* 15 (1957), 178-181; 16 (1958), 217-232. For detailed criticism of the edition of Chalcocondyles by Darkó, cf. R. GUILLAND, *Revue des Etudes Grecques* 36 (1923), 561-564; E. KURTZ, *B. Z.* 25 (1925), 359-362; V. LAURENT, *E. O.* 27 (1928), 465-470; E. DARKÓ, *B. Z.* 32 (1932), 2-12. Practically none of the criticisms affect the sections referred to in the present study.

although similar, occurred at different times. His account of the voyage of John V in Italy (1369-1371) contains a number of elements which really belong to that of his son, Manuel II, in Italy, France and England thirty years later⁽³⁾. The usurpation of the Byzantine throne by Andronicus IV (1376-1379) is confused with that of his son, John VII (1390)⁽⁴⁾. When it comes to Manuel's reign in Thessalonica, his narrative becomes decidedly entangled, owing chiefly to his failure to distinguish the two periods when Manuel governed the city, as despot (1369-1373) and as emperor (1382-1387)⁽⁵⁾. Still, this does not mean that Chalcocandyles deliberately falsifies or invents. In general he is well informed and his history is based on sources, although he does not always understand them well and often combines them even less well.

It might be useful to present in schematic form the order in which Chalcocandyles arranges the events dealt with in the present work. First is given the reference to Chalcocandyles (all are from Book I), then the historical event followed by its actual date.

28, 4-17.	Battle at the Maritza River	1371
28, 18 - 29, 9.	Soleiman captures Adrianople.	1361
29, 9-11.	Capture of Philippopolis.	1363
29, 24.	Accession of Murad I.	1362
(30, 19 - 32, 19.	Digression on various Slavic groups.)	
33, 3-6.	Turkish capture of Serres.	1383
34, 14-21.	Alliance of John V with Murad.	1373/74
36, 20 - 42, 4.	Rebellion of Andronicus IV and Soudchi.	1373
42, 5 - 44, 4.	Manuel ruling Thessalonica, which is taken by Khairaddin.	1382-1387
46, 6 - 47, 18.	Voyage of John V to Italy.	1369-1371
48, 3-5.	Theodore is sent to the Peloponnesus.	1382

⁽³⁾ Cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Jean V Paléologue à Venise 1370-1371", *R. E. B.* 16 (1958), 223-224.

⁽⁴⁾ R. J. LOENERTZ, "Autour du *Chronicon maius* attribué à Georges Phrantzès", *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, III (= *Studi e Testi* 123; Città del Vaticano, 1946), 295-296.

⁽⁵⁾ CHALC., I, 42, 5 - 48, 22.

48, 5-8.	He conspires with Manuel, then ruling Thessalonica, against Murad.	1382-1387
48, 8-9.	Manuel called to Constantinople and proclaimed emperor.	1373
48, 15-22.	Manuel at war with Murad.	1382-1387

Without other sources it would be practically impossible to form a clear notion of the precise sequence of events, and one can understand how later historians have been confused by this narration. The story of Manuel's reign in Thessalonica, substantially the same story, is told twice, an indication, so it would seem, that Chalcocandyles was relying on two different sources, which he did not fully understand and which he failed to harmonize.

Sphrantzes and Pseudo-Phrantzes

Among the sources cited in this work one will not find the *Journal* of George Sphrantzes Phialites, which is also called the *Chronicon Minus*, since his narrative begins in 1401, the year of his birth, and enters into greater detail only with the year 1416-1417 ⁽⁶⁾. It had been thought that the author had composed a second and more extensive historical work, the *Chronicon Maius*, but Father R. J. Loenertz has conclusively demonstrated that this is a compilation of the end of the sixteenth century, the work of Macarius Melissenus, Metropolitan of Monembasia, and a well known falsifier ⁽⁷⁾. The *Chronicon Maius*, then, should not be cited under the name of Sphrantzes or Phrantzes, but as Pseudo-Phrantzes, alias Macarius Melissenus. For the events between 1370 and 1387 it is clear, practically at first glance, that we have to do with a paraphrase of Chalcocandyles and nothing more;

⁽⁶⁾ On his name cf. V. LAURENT, "Σφραντζής et non Φραντζής", *B. Z.* 44 (1951), 373-378; "Sphrantzès et non Phrantzès à nouveau", *R. E. B.* 9 (1951), 170-171; D. A. ZAKYTHINOS, "Σφραντζής ὁ Φιλιππῆς", *E. E. B. Σ.* 23 (1953), 657-659; R. J. LOENERTZ, "Etudes sur les chroniques brèves byzantines", *O. C. P.* 24 (1958), 162, n. 2.

⁽⁷⁾ LOENERTZ, "Autour du *Chronicon maius*", 273-311. This thesis has now been generally accepted by scholars. Cf. OSTROGORSKY, *History of the Byzantine State*, 417, n. 2; F. DÖLGER, *B. Z.* 43 (1950), 63; F. DÖLGER - A. M. SCHNEIDER, *Byzanz* (Bern, 1952), 29-30; MORAVCSIK, *Byzantinoturcica*, I, 284-285.

a few minor liberties are taken with the text of the Athenian historian, a few names misspelled, but the dependence allows of no doubt⁽⁸⁾.

Short Chronicles and Chronological Notices

Certain Greek copyists have been thoughtful enough to tell us their names, that of the places where they did their copying, the date when they finished, and sometimes, the person who paid them — and the amount. It may even happen that in their colophon they indicate some historical event, some recent fact or incident, thus constituting a valuable document for the historian in search of precise dates. A good example and one which enters into the ambit of this history is furnished by the manuscript 555 of the Meteora. The copyist, Thomas Xeros, chartophylax of the diocese of Trikkala, informs the reader that he has finished his transcription of the present book for the monk Joasaph (ex-Emperor of the Greco-Serbian realm of Thessaly) in 6894 *anno mundi* (1385-1386), "when the Turks had become masters, not only of Berrea, but almost of the whole world"⁽⁹⁾. These colophons, however, which can be called historical, are very rare. A more common case is that of the owner of a manuscript who makes use of some blank pages at the end or in the body of the book to enter all sorts of notes, some chronological and some of general interest. S. Lampros has published a collection of these isolated notices, which are of great value for epochs which are poor in other sources such as the fourteenth century⁽¹⁰⁾. When several of these notices are found one after the other in more or less chronological order, they assume the form of the other type of document mentioned in the title, the short chronicles, brief compositions whose name sufficiently indicates their character.

(8) *Georgii Phrantzæ Chronicon*, I, ed. J. B. PAPADOPOULOS (Leipzig, 1935), p. 51-61; compare this with CHALC. I, 28-48. For a detailed examination of this dependence cf. LOENERTZ, "Autour du *Chronicon maius*", 293-296.

(9) Edited by N. VEIS, "Συμβολή εις την ιστορίαν τῶν μονῶν τῶν Μετεώρων", Βυζαντίς I (1909), 236; S. LAMPROS, "Ἐνθυμήσεων ἤτοι χρονικῶν σημειωμάτων συλλογή πρώτη", N. E. 7 (1910), 113-313; no. 79, p. 146.

(10) LAMPROS, *op. cit.*; "συλλογή δευτέρα" in N. E. 16 (1922), 407-420.

Some of these have been published separately, but a considerable number, fifty-six, had been gathered by Lampros and were published after his death by K. Amantos (*Βραχέα Χρονικά*, Athens, 1932) ⁽¹¹⁾.

These historical notices and short chronicles have been of service to the present study in two ways: first, by positively and directly enriching our knowledge of Manuel's reign in Thessalonica; secondly, by providing data which enable us to understand better, to interpret and, when necessary, to correct the accounts of the Greek historians and the information scattered throughout the non-narrative sources. Of particular value have been the two following items: the precise date of the capture of Serres (19 September 1383), and that of the duration of the siege of Thessalonica and of its capture by the Turks (April 1387). The date of the fall of Serres is given in five chronicles, all of them listing a series of Turkish conquests (*B. X.* 16, 5, p. 33; 20, 4, p. 37; 21, 5, p. 38; 22, 1, p. 41; 32, 1, p. 61). Two others merely give the year (*B. X.* 48, 9, p. 83 and 28, 23, p. 53 — which has the wrong date, 1417-1418). No. 32 speaks of "wretched Serres" as though the writer were, in some way, more closely connected with the event. Although there are some errors in these chronicles, the information regarding Serres can be considered as certain and is, moreover, confirmed by an act of the patriarchal synod of May 1387 which speaks of the Metropolitan of Serres, Matthew Phacrases, being in his fourth year of Turkish captivity ⁽¹²⁾.

The historical notice recording the capture of Thessalonica is found in the *cod. Marcian. gr. 408* (new number 672), a manuscript written throughout by one hand, although at two different periods a few years apart. The central section (fol. 16-144) contains as its principal composition the Byzantine Romance of Alexander the Great (fol. 16-142) ⁽¹³⁾. The last three verses, which form the colophon, state that the transcription was completed

⁽¹¹⁾ The edition, however, leaves much to be desired. Cf. the criticism of P. WITTEK, *Byzantion* 12 (1937), 309-323; on p. 309 he remarks: "Ils sont présentés d'une façon qui les rend presque impraticables pour l'historien".

⁽¹²⁾ *M. M.*, II, no. 374, p. 77-79.

⁽¹³⁾ Edited by M. WAGNER, *Trois poèmes grecs du moyen-âge* (Berlin, 1881), 56-241.

in 6896 *anno mundi*, the eleventh indiction (1387-1388) ⁽¹⁴⁾. The first section of the codex (fol. 1-15) contains as its chief work (fol. 1-13v) an historical poem about the taking of Constantinople by the Franks (1204) and its recapture by Michael VIII Palaeologus (1261) ⁽¹⁵⁾. Once more the last three verses form a colophon, which mentions that the copy was finished in 6900 *anno mundi*, the fifteenth indiction (1391-1392) ⁽¹⁶⁾. The final section (fol. 145-155) has as its principal item (fol. 145-146v) a short prose narration of the events from 1204 to 1261 recounted in the historical poem in the first section, followed by a short chronicle about the Palaeologi, ending with the death of John V Palaeologus on 16 February 1391, 6899 *anno mundi*, the fourteenth indiction ⁽¹⁷⁾.

The pages left blank after the transcription of the principal works have been filled by the same hand with shorter items, among which are nine brief didactic poems in the same type of verse as the historical poem and the Romance of Alexander. On fol. 15 there is a chronological note on the length of time since the death of Michael IX Palaeologus (20 October 1320) to the date when the scribe was writing (1391-1392) ⁽¹⁸⁾. On fol. 144 there is an historical notice (taken from George Acropolites) on

(14) "Ἐγράφη δὲ πρὸς ἑτασι τοῖς ἑξακισχίλοις ἔξ σὺν τοῖς ἐνεήκοντα καὶ τοῖς ὀκτακοσίοις, ἡνδικτιῶνος ἐν αὐτοῖς τρεχοῦσης ἑνδεκάτης." Fol. 142 of the ms.; edition of WAGNER, verses 6113-6120.

(15) Edited by J. MÜLLER, *Byzantinische Analekten, Sitzungsberichte der k. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. Hist. Cl.* 9 (Vienna, 1852), 366-389. The poem contains 759 non-rhyming political verses, exclusive of the verse-rubrics.

(16) "Κατὰ τὸ νῦν ἱστάμενον ἔτος τὸ μέγα κόσμου ἑξακισχίλιον αὐτὸ σὺν τοῖς ἑννακοσίοις, τὸ φέρον καὶ τὴν ἡνδικτον πεντεκαίδεκαταίαν." Fol. 13v of the ms.; edition of MÜLLER, p. 389, verses 754-756.

(17) Both the prose narration and the short chronicle have been edited by MÜLLER, *op. cit.*, p. 389-393; the short chronicle has also been published as no. 52 of the Lampros-Amantos collection.

(18) "Ἐὖρον γεγρέαμνον, ὅτι ἐκοιμήθη ὁ βασιλεὺς κύρ Μιχαήλ ὁ νέος Παλαιολόγος μηνὶ Ὀκτωβρίῳ ιβ' ἡνδ. δ', ἀνακύλισον γοῦν τὴν ἡνδικτιῶνα τετράκις καὶ εἰπέ· τετρά(κ)ι(ς) δεκαπέντε· ἑξήκοντα καὶ ἑνδεκα τῆς ἀναπληρώσεως τῆς τότε τρεχοῦσης ἡνδ. ἔτη σα', ἥτοι κατὰ τὸ νῦν ἱστάμενον μέγα ἔτος ς'α', ἡνδ. ιε'. ἀπέθανε δὲ πρὸς ε' ἡνικυτῶν τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως κυροῦ Ἀντωνίου μοναχοῦ".

the origin of the Bulgarian patriarchate of Trnovo⁽¹⁹⁾, and immediately after this, on the same page, is the notice on the duration of the siege of Thessalonica and the date of its capture by the Turks. 'Εν ἔτει ςωϛε' μηνὶ 'Απριλλίῳ Ἰνδικτιῶνος ι' παρεδόθη ἡ Θεσσαλονίκη τοῖς 'Αγαρηνοῖς· ἐπολιορκεῖτο παρ' αὐτῶν χρόνους δ' (20). A year and four months at the most passed between this event and the completion of the copy of the Romance of Alexander. Clearly, therefore, the copyist was a contemporary of the event and his note merits complete confidence. It is, moreover, confirmed by a deliberation of the Venetian Senate of 22 July 1387, which states that Thessalonica is in the power of Murad⁽²¹⁾.

Non-Greek Narrative Sources

Of great importance for the history of late fourteenth century Byzantium are the Venetian chronicles, which were written to a large extent by contemporaries or by men who had access to state documents, some of which have since been lost⁽²²⁾. The Slavic chronicles, on the other hand, limit themselves to a garbled and inaccurate repetition of the Greek sources and thus contain practically no reliable information for the events under consideration in this study. All that the Turkish chronicles have to relate of the early period of Ottoman history is found in one form or another in the collections of Löwenklau (Joannes Leunclavius, *Historiae Musulmanae turcorum de monumentis ipsorum exscriptae*

(19) Published by MÜLLER, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 394; republished by S. LAMPROS, *N. E.* 9 (1912), 404, n. 1, and *N. E.* 10 (1913), 196 (the year is incorrectly given as 1388). Still, he has not included this notice in his edition of the short chronicle taken from the same *ms.*, *B. X.* 52, nor in his list of chronological notices in *N. E.* 7 (1910); where its place would be between no. 81 and 82, p. 146. This notice has also been republished by O. TAFRALI, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle*, 284, n. 1; R. J. LOENERTZ, *E. O.* 36 (1937), 477, n. 1 (with a misprint, ςωϛε' for ςωϛε'); P. CHARANIS, *Byzantion* 13 (1938), 359, n. 5; K. MERTZIOS, *Μνημεῖα Μακεδονικῆς Ἱστορίας* (Thessalonica, 1947), 29. Only Loenertz and Charanis have added any commentary.

(21) *Appendix*, doc. B.

(22) Many of these chronicles are still unedited; cf. F. THIRIET, "Les Chroniques venitiennes de la Marcienne et leur importance pour l'histoire de la Romanie gréco-venitienne", *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire* 66 (1954), 241-292.

libri XVIII, Frankfurt, 1591) ⁽²³⁾. These chronicles, however, are of little service to the student of fourteenth century Byzantium. Written, at the earliest, in the middle of the fifteenth century, they are chiefly concerned with the internal conflicts of Turkish and other Moslem princelings in Asia and with a naive and legendary account of the origins of the Ottoman Empire. Although they may contain a certain amount of useful oral tradition, it is practically impossible to fix upon any precise facts. "They are, moreover, full of confusion and contradictions so serious that, as Babinger says, even the most unbridled imagination can not reconcile them. The truth is that, from the Turkish chronicles alone, no date in Ottoman history prior to 1421 can be fixed with any degree of certainty" ⁽²⁴⁾.

b) OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF STATE AND CHURCH

Most of the extant Byzantine imperial documents of the late fourteenth century are related to monasteries, where, in fact, they have been preserved, and while extremely useful, tell us little or nothing of the nomination of state officials or ambassadors, of treaties with other states and such matters. The archives of Byzantium have long since perished, but the scholar can reconstruct — obviously only to a very limited degree — their contents from other sources. More plentiful, perhaps, are the official acts of the Byzantine patriarchate, although these, too, are far from complete. Much useful historical detail, however, is found in western diplomatic sources, particularly in the records of the deliberations of the Venetian senate, the *Misti*, so called from the great variety of political and administrative matters with which they deal.

⁽²³⁾ P. WITTEK, "Zum Quellenproblem der ältesten osmanischen Chroniken (mit Auszügen aus Neşri)", *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte* 1 (1921/22), 77-150, esp. 149. Cf. also F. BABINGER, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927).

⁽²⁴⁾ W. L. LANGER and R. P. BLAKE, "The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and its Historical Background", *American Historical Review* 37 (1932), 472.

The papal archives, usually so rich in material for the historian, are most disappointing for the period of Manuel's reign in Thessalonica (1382-1387), although for the decade or so preceding this reign they furnish a fair amount of valuable information. It is with the registers of Pope Urban VI (1378-1389) that the difficulties begin. O. Halecki, who has contributed so much to the history of Roman-Byzantine relations for this period, after as thorough a search as was possible, remarks: "Ils nous sont parvenus dans un état déplorable... deux volumes seulement et une petite partie d'un troisième se rapportent à ce règne... Des années entières manquent complètement, et les copies de bulles d'Urbain VI, dispersées dans divers manuscrits des Archives et de la Bibliothèque du Vatican, n'y remédient que d'une façon tout à fait fragmentaire" (25).

Further investigation has failed to add anything to the findings of Professor Halecki. In the series of registers of Urban VI in the Vatican Archives there are no documents from the first year of his reign. A few acts from the second year (March-April 1380) are extant in *Reg. Vat.* 310, which covers the third, fourth and fifth year, i. e. to 8 April 1383. The next volume of registers, *Reg. Vat.* 311, begins with a letter of 26 February 1386 and the registers proper (on fol. 11) with documents of 22 September 1386. The other volumes (*Reg. Vat.* 312 and 347 in part) continue the series to the death of Urban VI. Other documents of the same Pope are found in *Armarium* 31, tom. 36; *Armarium* 33, tom. 12; *Oblig. et Sol.* 47 and 48; *cod. Ottob. Lat.* 1443; *cod. Vat. Lat.* 6330 and 6772. None of these, however, contains any references to the Byzantine Empire, apart from a few items pertinent to the Latin Church in Greece.

The gap between *Reg. Vat.* 310 and 311 means that there exists no series of registers covering the sixth, seventh, eighth and part of the ninth year (8 April 1383 to 22 September 1386) of the pontificate of Urban VI (26). And it is precisely these

(25) O. HALECKI, "Rome et Byzance au temps du grand Schisme d'Occident", *Collectanea Theologica* (Lwów) 18 (1937), 479. Also cf. N. VALOIS, *La France et le grand Schisme d'Occident* (Paris, 1896), I, préface, p. xii; E. KROFTA, *Monumenta Vaticana Bohemiae* (Prague, 1903). Preface to vol. V.

(26) Raynaldus, who died in 1671, had already noted that the registers

years which are extremely important for the history of Manuel II in Thessalonica. Therefore, unless new evidence is forthcoming, the full account of the relations between Pope Urban VI and Manuel II cannot be written, and one is forced to depend on other sources, certain, but less precise than papal documents would have been.

c) LITERARY SOURCES

Manuel II Palaeologus

Manuel, the third child of John V Palaeologus and Helen Cantacuzena, was born on 27 June 1350 in Constantinople, a few months after his father had left for Thessalonica⁽²⁷⁾. In February or March 1352 John V returned to the capital but soon

for these years had perished: RAYNALDUS, 1384 (p. 477). A few letters of the seventh and eighth years are scattered about in *Reg. Vat.* 311 and 312 but are not relevant to the present subject. It is not unlikely that these registers became lost during the travels of Urban VI, who had left Rome in August 1383 and did not return until the beginning of September 1388. Cf. his itinerary in M. ROTHBARTH, *Urban VI und Neapel (Abhandlungen zur Mittleren und Neueren Geschichte*, 49; Berlin, 1913), 89-92. Urban left many documents and belongings behind when he hastily departed from Nocera (near Naples) on 7 July 1385. A notice in *cod. Vat. Lat.* 8224, fol. 162v, dated 11 February 1390, states: "Nicolaus de Imola, litterarum apostolicarum scriptor et familiaris pape, mittitur Luceriam Christianorum [Nocera] pro deferendis Romam et ad cameram apostolicam res et bona mobilia ad dictam cameram pertinentia in castro ipso per fel. rec. Urbanum VI praed. n. dimissa, et praesertim registra supplicationum et litterarum apostolicarum et alios libros ibidem existentia". Apparently Nicolaus de Imola was successful in his mission, for that same year, 1390, some thirty-eight books from the library and archives of Urban VI were returned to the Curia from Campania: *Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Armarium* 29, tom. 1, fol. 191-192. However, how many registers were not returned and how many of those gathered by Nicolaus were again lost is quite uncertain.

(27) The date has been established by R. J. Loenertz, correcting an error of Sphrantzes who made Manuel two years older than he really was: "Une erreur singulière de Laonic Chalcocondyle: Le prétendu second mariage de Jean V Paléologue", *R. E. B.* 15 (1957), 182-183.

left for Didymotichus, accompanied by his wife and their infant son, Manuel, while the two older children, Andronicus and Irene, remained with their grandmother, Irene Asanina⁽²⁸⁾. Three years later Manuel is mentioned in one of the most curious of the Byzantine imperial chrysobulls sent to a pope: in order to obtain western help, John V promised, among other things, to have his second son, the Despot Manuel, educated at the papal court in Avignon as a sort of adopted son of the pope⁽²⁹⁾. In another letter to Pope Innocent VI, dated 7 November 1357, the Byzantine Emperor mentioned that the Papal Legate in Constantinople, St Peter Thomas, had dissuaded him from carrying out this project, although he still hoped to be able to send Manuel to Avignon⁽³⁰⁾. Actually, nothing came of the entire plan.

In the letters of John V of 1355 and 1357, cited above, Manuel is called 'despot', a title frequently bestowed at this period on those younger sons of the emperor who were not destined to succeed to the throne⁽³¹⁾. His elder brother, Andronicus, had the title of *basileus* from at least mid-August 1355 and was intended to succeed his father⁽³²⁾. On 8 October 1364 Andronicus and Manuel, entitled emperor and despot respectively, represented their father at the enthronement of Philotheus Kokkinos for his second term as patriarch⁽³³⁾. The following year Manuel accompanied his father to visit Louis d'Anjou, King of Hungary, on the first of the peregrinations of the later Palaeologi to western

(28) CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 31-33: III, p. 229, 11-12; 237, 6-9; 237, 24-238, 2; 238, 15-19. For the date, cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Wann unterschrieb Johannes V. Palaiologos den Tomos von 1351?", B. Z. 47 (1954), 116.

(29) Edited by A. THEINER and F. MIKLOSICH, *Monumenta spectantia ad unionem ecclesiarum graecae et romanae* (Vienna, 1872), no. 8, p. 29-33. A detailed analysis is given in HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 31 ss.

(30) The letter is preserved in *The Life of Saint Peter Thomas* by Philippe de Mézières, edited by Joachim SMET (Rome, 1954), 76-69, esp. 79, 2-4.

(31) Cf. R. GUILLAND, "Etudes sur l'histoire administrative de l'empire byzantin: le Despote", R. E. B. 17 (1959), 52-89, esp. 61-71.

(32) In a document of the patriarchal synod, dated 17 August 1355, Andronicus is called *basileus* both in the title of the act and in the text: M. M., I, no. 185, p. 432.

(33) CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 50: III, p. 363, 9-19; the date is given in M. M., I, p. 448.

courts in search of aid against the Turks⁽³⁴⁾. It would seem that he remained behind in Buda as a hostage after the departure of John V⁽³⁵⁾, who had solemnly promised Louis d'Anjou that he and two of his sons, Manuel and Michael, would accept the Catholic faith⁽³⁶⁾. When Manuel returned to Constantinople, he found a letter from the pope exhorting him to promote ecclesiastical union⁽³⁷⁾, although, as far as Manuel was concerned, nothing resulted from these negotiations.

In summer 1369, if not earlier, Manuel was appointed governor of Thessalonica, a position presumably meant to be permanent⁽³⁸⁾. The following year John V found himself in grave financial difficulties in Venice and addressed an urgent appeal to his eldest son, Andronicus, who during the Emperor's absence was governing Constantinople⁽³⁹⁾. Andronicus, however, turned a deaf ear to the appeal, and the Emperor had to rely on his second son in Thessalonica. Manuel gathered the amount needed and without delay in the middle of winter 1370-1371 sailed for Venice⁽⁴⁰⁾. After the departure of his father in spring 1371, Manuel remained there "to make trial of what hopes were left and to guarantee

(34) Cf. HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 111-137.

(35) *Ibid.*, p. 135. "οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δεῖσαν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐκείθεν ἐξελθεῖν τοῦτον καὶ μένειν, ὥς ἂν οὐκ ἔνευ ὁμήρων τοῦ ῥηγὸς τὴν ἔξοδον συγχωροῦντος." From the chrysobull of John V for Manuel issued in autumn-winter 1371, edited by K. E. ZACHARIAE VON LINGENTHAL, *Prooemion von Chrysobullen von Demetrios Kydones, Sitzungsberichte der k. preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1888, 2, 1419.

(36) Mentioned in a letter of Pope Urban V to John V of 1 July 1366: RAYNALDUS, 1366, no. 5.

(37) HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, no. 8, p. 367.

(38) Manuel was named governor of Thessalonica before John V left Constantinople for Italy, which was probably in early summer 1369, for John arrived in Castellammare near Naples on 7 August 1369: *Cronicon Siculum*, ed. J. DE BLASIS (Naples, 1887), p. 22. In June 1369 Alexis Metochites, about to enter the monastery of Vatopedi on Mt. Athos, no longer held the position of governor of Thessalonica: F. DÖLGER, "Neues zu Alexis Metochites und zu Theodoros Metochites", *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, III (= *Studi e Testi* 123; Città del Vaticano, 1946), 238-251, esp. 242.

(39) On this incident, cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Jean V Paléologue à Venise (1370-1371)", *R. E. B.* 16 (1958), 217-232.

(40) KYDONES, Letter 21, 10-14, written to Manuel in Venice in spring or summer 1371; Chrysobull cit., p. 1420.

the expenses occasioned during so long a period, expenses increased by the petty-mindedness of the merchants" (⁴¹). In the summer or autumn of 1371 he returned by way of Constantinople to Thessalonica (⁴²).

Manuel's writings provide abundant proof that he received an excellent education in the Greek classics and in rhetoric, as well as in theology. It is very likely that one of his teachers was Demetrius Cydones, to whom he always remained strongly attached and to whose teaching, so he wrote, was due any proficiency he had in the art of rhetoric (⁴³). Of his education and early life Manuel himself has left a brief account in the introduction to a lengthy theological work, written in epistolary form to Alexis Iagoup (⁴⁴).

As a child I was not allowed to frequent only the school of liberal arts and to devote myself entirely to this with the aim of surpassing all the learned, even those revered for their eloquence. But, according to a decision of the council, other studies followed one upon the other and I was compelled to alternate between many teachers each day, who taught a number of different subjects; how to handle the bow and the spear and how to ride a horse. After I had left childhood behind and before man's estate, fortune took hold of this part of my life in another guise, full as it was of tempests and troubles, and many indications warranted the prophecy that what the future held in store for me would make the past seem like a period of absolute calm. But there is no need of recounting all this to those who already know it. Besides, everyone is aware that there were certain prophets, not to be despised, who foretold that evil days were at hand. They have already arrived. And if as a child I plucked the fruits of literary studies, I have since to a large extent been torn away from these and swept along from letters to other cares. For many things, as though in league, rained upon me then in close succession; difficulties, wrestling with various misfortunes and all sorts of dangers. As though I had been caught up in a whirlwind, I was unable to catch my breath.

(⁴¹) Chrysobull *cit.*, p. 1420.

(⁴²) CYDONES, Letter 79, written in 1371-1372 from Constantinople, whence Manuel had just sailed for Cydones' native city.

(⁴³) MANUEL, Letter 11, 31-35 (LEGRAND, p. 14-15).

(⁴⁴) The work, extant in *cod. Paris. gr. 3041*, fol. 72v-85v, and in *cod. Barberin. gr. 219*, fol. 36v-50, is unedited apart from a brief section from the *Paris ms.* published by J. BERGER DE XIVREY, *Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue* (*Mémoires de l'Institut de France, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 19, Paris, 1853, 2e partie, 1-201), p. 26, n. 1, from which the present translation is taken.

Among the members of his family, Manuel was particularly attached to his youngest brother, Theodore, to whom he was, in the familiar sense of the word, the 'big brother' looking after him and acting as a sort of father to him⁽⁴⁵⁾. When Theodore died the sincerity of Manuel's sorrow was not obscured by the rhetoric of the funeral oration he composed to be recited over his grave. There he wept at the loss of a brother, a friend, a pupil and a son, and he described in moving terms Theodore's loving care when he was wounded in the civil strife of summer-autumn 1376⁽⁴⁶⁾. About his other two brothers, Andronicus and Michael, Manuel has scarcely a word to say in all his writings. That his feelings towards Andronicus were something less than brotherly is understandable in the light of the events of 1370 to 1385. Of Michael so little is known that it is difficult to form a judgement. Manuel's love for his mother reveals itself not only in his writings, especially the letter he addressed to her and the *Dialogue on Marriage* in which she figures as taking a prominent part, but also in his asking her counsel even in political matters⁽⁴⁷⁾.

The literary and theological erudition of a man whom history presents as a seasoned military commander, capable administrator and emperor, is rather unexpected in the last days of a dying empire. To some extent we can share the admiration of Demetrius Cydones for this prince who could join the practical necessities of defending a besieged city with an extensive literary interest, who could "with war raging all around, practice rhetoric"⁽⁴⁸⁾. Even though Manuel occupies a significant position

⁽⁴⁵⁾ Manuel wrote to Tribolus in the Peloponnesus, "which now possesses my most dear brother and friend and son": Letter 9, 36-37 (LEGRAND, p. 13).

⁽⁴⁶⁾ MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 13, 17-19; 27, 26-28, 7.

⁽⁴⁷⁾ MANUEL, Letter 1 (LEGRAND, p. 1-2). The *Dialogue on Marriage*, unedited, is found in *cod. Paris, gr. 3041*, fol. 89-104; the ms. is covered with corrections, almost certainly by Manuel himself. In July 1392 both Manuel and his mother conducted negotiations with the Venetian ambassador: THURIET, *Régestes*, 820, p. 196. Five years later he consulted her before selling Corinth to the Hospitallers: MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 70, 2.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ CYDONES, Letter 262, 39-40. Also cf. Letter 309.

The basic studies on Manuel's literary activity have been written by Jules BERGER DE XIVREY, *op. cit.*, and by Louis PETIT, "Manuel II Paléologue" *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, IX, 2 (Paris, 1926), col.

in the history of Byzantine Literature, the definitive work on his literary production has not yet been written, nor is it likely to be for some time to come, for a surprisingly large number of his writings remains unedited, and for some of these his authorship is not established with certainty. Then too, while the Greek employed by Manuel is linguistically pure and classical, it is also a very difficult Greek and at times his meaning is something less than crystal-clear.

The writings of Manuel utilized in this work include his letters, chiefly those sent to Demetrius Cydones and to Cabasilas, his *Discourse to the Thessalonians*, which will be discussed in some detail, and the funeral oration for his brother Theodore, Despot in the Morea, who died in 1407. This last is extremely long and was actually delivered (although not by Manuel himself) in Mistra before his brother's subjects who, even if they understood the intricately classical language of the discourse, most probably did not share his sentiments⁽⁴⁹⁾. Yet, scattered among pages of sheer rhetoric are a number of interesting details regarding the imperial family. Theodore's governorship in the Morea and other matters, some of which are known only from this oration.

Isidore Glabas, Metropolitan of Thessalonica

John Glabas, born in 1342, became a monk on 1 April 1375 taking the name of Isidore and five years later was consecrated for the metropolitan see of Thessalonica⁽⁵⁰⁾. The ceremony took

1925-1932. This last contains a detailed list and description of Manuel's writings, which should be read together with the observations of R. J. LOENERTZ, "Ecrits de Macaire Macrès et de Manuel Paléologue dans les mss. Vat gr. 1107 et Crypten. 161", *O. C. P.* 15 (1949), 185-193.

(49) Manuel sent the discourse to Mistra with the monk Isidore (later Metropolitan of Kiev and Cardinal). In the fifth of his letters published by W. Regel (*Analecta Byzantino-Russica*, St. Petersburg, 1891, p. 65-69), Isidore informed Manuel of the effect produced by the reading of the oration on the public assembled for one of the first anniversaries of Theodore's death. Cf. D. A. ZAKYTHINGS, "Μανουὴλ Β' ὁ Παλαιολόγος καὶ ὁ καρδινάλιος Ἰσιδωρος ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ", *Mélanges Octave et Melpo Merlier*, III (= *Collection de l'Institut Français d'Athènes*, 94; Athens, 1957), 45-69, esp. 47-50.

(50) Notice in *cod. Sinaiticus* 141 (alias 869): V. BENEŠEVIĆ, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum graecorum qui in monasterio S. Catherinae montis*

place on 25 May 1380, presumably in Constantinople, for the new prelate took part in meetings of the patriarchal synod during June of that year⁽⁵¹⁾, and apparently left for Thessalonica later in the summer. Within two years he found himself at odds with the Patriarch Nilus, who had received the appeals of Dorotheus, bigoumenos of the monastery of St Basil, and of a priest named Allelouias, both of whom had been suspended from their functions by Isidore. In reply to Isidore's protests that this constituted an unwarranted interference in his diocese, Nilus justified his action and gave the Metropolitan of Thessalonica a brief lesson on the rights of the ecumenical patriarch⁽⁵²⁾. But this was only the beginning of Isidore's difficulties, for, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, he disobeyed the Patriarch, abandoned Thessalonica, which was being besieged by the Turks, and in September 1384 was suspended by the Patriarch and his synod. A year and a half later he was rehabilitated and remained in Constantinople until at least summer 1389⁽⁵³⁾. It was perhaps about this time that he undertook a mission to Asia, probably to the Ottoman Porte in connection with the Thessalonians led into captivity by the Turks after April 1387⁽⁵⁴⁾. At any rate, he was back in Thessalonica to preach the sermons for the first and second Sundays before the feast of St Demetrius, 5 and 12 October 1393⁽⁵⁵⁾.

Sina asservantur, I (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 127; N. VEIS, "Αἱ πασχίλας ἐπιγραφαὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Δημητρίου Θεσσαλονίκης καὶ ὁ μητροπολίτης αὐτοῦ Ἰσιδώρος Παβῆς († 1396)", *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 7 (1928/29), 143.

⁽⁵¹⁾ *M. M.*, II, no. 332, p. 8; no. 335, p. 10; no. 337, p. 17; no. 338, p. 19.

⁽⁵²⁾ In July 1382: *M. M.*, II, no. 354, p. 39-42.

⁽⁵³⁾ He took part in the synod in February and April 1389 (*M. M.*, II, no. 403, p. 115; no. 405, p. 130; no. 406, p. 133), but was not present in July or thereafter (*ibid.*, no. 409, p. 135).

⁽⁵⁴⁾ Cf. the funeral oration on Isidore given by Ivankos, ed. E. LEGRAND, *Lettres de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue* (Paris, 1893), p. 105-108, esp. 107, 78-81. Such a voyage of Isidore also seems to be referred to in the *Synodicon* of Thessalonica, ed. V. LAURENT, *E. O.* 32 (1933), no. 59, p. 302, and in the sermon of Isidore himself given on 5 October 1393, ed. B. LAOURDAS, *Ἰσιδώρου ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης ὁμιλίαι εἰς τὰς ἐορτὰς τοῦ ἁγίου Δημητρίου*, *Ἑλληνικά, παράρτημα* 5 (Thessalonica, 1954), homily IV, p. 56, 40-57, 3.

⁽⁵⁵⁾ Edited by LAOURDAS, *op. cit.*, homilies IV and V, p. 55-65. These sermons are incorrectly ascribed to Isidore's successor, Gabriel, by A. EHRHARD, *Überlieferung und Bestand der hagiographischen und homiletischen*

and there he seems to have remained until his death on 11 January 1396 ⁽⁵⁶⁾.

Two works of Isidore Glabas figure among the sources employed for the history of Manuel II in Thessalonica: a collection of homilies and a small collection of letters. The first contains some fifty homilies, arranged according to the liturgical year, although it is not certain that all were actually delivered in Thessalonica. These are extant chiefly in two manuscripts, the first volume in *cod. Paris. gr. 1192* and the second in *cod. Vat. gr. 651* ⁽⁵⁷⁾. Four of his homilies on the Blessed Virgin have been edited in *P. G.* 139, 12-164, and five others on St Demetrius, three of which were given in 1383, have been published by B. Laourdas. Apart from a few fragments edited by S. Lampros, the other homilies of Isidore remain unedited. In general, these sermons are of small value to the historian for, while the allusions to contemporary events are frequent enough, they rarely enter into concrete detail. Still, on the few occasions when such details are given, the preacher furnishes significant information. The correspondence of Isidore (edited by S. Lampros) comprises eight letters, four of which are contemporary with Manuel's reign in Thessalonica, and one other was written shortly after the city fell to the Turks.

Demetrius Cydones

Statesman, author, theologian and lay ascetic, Demetrius Cydones came from a noble family of Thessalonica, where he was born about the year 1322, and when his father died in 1341 Demetrius became head of the family ⁽⁵⁸⁾. During the civil war of 1341-1347 he gave his support to the usurper, John VI Can-

Literatur der griechischen Kirche, III (*Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, 52, 5; Leipzig, 1943), 711.

⁽⁵⁶⁾ The date of his death is given in the notice cited above, p. 16, n. 50. Cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Isidore Glabas, métropolitain de Thessalonique (1380-1396)", *R. E. B.* 6 (1948), 181-190.

⁽⁵⁷⁾ Cf. EHRHARD, *op. cit.*, 709-713. The three unnumbered sermons of 1393 and 1395 (p. 711) were given by Isidore, not by Gabriel as Ehrhard states, who followed L. Petit in placing the beginning of Gabriel's episcopate in 1393.

⁽⁵⁸⁾ R. J. LOENERTZ, "Notes d'histoire et de chronologie byzantines", *R. E. B.* 17 (1959), 162-166.

tacuzenus, a fact which earned him the enmity of the 'loyalists' in his native city. Forced by them to leave Thessalonica shortly before the bloody events of July-August 1345, he sought refuge in Berrea with Manuel, the second son of John Cantacuzenus, whom he later joined in Thrace⁽⁵⁹⁾. After the victory of Cantacuzenus (3 February 1347), Cydones entered his service and by the end of his reign (22 November 1354) was his chancellor and principal minister⁽⁶⁰⁾. While performing these important functions, he learned Latin from a Dominican in Pera and began his translation of the *Summa contra Gentiles* of St Thomas Aquinas, the first of a series of translations destined to have profound repercussions on the intellectual and spiritual life of Byzantium⁽⁶¹⁾. Between 1354 and 1365 he made profession of the faith of the Roman Church; undoubtedly he had previously embraced the anti-Palamite cause notwithstanding his ties with John Cantacuzenus, the protector of the hesychasts and of Gregory Palamas. With the fall of Cantacuzenus, Cydones retired to private life and to his studies for a period, which seemed to him all too brief. Soon, however, John V Palaeologus invited him to the court to perform the same functions as he had held under his predecessor⁽⁶²⁾. For about thirty years, according to his own testimony, he occupied the position of chancellor and prime minister⁽⁶³⁾, and it was in this capacity that he accompanied the Emperor on his famous voyage to Italy (1369-1371). Loyal to John V and bound by close personal ties to Manuel II, he refused to serve Andronicus IV⁽⁶⁴⁾. After the restoration of John V (1 July 1379), he resumed his position at the court even though relations between himself and the Emperor had, during the years 1371-

(59) R. J. LOENERTZ, "Note sur une lettre de Démétrius Cydonès à Jean Cantacuzène, *B. Z.* 44 (1951), 405-408.

(60) CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 39: III, p. 285, 5-9.

(61) Cydones in his apology for his faith, edited by G. MERCATI, *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti* (= *Studi e Testi* 56; Città del Vaticano, 1931), p. 359-403, esp. 360, 26-363, 29.

(62) CYDONES, *Ad Ioannem Palaeologum Aug. oratio*, ed. R. J. LOENERTZ, *Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance*, I (= *Studi e Testi* 186; Città del Vaticano, 1956), 11, 29-32.

(63) CYDONES, Letter 338, 8-9.

(64) CYDONES, Letter 154, 39.

1376, been marred by serious disagreements⁽⁶⁵⁾. The most abundant source of new information relevant to Manuel's reign in Thessalonica are the letters written by Cydones between 1382 and 1387 and, for this reason, it is necessary to discuss them in some detail.

Some 450 letters of Demetrius Cydones, covering half a century (1346-1391), have been preserved. Their importance as sources for the history of Byzantium in the second half of the fourteenth century can scarcely be overestimated. The list of his correspondents alone shows that Cydones was in contact with practically all of the leading figures of the period, while his long service at the imperial court, both of the Cantacuzeni and of the Palaeologi, and his close ties with both families, placed him in an extremely favorable position to report on events of the time. More pertinent to the present work, however, is his friendship with Manuel II, whose teacher he had been, a friendship not disturbed by Cydones' conversion to Catholicism, although Manuel remained staunchly Orthodox. They both shared a real passion for classical literature and both held the same political views, that is, they were strongly opposed to any *rapprochement* with the Turks.

While the letters of Cydones are a mine of information for the historian, the extracting of this information is not always easy for, as with any collection of letters, and far more so with Byzantine letters, a horde of difficulties arises when it comes to searching for concrete facts.

Ecrites selon les préceptes d'une rhétorique hostile aux noms propres, aux détails concrets et aux termes techniques, leurs lettres nous présentent l'image de leur temps dans le miroir déformant de l'antiquité classique. ... Les Triballes peuplent la Serbie et les Moesiens la Bulgarie, et, dominant l'Asie Mineure, les Perses menacent la liberté des Hellènes. Dans cette vaste correspondance, seuls quelques mots étrangers comme cardinal, *passagium* et deux mots populaires (μούσπουλαι, néfles, et γούνα, pelisse) eussent dérouté un contemporain de Périclès. Enfin, comme c'est la règle avec les correspondances byzantines, les lettres de Cydonès ne portent jamais de date et trop souvent le nom du destinataire a été supprimé lors de la publication⁽⁶⁶⁾.

(65) CYDONES, Letter 338.

(66) R. J. LOENERTZ, *Les Recueils de Lettres de Démétrius Cydonès* (= *Studi e Testi* 131; Città del Vaticano, 1947), p. vi.

Despite their interest to scholars, the vast majority of the letters of Cydones has had to wait a long time before being edited⁽⁶⁷⁾. The principle impetus towards a study and utilization of these sources was given by G. Cammelli through his excellent edition and French translation of fifty letters (*Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance*, Paris, 1930), to which he added a list of the entire correspondence. In particular, his thorough investigation of the manuscript tradition paved the way for the future editor, R. J. Loenertz, who in 1947 published the results of his studies preparatory to a complete edition (*Les Recueils de Letters de Démétrius Cydonès (= Studi e Testi 131; Città del Vaticano, 1947)*). In 1956 appeared the first volume, containing 131 letters (*Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance, I (= Studi e Testi 186; Città del Vaticano, 1956)*), and the second volume containing the remaining letters, numbered consecutively, is now being printed (*Studi e Testi*).

The letters relevant to the reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica are almost all contained in books XXIV-XXXI of the second volume of the *Correspondance* and were, therefore, still unedited when we began the present work so that it was necessary to study them in the manuscript, or — towards the end — in the first uncorrected proofs. This study was made possible because the autograph manuscript of Cydones, containing the letters published in vol. II, is characterized by one feature useful for the historian. Cydones, who probably kept the rough drafts of his letters on separate sheets of paper, copied them periodically onto fascicles (i. e. a quaternion or τετραδίου, four sheets of paper folded once to make sixteen pages), taking care that the end of each fascicle coincided with that of a letter. Only twice has he made an exception to this rule. In vol. II of the edition each book represents one of these fascicles except for books XXII and XXVI, which include two fascicles each. Furthermore, the letters grouped together in a fascicle belong, generally speaking, to the same period. True, there are exceptions to this rule, but, when everything has been said, they are just that, exceptions, and the presence of a

⁽⁶⁷⁾ The most important editions before that of Cammelli were: C. F. MATHÆI, *Isocratis, Demetrii Cydonii et Michaelis Glycae aliquot epistulae* (Moscow, 1776), p. 34-43 — 9 letters; J. F. BOISSONADE, *Anecdota Nova* (Paris, 1844), p. 251-328 — 38 letters.

letter in a certain fascicle justifies the presumption that it probably belongs to the same period as the others contained therein. By a singular good fortune, the fascicles XXIV-XXXI are particularly homogeneous and show only one serious exception to the rule (letter 275, dated 1361). The notes of the editor and the cross-references from one letter to another frequently aid the reader in discovering the motives for the date assigned to a letter in the edition.

2. Modern Research and Manuel's Reign in Thessalonica

The purpose of this section is simply to present a brief conspectus of the development of research dealing with Manuel's five-year reign in Thessalonica. Without the least wish to detract from the reputation of former scholars, whose works are of great value, the situation may be summed up by stating that before Father Loenertz began his studies on Manuel II and Demetrius Cydones, historians had not the slightest notion of what actually went on in Thessalonica between 1382 and 1387. The reasons for this have been explained above, chiefly the scarcity of sources and the lack of critical studies of such sources as were available.

Three types of works could be expected to include an account of, or at least references to, the reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica: 1) general histories of the Byzantine Empire; 2) monographs on Manuel II; 3) histories of Macedonia or of Thessalonica. The deficiencies of the first group in this regard have already been pointed out, but since it was then question of modern histories of Byzantium, it might be useful to cast a glance at two of the older, and still oft-cited, works of this sort, those of Karl Hopf and Edouard de Muralt. The extremely erudite — and often inaccurate — history of Karl Hopf, *Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit* (in Ersch-Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste*, vols. 85-86, Leipzig, 1867-1868), which has been, practically speaking, the standard reference work for the history of medieval Greece, particularly for Latin Greece, has not been of great service here, for although the author knew the chronological notice of the *cod.*

Marcian. gr. 408, he treats of the events of 1382-1387 in a very general fashion (p. 27 ss.). Édouard de Muralt in his *Essai de Chronographie Byzantine 1057-1453*, II (Bale-Genève-St-Petersbourg, 1871), p. 695-731, follows the account of the Greek historians and, for that reason, is deficient, although, like Hopf, he cites the notice of the *cod. Marcian gr. 408* and correctly places the fall of Thessalonica in April 1387.

The first full monograph on Manuel II was written a little more than a century ago by Jules Berger de Xivrey, *Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue*. Taking as his starting point the then unedited letters of Manuel II, Berger de Xivrey treats of the known writings of the Emperor, at that time almost entirely in manuscript form, and distributes them in chronological order (p. 185-201). While one may take issue with some individual dates he assigns, his relative dating is, in general, still valid. The biographical section of his work, however, is not quite as successful, although he does remark on the confusion of the Greek historians for the period with which we are concerned (p. 26). A pioneer work of this sort necessarily has its defects, but it is still extremely useful and, to a large extent, must form the basis of any complete study of the Emperor and his writings. The short article of L. Petit in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* is important for its relatively detailed list of Manuel's writings, but its notes on the Emperor's life are decidedly incomplete and there is not a word about his Thessalonian episode.

As far as histories of Thessalonica are concerned, that of the Rumanian scholar, O. Tafrali, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle* (Paris, 1913), well written, well printed, well presented and prefaced by the noted Byzantinist, Charles Diehl, has been considered the standard work on the subject for over forty years. But in 1957, Ihor Ševčenko published the principle unedited source employed by Tafrali in his treatment of the Zealot Revolution and demonstrated without leaving the slightest doubt that this supposed source had nothing to do with the subject and that the citations of Tafrali were devoid of sense⁽⁶⁸⁾. Tafrali's book III,

⁽⁶⁸⁾ "Nicolas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse: a Reinterpretation", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 11, (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 79-171.

devoted to the political history of Thessalonica, is divided into four chapters of which the last — sixteen pages out of a total of eighty-five — deals with the events after the fall of the Zealots, that is, the entire second half of the century (p. 273-288). This disproportion should not be blamed on the author but on the extreme scarcity of sources; still, it should be noted that he has not utilized to advantage those sources which did exist. The letters of Isidore Glabas are not cited even once; the duration of the siege of Thessalonica is not mentioned although the notice from the *cod. Marcian. gr.* 408 is printed *in extenso*. His treatment of the period 1370-1390 is both confused and inaccurate (p. 281-288). Although he knew that Manuel governed Thessalonica in 1370 and in 1387, he implies that his government there was uninterrupted and he makes no mention of his coronation as emperor. Further, misreading a phrase from the Life of St Athanasius of the Meteora, he postulates a Turkish capture of the city about the year 1380, followed by another capture in 1387.

Two more recent, although very brief, histories of Thessalonica should be mentioned: A. Vakalopoulos, *Ἱστορία τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης* 315 π. X.-1912 (Thessalonica, 1947), and G. Theocharides, *Τοπογραφία καὶ πολιτικὴ ἱστορία τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης κατὰ τὸν ΙΔ' αἰῶνα* (Thessalonica, 1959). Neither book presents any documentation and the bibliographies are most jejune. In any case, the first has absolutely nothing to say about a reign of Manuel in Thessalonica (the proper place would have been on p. 79), and merely notes that historians are not agreed on the date of the first Turkish capture of the city — this almost a hundred years after the notice of the *cod. Marcian. gr.* had been published. The second work, which deals *ex professo* with the fourteenth century, is very disappointing, particularly when it comes to the last three decades of that century. Manuel's attempt to capture Serres is mentioned (it is placed in March 1383 although no authority is cited) as well as the Turkish capture of the city in 1387 and Manuel's subsequent flight (p. 47-48).

The task of putting some order into the history of Manuel II really began a little over twenty years ago with the first articles of R. J. Loenertz on the correspondence of Manuel II and Demetrius Cydones (*E. O.* 36 (1937), 271-287: 474-487; 37 (1938), 107-124). Originally intending to devote himself to research on

the life and writings of Manuel II, Father Loenertz soon realized that this was impossible without a study (and consequent publication) of the letters of Cydones. In connection with this study, he has, in the course of the past two decades, produced a large number of articles bearing directly or indirectly on the history of Byzantium in the late fourteenth century, and his thorough investigation of the *Chronicon Maius* attributed to George Phrantzes has cleared away one of the major obstacles as far as the source material is concerned. Certain aspects of Manuel's reign were treated of in 1955 ("Un prostagma perdu de Théodore I Paléologue regardant Thessalonique (1380/82 ?)", *E. E. B. Σ.* 25 (1955), 170-172), and in the following year he presented a list of sources dealing with the reign ("Une page de Jérôme Zurita relative aux Duchés Catalans de Grèce (1386)", *R. E. B.* 14 (1956), 162, n. 1). Further details were brought forth in his article, "Notes sur le règne de Manuel II à Thessalonique, 1381/82-1387" (*B. Z.* 50 (1957), 390-396). The gradual emergence of this history from obscurity can be gathered from the fact that some of his conclusions in that article (only three years ago) have since had to be modified, for example, the date of the beginning of Manuel's reign and that of the *Discourse to the Thessalonians*. With all this in mind, the reader should not be surprised if references to his writings abound in these pages.

In recent years a number of other scholars have also contributed to our knowledge of this epoch. To name but a few, whose works are cited in the notes and in the bibliography, there are the general studies of this period by P. Charanis in *Byzantion* and the brief and somewhat hesitant discussion by P. Lemerle in his *Philippes et la Macédoine Orientale* (p. 217-219).

Publications of texts and articles dealing with various individuals have also been most useful, for instance, the works of N. Veis and B. Laourdas on Isidore Glabas as well as articles of Laourdas and V. Laurent on Gabriel of Thessalonica. To these could be added a series of studies on the history of the convent of the Nea Moni in Thessalonica by Laurent and by G. Theodorides.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BYZANTINE POLITICAL SITUATION TO AUTUMN 1382

1. The Conflict in the Imperial Family

In May 1373 Andronicus IV Palaeologus, eldest son of the Emperor John V, rebelled against his father and, in league with Saudchi-chelebi, eldest son of the Ottoman Emir Murad I, attempted to seize the throne for himself⁽¹⁾. The insurrection, however, failed and Andronicus was forced to yield to his father who had him imprisoned with his wife and son in the monastery of Antony Cauleas. At the instance of the Emir Murad, John V

⁽¹⁾ Andronicus was born on 11 April 1348: Chronicle edited by B. T. GORJANOV, "Neizdannyy Anonimnyj vizantijskij Khronograf XIV veka", *Vizantijskij Vremennik* 2 (1949), 276-293, esp. p. 286, 208-209. Exactly when he was proclaimed emperor is not clear. Cantacuzenus calls him by the imperial title in relating events of 1352: Bk. IV, ch. 32: III, p. 238, 19-20. In any case, it is certain that he had the title of *basileus* before 17 August 1355: *M. M.*, II, no. 185, p. 432-433. In the agreement with Genoa of 23 August 1376, Andronicus employs the imperial title for himself, his wife and his son, John VII: *Liber Iurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, ed. H. RICIOTTIUS (Turin, 1857), II, no. 250, p. 819-821. However, it was not until 18 October 1377 that he was crowned (*ἡστέφθη*); *B. X.* 52, 33, p. 89.

Saudchi had already been in rebellion against his father for some months, and when Murad learned of the complicity of Andronicus, he informed John V. Andronicus then fled from Constantinople on 6 May and openly joined Saudchi. On 25 May the rebel army was defeated by Murad at Pikridiou and five days later Andronicus surrendered to his father at Athyros. Saudchi, however, was able to retreat and, with a handful of followers, resisted until 27 September when he was taken by Murad at Didymotichus in Thrace and blinded: *B. X.* 47, 35-51, p. 81; *CHALC.*, I, 35-42: DUCAS, ch. 12, 1-2: p. 71-73 (Greeu): 43-44 (Bonn); RAPHAYNI DE CARESINIS, *Chronica AA.* 1343-1388, ed. E. PASTORELLO, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 12, 2 (Bologna, 1923), p. 32, 10-11) (hereafter referred to as CARESINI).

had his son blinded, or rather, made a show of having him blinded; for the operation was carried out in such a way that a partial cure was later possible⁽²⁾.

The motives which impelled Andronicus are not known. Since 1371 the relations between him and his father could hardly have been cordial, for when his father found himself in Venice in grave financial difficulties Andronicus had not answered his urgent appeal for aid and had prevented the cession of Tenedos to the Venetians to whom John V wished to sell it⁽³⁾. Nonetheless John V did not at that time make any change in the established order of succession to the throne. To his second son Manuel, his favorite, who had just rendered important services to his father and to the Empire, John V had given in appanage the lifetime governorship of Thessalonica and Byzantine Macedonia⁽⁴⁾. He had made a similar provision for Michael, his third son, who received the Greek cities on the European side of the Black Sea, with his residence at Mesembria⁽⁵⁾. The insurrection of 1373, however, changed everything and on 25 September, at the age of twenty-three, Manuel was proclaimed emperor⁽⁶⁾. The coronation took place shortly before March 1374, if one can take literally the expression *coronatus de novo imperator*, found in the deliberations of the Venetian Senate of 9 March 1374⁽⁷⁾.

⁽²⁾ B. X. 47, 52, p. 81; CHALC., I, 55, 4; DUCAS, ch. 12, 2: p. 71-73 (Grecu): 44, 6-19 (Bonn); CARESINI, 32, 13; DANIELE DI CHINAZZO, *Cronica de la Guerra da Veneciani a Zenovesi*, ed. V. LAZZARINI, *Monumenti Storici, Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Venezie*, nuova serie XI (Venice, 1958), p. 17 (= MURATORI 15, 711 B) (hereafter referred to as CHINAZZO, with references to both editions, that of Lazzarini being placed first). Ducas and Caresini add that the infant son of Andronicus, John VII, was also blinded.

⁽³⁾ R. J. LOENERTZ, "Jean V Paléologue à Venise (1370-1371)", *R. E. B.* 16 (1958), 226-229.

⁽⁴⁾ K. E. ZACHARIAE VON LINGENTHAL, *Prooemion von Chrysobullen von Demetrius Kydones*, *Sitzungsberichte der k. preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1888, 2, p. 1421-1422.

⁽⁵⁾ Cf. CYDONES, Letter 148, note 1; N. IORGA, "Veneția în Marca Neagră", *Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, ser. II, tom. 36 (Bucharest, 1914), 1050-1051.

⁽⁶⁾ B. X. 47, 49, p. 81; also in an astrological notice cited as a note to Ducas (ch. 12, 4) in the Bonn edition, p. 555.

⁽⁷⁾ "Cum isti ambaxiatores imperatorum Constantinopolitanorum, antiqui et novi, instanter supplicent nobis, qui occasione matrimonii domini

These events had a disastrous influence on the destinies of the Byzantine Empire. During thirty years the state would be divided and critically weakened by the rivalry between the two branches of the dynasty — John V and Manuel II on the one side, Andronicus IV and his son, John VII, on the other — all of whom sought assistance at one time or another from Venice, Genoa and even the mortal enemy, the Ottoman Porte. This series of civil wars with their continual foreign intervention served only to hasten the final ruin of the Empire.

Shortly before July 1376 Andronicus IV escaped from his prison and took refuge behind the ramparts of Pera (Galata), the Genoese commercial colony on the other side of the Golden Horn⁽⁸⁾. He had already rendered a capital service to Genoa in preventing Tenedos from being delivered to her rival, Venice. The old antagonism between the two maritime republics was stronger than ever and would soon culminate in the conflict known

despoti, coronati de novo imperatoris, habent necessario redire in Constantinopolim": HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 302, n. 1 (this has been overlooked by Thiriet in his *Régestes*). On 15 February 1375 the Venetian ambassador in Constantinople was instructed to consider speaking with the son of John V, *ad presentiam filii sui coronati*: THIRIET, *Régestes*, 553, p. 137. In the account of his pilgrimage to the Holy Land (1389-1405), Ignatius of Smolensk describes the coronation of Manuel and his wife which he himself attended in Constantinople on 11 February 1392: *Khoždenie Ignatija Smolnjanina*, ed. S. V. ARSENJEV, *Pravoslavnyj Palestinskij Sbornik*, tom. IV, fasc. 3 (1887), 14-18: French translation by B. DE KHITROWO, *Itinéraires russes en Orient* (Geneva, 1889), 143. However, this would seem to refer to his marriage and the coronation of the empress. Cf. L. T. BELGRANO, "Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera", *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 13 (1894), doc. 38, p. 169. Apart from the first Venetian document cited above, there is no other reference to a marriage of Manuel at this time. It is true that he did have an illegitimate daughter who was married some twenty years later: A. PAPADOPULOS, *Versuch einer Genealogie der Palaiologen* (Munich, 1938), p. 70.

(⁸) B. X. 47, 52-53, p. 81; CHALC., I, 55, 4; *Chronicon Breve de Graecorum imperatoribus ab anno 1341 ad annum 1453 e codice Vaticano graeco 162*, ed. R. J. LOENERTZ, *E. E. B. S.* 28 (1958), cap. 11, p. 208 (hereafter cited as *Chron. Vat. 162*); DUCAS, ch. 12, 3: p. 73, 3-6 (Grecu): 45, 1-7 (Bonn); CARESINI, 32; *Chronicle of Gian Giacomo CAROLDO*, unedited, cited from the *cod. Marcian. It. VII, 128a* (coll. 8639) (referred to as CAROLDO), fol. 398; ANDREA DE REDUSIIS DE QUERO, *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, MURATORI, 19, 756 D-E; CYDONES, Letter 167, 21-22.

as the Tenedos and Chioggia War (1376-1381). Perhaps Genoa had not been a stranger to the actions of Andronicus in 1371. In any case, the Genoese in Pera knew how to profit from the presence among them of an ex-Emperor and claimant to the throne, who, if restored by them, could be of invaluable assistance in the struggle which everyone knew was coming. With their help and that of the Turks of Murad I, Andronicus, after a thirty-two day siege, became master of Constantinople on 12 August 1376 and besieged his father in his fortress palace⁽⁹⁾. In October John V capitulated and with his two sons, Manuel and Theodore, was imprisoned in the Anemas tower⁽¹⁰⁾. When they escaped, in 1379, they went straight to Brusa, to the Sublime Porte. Thanks to Murad's troops, they re-entered the capital victoriously on the first of July 1379. A Venetian squadron under the orders of Carlo Zeno arrived too late to bring about their restoration, but at least it provided the aid necessary to dislodge the last partisans of Andronicus and to enable John and Manuel to consolidate their power in the city. The defeated usurper had retreated to his Genoese allies in Pera.

The restoration of John V and Manuel II in 1379 touched off a new civil war, which must be discussed in some detail, for the treaties of 1381 and 1382, which concluded the struggle, are the point of departure for the events with which this history is more especially concerned. But before entering into these details, it would be well to examine the foreign policy, in particular the Turkish policy, of John V and Andronicus IV before 1379.

(⁹) B. X. 15, 15-19, p. 32; 47, 54-56, p. 81; 52, 31-33, p. 89; CHALC., I, 56, 19-57, 5; *Chron. Vat.* 162, *loc. cit.*; CYDONES, Letter 167, 13-17; 222, 56-66; MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 27, 14-20.

(¹⁰) B. X. 15, 15-19, p. 32; CHALC., I, 57, 5-6; *Chron. Vat.* 162, *loc. cit.*; DUCAS, ch. 12, 3: p. 73, 9-10 (Grecu): 45, 10-11 (Bonn); CARESINI, 32, 20-22; CHINAZZO, 18 (711 C). Manuel later wrote: "While we were in the prison a little less than three years, many ills visited us and caused us deep and bitter suffering ... Since, as far as reason could see, there was no hope of being freed, the situation compelled us to hate life itself": *Fun. Or.*, 29, 21-30, 2. Cf. CYDONES, Letter 167, 36-38; 222, 86-92.

2. The Foreign Policy of Byzantium from 1354 to 1379

When John V Palaeologus, after two years of civil war, penetrated into Constantinople the night of 22 November 1354 ⁽¹¹⁾, his father-in-law, John VI Cantacuzenus, who was still in a position to resist, preferred to negotiate with his younger adversary. It was agreed that the two Emperors should once more rule together. But this joint reign did not last long for on 10 December John Cantacuzenus abdicated and took the monastic habit ⁽¹²⁾. During the few days separating these two events, a council presided over by Cantacuzenus with his younger colleague at his side deliberated about the policy to follow towards the Turks ⁽¹³⁾, who at the beginning of the year had occupied Gallipoli and founded what was to become European Turkey or Rumelia ⁽¹⁴⁾. John V and the younger councillors were determined to have recourse to arms. Cantacuzenus advised against this; in his opinion the Empire was ill-prepared for such a venture. However, the war party carried the day.

The result was calamitous ⁽¹⁵⁾. A year after the capture of Gallipoli, Constantinople was paying its first tribute to the Ottomans ⁽¹⁶⁾, but this setback did not discourage the young

⁽¹¹⁾ CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 39 : III, p. 284, 18-22 ; Nicephorus GREGORAS, *Byzantina Historia*, ed. L. SCHOPEN and I. BEKKER, 3 vols. (Bonn, 1829-1855), Bk. 29, ch. 27 : III, p. 241, 17-242, 3. The date is given in a short notice in *cod. Laurent. Plut. LXXXV*, fol. 2, ed. S. LAMPROS, *N. E.* 14 (1917), 403.

⁽¹²⁾ CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 42 : III, p. 307, 4-7 ; Nicephorus GREGORAS, Bk. 29, ch. 30 : III, p. 243, 18-244, 3 ; *N. E.*, *loc. cit.* In 1349 Cantacuzenus had planned to retire with Nicholas Cabasilas and Demetrius Cydones to the monastery of St Mamas, then to that of the Mangana. But in 1354 he became a monk in the monastery of Charsianites, also called the New Peribleptos : Testament of the Patriarch Matthew I. edited by H. HUNGER, "Das Testament des Patriarchen Matthaios I (1397-1410)", *B. Z.* 51 (1958), 288-309, esp. 299, 3-17. Ducas had him enter the monastery of Peribleptos : ch. 11, 4 : p. 69, 24-26 (Grecu) : 42, 19-21 (Bonn).

⁽¹³⁾ CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 40 : III, p. 294, 24-300, 15.

⁽¹⁴⁾ *B. X.* 52, 22-25, p. 89.

⁽¹⁵⁾ CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 40 : III, p. 300, 15-17.

⁽¹⁶⁾ In his discourse *De non reddenda Callipoli* (*P. G.* 154, 1009-1036), Cydones recalls the disastrous consequence of its occupation by the Turks

Emperor. From the moral aspect indeed, John V Palaeologus was a sad figure, but when he really wanted something he did not hesitate to pay the price required. For almost twenty years, with the exception of a brief truce in 1358, he carried on the struggle against the Turks. For this he relied upon help from the Christian West, which is evident not so much from narrative sources, which are scarce, as from the way in which he acted.

For some twenty years, John V strove to win the friendship and alliance of one Latin prince after another. In the summer of 1355 he gave his sister Maria in marriage to Francesco Gatiluso, a determined foe of the Turks, and also bestowed on him the lordship of Lesbos⁽¹⁷⁾. At about the same time he granted the Genoese Mahona the island of Chios⁽¹⁸⁾. In December he signed a formal promise of church union in order to obtain the support of the Roman Church⁽¹⁹⁾. He renewed this promise of union in November 1357 in the hands of the Papal Nuncio, St Peter Thomas, or, more correctly, he made a positive profession of the Roman faith, which he repeated in a letter to Pope Innocent VI on 7 November. This declaration appeared so positive and certain that the Nuncio administered Holy Communion to him as to a Catholic⁽²⁰⁾. About the same time, he renewed, without any difficulty the quinquennial treaty with Venice, as he did again in 1363 and 1370⁽²¹⁾. Although he concluded a

in 1354: "When at the time of the general confusion caused by the earthquake in the Hellespont and the Propontis, that place fell into the power of the barbarians, they brought under subjection the entire Chersonese and seized cities in Thrace and a year had not gone by when they imposed a tribute on us and put our suburbs to sack". P. G. 154, 1012 D. The earthquake occurred on 2 March 1354 and was followed by the Turkish occupation of Gallipoli: B. X. 52, 22-25, p. 89.

(17) DUCAS, ch. 12, 5: p. 73 (Grecu): 46, 11-14 (Bonn); *Chronicle Περί τῆς Μυτιλήνης*, ed. S. LAMPROS, N. E. 6 (1909), 39, 1-5.

(18) The grant was made on 7 June 1355 and was confirmed again on 14 June 1367: Philip P. ARGENTI, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346-1566*, vol. II, *Codex and Documents* (Cambridge, 1958), 173-177.

(19) HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 31 ss.

(20) *The Life of Saint Peter Thomas by Philippe de Mézières*, ed. J. SMET (Rome, 1954), p. 75, 11-24. Letter to Innocent VI: p. 76-79.

(21) *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, pars II (1351-1454), ed. G. M. THOMAS (Venice, 1899) — the treaty was renewed on 8 October 1357: no. 21,

truce with the Turkish Emir Orkhan in 1358, still, in the following year his ships joined those of the Papal Legate in an attack against Lampsacus in Ottoman territory⁽²²⁾. In 1362 he negotiated with the ambassadors of the Venetian Doge, Lorenzo Celsi, who had proposed an anti-Turkish league⁽²³⁾. Two years later, as proof of his good will, he offered Pope Urban V his participation in the crusade against Egypt which King Peter I of Cyprus and St Peter Thomas were then preparing⁽²⁴⁾. In 1365-1366 he went in person to Buda to seek assistance from Louis d'Anjou, King of Hungary. The following year he accepted the aid of his cousin, Amedeo VI, Count of Savoy, who recaptured Gallipoli from the Turks, and he promised him that he would come to Rome to make his profession of the Catholic faith. Finally, in 1369-1371 he fulfilled this promise and both in Rome and in Venice he conducted negotiations which should have led to the military aid he needed. It is well known that the results did not at all correspond to the hopes he entertained⁽²⁵⁾, and perhaps this disappointment occasioned the radical change which took place in Byzantine foreign policy a short while afterwards.

At about the time that John V returned to Constantinople (28 October 1371)⁽²⁶⁾, he must have learned of the crushing defeat Murad had inflicted on the Serbs at the Maritza river on 26 September when the Serbian King Vukašin with his brothers Gojko and John Ugleša, Despot of Southeastern Macedonia, fell in battle⁽²⁷⁾. The Turks could now raid at will through Macedonia

p. 39-43 (although not without some difficulty, cf. THIRIET, *Régestes*, 291, p. 80; 299, p. 82; 303, p. 83); on 13 March 1363: no. 53, p. 87-92 (cf. THIRIET, *Régestes*, 402, p. 104); on 1 February 1379: no. 89, p. 151-156.

(22) *The Life of Saint Peter Thomas*, p. 85, 8-10.

(23) F. THIRIET, "Una proposta di lega antiturca tra Venezia, Genova e Bisanzio nel 1363", *Archivio Storico Italiano* 113 (1955), 321-334.

(24) RAYNALDUS, 1364, no. 27.

(25) Cydones described the results in these words: "It was only a wasted effort without any profit at all to our fatherland": Letter 37, 5; cf. also Letter 168, 28.

(26) B. X. 47, 32, p. 81.

(27) B. X. 20, 3, p. 37; 33, 1, p. 61; *Chronicon Breve Thessalonicense*, ed. R. J. LOENERTZ, *Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance*, I, cap. 7, p. 175; *Serbische Annalen*, ed. J. BOGDAN, *Archiv für Slavische Philologie* 13 (1891), p. 521; *Stari srpski Rodoslovi i Letopisi*, ed. Lj. STOJANOVIĆ, *Zbornik za*

to Thessaly and Albania. Yet John persisted in his anti-Turkish policy. In a chrysobull of autumn-winter 1371, he gave to Manuel the city of Thessalonica and the lands which he should take from the Serbs, and expressed the hope that he would be able to defend them against the Turks⁽²⁸⁾. Probably before this, Manuel had entered and taken possession of the city of Serres in November 1371⁽²⁹⁾. The Turks, however, soon turned their attention back to Macedonia. On 10 April 1372 they attacked Thessalonica which Manuel had left by ship four days previously⁽³⁰⁾. Exactly why Manuel left the city on the eve of the Turkish attack is not clear. At any rate, the city proved too strong and was not taken. In the absence of Manuel the Emperor had named the Grand Primicerius Phacrasas, acting governor of the city⁽³¹⁾.

The first indication we have that John V and Murad had come to an understanding is about a year later, during the first rebellion of Andronicus. Furious at the treachery of his eldest son, John

Istoriju jezika i književnost srpskog naroda, ser. I, 16 (1927), no. 582, p. 208-209. Cf. K. JIREČEK, *Geschichte der Serben*, I (Gotha, 1911), 438-439.

Shortly after the battle of the Maritza a Turkish fleet raided Mt Athos, but was repulsed by the Grand Primicerius with the aid of three Venetian galleys: F. HALKIN, "La vie de Saint Niphon ermite au Mont Athos (XIV S.)", *Analecta Bollandiana* 58 (1940), cap. 18, p. 24-25. The same event is also recorded in a letter of Alexius, Lord of Christopolis and other cities, to the doge of Venice in August 1374: *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum*, II, no. 98b, p. 165-166.

⁽²⁸⁾ Chrysobull of John V, ed. K. E. ZACHARIAE VON LINGENTHAL, cited above, p. 1421-1422.

⁽²⁹⁾ Notice in *cod. Protaton* 21, edited by P. N. PAPAGEORGIOU, "Αἱ Σέρραι καὶ τὰ προάστεια, τὰ περὶ τῆς Σέρρας, καὶ ἡ μονὴ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Προδρόμου", *B. Z.* 3 (1893), 225-329; 316, n. 2. Cf. HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 247; P. LEMERLE, *Philippe et la Macédoine Orientale* (Paris 1945), 214 ss; JIREČEK, *op. cit.*, I, 383-439.

⁽³⁰⁾ *Chronicon Breve Thessalonicense*, cap. 6, p. 175.

⁽³¹⁾ CYDONES, Letter 77, 25-26. The Turkish attack on Thessalonica and vicinity would seem to have been of brief duration. In August 1373, Anna Cantacuzena Palaeologina, wife of the Grand Domestic, Demetrius Palaeologus, gave to the convent of Dochiariou the property of Mariana in Kalamaria, a subdivision of the theme of Thessalonica. After having been in Serbian hands for a long time, "it has just been restored with other lands to Byzantine rule", even though practically stripped of its inhabitants and resources. Edited by C. KTENAS, "Χρυσόβουλλοι λόγοι τῆς μονῆς τοῦ Δοχειαρίου", *E. E. B. Z.* 4 (1927), 284-311; 301, 29-32.

V came to an agreement with the Turkish Emir, who was in pursuit of his own rebellious son, and at least allowed him to cross the Bosphorus and march through Constantinople with a large army⁽³²⁾, although it is not clear whether John himself took the field with Murad. After the defeat of the rebels, John V had Andronicus blinded at the command of Murad, or at least, in accord with a previous agreement⁽³³⁾. These actions may merely imply a temporary alliance with the Turk occasioned by the insurrection of the two princes or they may mean that a formal Greco-Turkish entente had already taken place⁽³⁴⁾. In any event, it was not until a year later that news of it reached the West.

On 13 November 1372 Pope Gregory XI had invited John V and other Christian rulers to a congress set for the following year in Thebes to form an anti-Turkish league⁽³⁵⁾. The Pope would certainly have composed a different sort of letter if he had suspected that the Greeks were allied with the Turks. In a letter to John V of 21 June 1373 the Pope expressed his intention of assembling a western fleet to aid him to drive off the Turks, who, according to the reports reaching Avignon, had practically surrounded Constantinople, Thessalonica and certain other territories⁽³⁶⁾.

⁽³²⁾ B. X. 47, 37-39, p. 81.

⁽³³⁾ Cf. sources cited above, p. 27, n. 2.

⁽³⁴⁾ According to Chalcocondyles (I, 47, 19), John made a treaty with Murad shortly after he returned from Venice and it was in accord with this that he was campaigning with Murad in Asia Minor before May 1373. However, his account of the rebellion is confusing and in places contradictory. Cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "La première insurrection d'Andronic IV Paléologue (1373)", *E. O.* 38 (1939), 337-339. P. CHARANIS places the alliance in 1372, in accordance with Chalcocondyles' account of the joint Asiatic campaign in spring 1373: "The Strife among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370-1402", *Byzantion* 16 (1942/43), 293. A Bulgarian Chronicle speaks vaguely of friendship between John and Murad after the rebellion of Andronicus: *Bulgarische Chronik von 1296-1413*, ed. J. BOGDAN, *Archiv für Slavische Philologie* 13 (1891), p. 528.

⁽³⁵⁾ RAYNALDUS, 1372, no. 29; *D. O. C.* 336, p. 423-424. Cf. HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 254-260; K. SETTON, *Catalan Domination of Athens 1311-1388* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 77-78; R. J. LOENERTZ, "Athènes et Néopatrias", *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 28 (1958), 5-91, no. 176, p. 66. Actually, the congress does not seem to have taken place.

⁽³⁶⁾ RAYNALDUS, 1373, no. 2. John Lascaris Calopheros, from whom the

Early in 1374 (4 February) the Pope sought the cooperation of Venice in assembling a naval force against the Turks. The Doge (Andrea Contarini), writing on 4 April 1374, gave a non-committal answer. He thought it best to send some papal envoys to exhort John to remain constant in his struggle against the Turks and to offer him western help to this end: even in the case that the Greeks might not want western aid he advised awaiting the return of the envoys before coming to any decision⁽³⁷⁾. The Pope apparently followed this counsel and ambassadors were named although they did not leave for the East until autumn⁽³⁸⁾.

In a letter to the Hospitallers of 21 September 1374 there is found the first indication that the Pope knew of a treaty with the Turks: *praesertim moderno tempore, quo inter Grecos et Turchos quedam impia colligatio adversus fideles Christi, ut dicitur, esse factam et ex certis aliis causis subiacet manifeste*⁽³⁹⁾. But the Venetians, whose commercial interests would have been affected by any such treaty, were aware of the alliance in July: *Intelleximus nuper nova de armata, que fit per dominum imperatorem Constantinopolitanum et per Moratum*, and the senate instructed the Captain of the Gulf to learn more about a situation which could prove dangerous to Venetian shipping⁽⁴⁰⁾. The same concern is shown in deliberations of the senate of 18 and 27 July⁽⁴¹⁾. The treaty, then, became known in the West in spring or early summer of 1374. Most probably it was not a formal alliance against the West, but rather an agreement by which John V in some form or other recognized Turkish suzerainty and promised to furnish Murad I with military assistance when requested.

John V must have felt that he had to apologize in some way, and before mid-December 1374 his envoy, Philip Tzycandyles, came before the Pope to explain the blinding of Andronicus and

Pope may well have received this information, and Cydones are suggested in the letter as suitable intermediaries: HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 272, 281.

⁽³⁷⁾ The text of the Venetian reply is given by HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, no. 27, p. 390-391; cf. *ibid.*, p. 290-291.

⁽³⁸⁾ HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 292-297.

⁽³⁹⁾ The letter is given in RAYNALDUS, 1374, no. 7, but without the beginning and end, which are edited by HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 301, n. 3.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ Dated 14 July 1374: HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 301; THIRIET, *Régestes*, 541, p. 134.

⁽⁴¹⁾ HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 301, n. 4; THIRIET, *Régestes*, 545-546, p. 135.

the treaty with the Turks⁽⁴²⁾. The Pope observed that the Emperor limited himself to vain excuses: his actions were beyond human judgement and he could only sympathize with him and offer condolences: he also warned him against the faithlessness of the Turks and reminded him that the only salvation for the Greeks lay in union with the Latins. On 28 January 1375 in his answer to a letter of John's the Pope complained about the persecution of converts to Catholicism in Constantinople and pointed out that such actions scarcely served as an incentive for the Catholic West to aid him against the Turks. The Pope had also learned "that those Turks, after the truce (*treugam*) which you have made with them, have entered the city in no small multitude and there dare to perform many horrible deeds, and we fear that they may deceive your Majesty and occupy the city" ⁽⁴³⁾.

What had led John V to make this complete about-face in his foreign policy and to ally himself with the Ottoman Turks, the mortal enemies of his Empire? The answer can probably be traced to his disillusionment, especially after his return from Italy in 1371, when he came to realize that western Christendom would furnish him with little more than words and promises in his struggle against the Turks. He complained about this to the Pope and, in particular, reminded him that in 1366 King Louis of Hungary had promised aid if John would become a Catholic. Yet, despite his conversion, no help had come. At the Greek Emperor's request, then, Gregory wrote to Louis⁽⁴⁴⁾, but, as might have been expected, no effective answer was made.

Relying on the reports of the papal envoys who had returned from Byzantium towards the end of October 1375, Gregory wrote a series of letters from which we can form an idea of the situation in Constantinople at this time⁽⁴⁵⁾. The Emperor of Constantino-

⁽⁴²⁾ John's letter is not extant and we can only reconstruct its contents from the Pope's reply of 13 December 1374: RAYNALDUS, 1374, no. 4. Cf. HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 305-306.

⁽⁴³⁾ RAYNALDUS (1375, no. 4) omits the beginning. The complete text is found in L. WADDING, *Annales Minorum*, VIII (Quaracchi, 1932), 356-357. The same day the Pope wrote to Manuel II in practically identical terms: *ibid.*, 357.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ Dated 18 January: RAYNALDUS, 1375, no. 6.

⁽⁴⁵⁾ Letter to Louis of Hungary, 27 October 1375: RAYNALDUS, 1375, no. 7-8, and to Queen Joanna of Sicily, same date, edited in WADDING,

ple has been so oppressed by the Turks that, finding himself without any help, he has been forced to become tributary to them; only by entering into a treaty and alliance with them (*certa concordia et colligatio*) could he hope to save his Empire. Yet this does not remove the danger from Constantinople, for the Turks cannot be trusted to maintain their agreement. And, the Pope insists, if Constantinople falls, all the other Christian lands in the East will also be lost. Not only have the Greek territories become tributary to the Turks, but as Gregory says, *fere in eorum manibus consistunt*. All the destruction, the enslavement of Christians by the Turks has come about, he adds, "because of the negligence of Christians" (⁴⁶).

Byzantine policy towards Venice had also undergone a decided reversal. Whereas John V had found no difficulty in renewing the earlier five-year treaties which regulated Veneto-Byzantine relations, he did not seem at all inclined to renew the treaty which expired on 1 February 1375. His actions were so dilatory, in fact, that Andrea Gradenigo, the Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople, wrote about his bad will in the matter (⁴⁷). It needed a show of Venetian naval strength to make the Emperor consent (⁴⁸).

However, the alliance of John V with Murad was brusquely interrupted for three years before being resumed in a manner less favorable for the Greeks. When, before mid-July 1376, Andronicus IV escaped from prison and fled to the Genoese colony of Pera, he immediately made contact with the Ottoman Emir and in return for Turkish soldiers promised an annual tribute, certain rights in the city and the cession of Gallipoli. Supported by both Turks and Genoese, Andronicus entered Constantinople (⁴⁹) and, after consolidating his position in the city, went,

op. cit., 362-363, and in *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane* 25 (1900), no. 167, p. 6-8.

(⁴⁶) Letter to Knights in Bohemia, etc., 8 March 1375: RAYNALDUS, 1375, no. 9.

(⁴⁷) Dated 24 July 1375: THIRIET, *Régestes*, 566, p. 140. The Senate instructed him to make a final effort and if this failed to return to Venice. In November he was back in Venice: *ibid.*, 567, p. 140; 575, p. 142.

(⁴⁸) R. J. LOENERTZ "Notes d'histoire et de chronologie byzantines", *R. E. B.* 17 (1959), 166-167.

(⁴⁹) Cf. Sources cited above, p. 29, n. 9. Chalcoeandyles has Andronicus

on 3 September, to Murad in Asia Minor to conclude or confirm the treaty with him⁽⁵⁰⁾. Demetrius Cydones, in a letter written the winter after these events to John Lascaris Calopheros in Rome, has left us a description of the condition of the Greek capital as a result of this rebellion of Andronicus.

Know then that personally I feel well, but I suffer in common with the city about which nothing good can be reported. For the old scourge, the Turks, roused to arrogance by the alliance which they concluded with the new Emperor against his father, have become more oppressive for us. Thus they received Gallipoli as compensation for this and seized many other things belonging to us and exacted such an amount of money that nobody could easily count it. Still, they claim that they are not sufficiently paid for their aid. They command everything and we must obey or else be imprisoned. To such a point have they risen in power and we been reduced to slavery⁽⁵¹⁾.

Obviously Murad had found Andronicus a more pliant vassal and easier to control than his father, while Venice was to find him more difficult. The understanding of Andronicus with the Genoese was based on the cession of Tenedos. If this island at the entrance to the Dardanelles fell into Genoese hands it would present a critical danger to Venetian trade routes⁽⁵²⁾. Shortly after entering Constantinople, Andronicus, on 23 August, ceded Tenedos to the Genoese *pro sincera dilectione amoris et obsequio ac adiutorio que presentibus temporibus demonstraverunt*⁽⁵³⁾. When the Genoese, however, arrived at the island with letters of Andronicus, the garrison, loyal to John V, refused to surrender the

visit Bajezid. Caresini (32, 14-20) and Caroldo (fol. 398) state that Andronicus also promised his sister to Murad, but that she died opportunely; however, this is found in no other source.

(50) B. X. 47, 57-58, p. 81; Iacobus ZENO, *Vita Caroli Zeni*, ed. G. ZONTA, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 19, 6 (Bologna, 1940), 14, 3-4. Murad took Gallipoli in 1377, i. e. after 1 September 1376: B. X. 45, 6-7, p. 77.

(51) CYDONES, Letter 167, 11-20.

(52) Cf. F. THIRIET, "Venise et l'occupation de Ténédos au XIV^e siècle", *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire* 65 (1953), 220.

(53) *Liber Iurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, II, no. 250, p. 819-821; BELGRANO, "Documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera", no. 24, p. 131; CAROLDO, fol. 398; Georgius STELLA, *Annales Genuenses*, MURATORI, 17, 1106 D-E; CYDONES, Letter 167, 21-22.

fortress and the island to them, and empty-handed they had to return to Constantinople ⁽⁵⁴⁾.

The Venetians lost no time and in October 1376, with the consent of the inhabitants, occupied Tenedos and proceeded to strengthen its fortifications ⁽⁵⁵⁾. Andronicus vented his anger on what Venetians he could find. Pietro Grimani, the Venetian Bailie in Constantinople was imprisoned together with a number of Venetian merchants, whose goods were confiscated; he also held a small Venetian ship *per sdegno* ⁽⁵⁶⁾. Cydones described the situation in these words:

The Emperor promised Tenedos to the Genoese while he was among them after he escaped from prison. But the Venetians, anticipating this, have seized the island, and now, after securing it and its fortress with walls, provisions, men and everything that makes a fortress impregnable, they have gone home, hoping to return in the spring with many triremes. But the Genoese cannot bear to keep the peace while their rivals hold Tenedos, for they believe that they would thus be deprived of access to the sea and of the profits of maritime commerce, a thing which is more terrible to them than if they were driven out of their own country. Therefore, they aim to invest the island with triremes, ships, engines of war and everything else that those who go to war invent. And they compel the Emperor to cooperate with them, for otherwise, they say, he would connive with the Venetians in their robbery and prefer them to the Genoese. The Emperor, in order to avoid all suspicion, has agreed to ally himself with them and now, in the midst of so much misery, he is preparing arms, munitions, engines of war and ships, and is forced to hire troops, a thing which for him is more difficult than flying. But what makes one consider these evils light, although they are really grave, are the ills of within. For the father and the brothers [of Andronicus] still live shut up in places whence there is no escape... For these reasons, men expect in the evening to hear of new things with sunrise, whereas the day makes them fear that night will bring some grave misfortune. So that everyone, as in a tempest, runs the risk of sinking ⁽⁵⁷⁾.

⁽⁵⁴⁾ CHINAZZO, 18 (711 C); *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, 757 A.

⁽⁵⁵⁾ LOENERTZ, "Notes d'histoire et de chronologie byzantines", 167; CARESINI, 32, 24-28; CHINAZZO, 19 (711 D); *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, 757 A-C; MARINO SANUDO, *Vita de' Duchi di Venezia*, MURATORI 22, 679 E; ANDREA NAVAGIERO, *Storia della Repubblica Veneziana*, MURATORI 23, 1057 A; STELLA, *Annales Genuenses*, 1106 E; *Vita Caroli Zeni*, 14, 16-27; CYDONES, Letter 167, 22-25.

⁽⁵⁶⁾ CARESINI, 32, 22-23; CHINAZZO, 20 (711 E); *Chronicon Tarvisinum*, 757 D; NAVAGIERO, *Storia d. Repubblica Veneziana*, 1057 A.

⁽⁵⁷⁾ CYDONES, Letter 167, 21-40.

Venice continued its preparations for the defense of its newly gained territory. In May 1377 the republic's fleet in eastern waters was reinforced by two more ships under the command of Carlo Zeno and Michele Steno⁽⁵⁸⁾. On 16 July the fleet of fourteen ships under Steno and Donato Tron arrived before Constantinople and was joined on 22 July by Vittorio Pisani. They attacked the city, caused some damage and suffered fifteen dead; on the 26th they sailed back to Tenedos. Without the support from within the city which they had expected, they were unable to accomplish much except to recover a single Venetian ship, perhaps the one Andronicus had taken in October 1376⁽⁵⁹⁾. At the beginning of August most of the galleys left Tenedos, leaving Carlo Zeno with three ships and some 300 soldiers to see to the defense of the island⁽⁶⁰⁾.

About the same time the Genoese had sent a fleet of ten ships under Aaron de Strupa to the East⁽⁶¹⁾. In November Andronicus and his Ligurian allies with some thirty-two ships attacked Tenedos. But, owing in large measure to the vigorous leadership of Carlo Zeno, who was wounded in the battle, the Greco-Genoese force, after three or four days of bloody fighting, had to return to Constantinople with heavy losses⁽⁶²⁾.

By the summer of 1379 the brief reign of Andronicus IV could show the following results: he had reduced Byzantium to an even more servile state of subjection to the Ottomans, to whom he had given the strategically located Gallipoli. His alliance with the Genoese had brought him only a Venetian attack (albeit of no great consequence) on his city and the loss of much equipment and many troops in an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the Venetians from Tenedos.

⁽⁵⁸⁾ *Vita Caroli Zeni*, 14, note 2.

⁽⁵⁹⁾ V. LAZZARINI, "Due Documenti sulla guerra di Chioggia". *Nuovo Archivio Veneto* 12 (1896), 140-141; *Vita Caroli Zeni*, 14, 40-15, 4; SANUDO, *Vita de' Duchi di Venezia*, 680 B.

⁽⁶⁰⁾ LAZZARINI, *loc. cit.*; *Vita Caroli Zeni*, 15, 4-5.

⁽⁶¹⁾ STELLA, 1107.

⁽⁶²⁾ CHINAZZO, 21 (712 B); SANUDO, *Vita de' Duchi di Venezia*, 680 B-C; *Vita Caroli Zeni*, 15, 7-40.

3. The Civil War of 1379-1381

Sometime about June 1379 John V and his two sons, Manuel and Theodore, managed to escape from the Anemas tower where they had been confined by Andronicus⁽⁶³⁾. Immediately they went to Murad in Asia Minor to seek aid. To bring him to reject Andronicus, they must have made sweeping concessions including the payment of tribute and military assistance. With troops of Murad they returned to Constantinople, which they entered by the Charisios gate on the first of July. Andronicus had no intention of surrendering the throne without a struggle and fled to Pera with his family, taking along as hostages his mother, the Empress Helen, her father, the ex-Emperor John Cantacuzenus (now the monk Joasaph), and her sisters⁽⁶⁴⁾.

He had left behind him in the large fortress of Constantinople (Blachernes?) a garrison of some 300 Genoese, who could be expected to hold the limited forces of John V in check. Fortunately for the old Emperor, within a few days there arrived several Venetian ships, whose captains, although at first reluctant to risk their vessels and crews in an assault on such a strong position, finally yielded to the prayers of the Greeks, *grandi e picholi*, who kept shouting *Viva San Marco*⁽⁶⁵⁾. The first attack took

(⁶³) B. X. 15, 19-22, p. 32; 52, 14-37, p. 89; CHALC., I, 57, 4-58, 5; *Chron. Vat.* 162, 13, p. 208; DUCAS, ch. 12, 4: p. 73, 17-24 (Grecu): 45, 20-46, 6 (Bonn); CYDONES, Letter 222, 86-92. Ducas mentions a mysterious person who aided them to escape, a certain Angelos, also called Diabolangelos: ch. 12, 4: p. 73, 14-17 (Grecu): 45, 15-19 (Bonn). B. X. 15 merely remarks that the escape was *θρυμμαστικῶς*.

(⁶⁴) B. X. 52, 36-37 p. 89; *Chron. Vat.* 162, 14, p. 209. According to CYDONES, Letter 222, 92-125, the Empress was accused of complicity in John's escape. For this reason she was imprisoned with her father and her sisters. Denied even the most necessary servants and subjected to fierce, uncouth jailors, she was enclosed in a besieged fortress where the defenders were suffering from plague and famine.

(⁶⁵) CHINAZZO, 214-216 (748 B - 749 A). The ships had left Venice on 10 June, arriving in Constantinople in mid-July: *ibid.* Cf. also CARESINI, 36, 9-16; CAROLDO, fol. 423; NAVAGIERO, 1058 C; SANUDO, 683 C. Many of the Venetian sources give Carlo Zeno the leading role in restoring John V to his throne: *Vita Caroli Zeni*, 23, 1-5; CARESINI, 36, 15-16, *et al.* How-

place on 28 July but resulted only in heavy losses for the Venetians, who then began to mine under the fortifications. After their siege engines had destroyed three towers and a good part of the walls, the Greeks and Venetians again attacked and, on 4 August, forced the Genoese defenders to surrender.

John V now had the city of Constantinople in his hands, but Andronicus and the Genoese were firmly entrenched on the other side of the Golden Horn, so, with his allies, John then laid siege to Pera, the Venetians by sea and the Turks by land ⁽⁶⁶⁾. Other allies also came to the Emperor's aid; there was a great shortage of food in besieged Pera so that famine resulted, and the town was also visited by the plague ⁽⁶⁷⁾.

During this period of civil war the sources have very little to report about John V or Manuel, but they do provide two items of interest regarding John's youngest son, Theodore. Before being imprisoned with his father and brother in October 1376, he had been designated as governor of Thessalonica ⁽⁶⁸⁾. After his escape in June 1379 and before his new appointment as governor of the Morea, he issued a *prostagma*, later confirmed by Manuel II, granting the *monydron* of St Photis in Thessalonica to Alexis Angelus, Caesar of Thessaly ⁽⁶⁹⁾.

ever, Zeno remained at Tenedos while some of the ships under his command aided the Emperor.

⁽⁶⁶⁾ CHINAZZO, 217 (749 C-D); STELLA, 1113 A. On 11 September 1379 eleven Venetian galleys under Bertuzzi Pisani left to aid John V in Constantinople, but on the way Pisani was killed in an attack on Turkish Samothrace: CHINAZZO, 217 (749 E). STELLA (*loc. cit.*) refers to the enemies of the Genoese as *Venetos, Graecos, Teucros, Burgaros, et alios Orientales legi Christianae contrarios*.

⁽⁶⁷⁾ STELLA 1113 A; CYDONES, Letter 222, 111-116.

⁽⁶⁸⁾ MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 27, 14-23. Andronicus and Murad were willing to allow Theodore to take possession of his governorship, Thessalonica "and other cities", and although John V at first agreed to this, he later changed his mind.

⁽⁶⁹⁾ This is clear from a document of Alexis, dated December 1389: V. LAURENT, "Une nouvelle fondation monastique des Choumnos: la *Néa Moni* de Thessalonique", *R. E. B.* 13 (1955), 109-132; the text is published on p. 129-130; Cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Un *prostagma* perdu de Théodore I Paléologue regardant Thessalonique (1380/82 ?)", *E. E. B. Σ.* 25 (1955), 170-172.

On 7 April 1380 the Despot Manuel Cantacuzenus, governor of the Morea, died childless and his older brother, the ex-Emperor Matthew, took over the reins of government provisionally⁽⁷⁰⁾. Sometime after this date and before May 1381 when the civil war in Constantinople came to an end, Theodore was nominated to rule the Morea⁽⁷¹⁾. However, he wished to remain in the capital until peace had been concluded, his father securely back on the throne, and his mother, grand-father and aunts released from Genoese captivity in Pera, and it was not until the year beginning 1 September 1382 that he actually arrived in the Morea⁽⁷²⁾.

The siege and intermittent fighting dragged on certainly for over a year, perhaps for two years. The Genoese chronicler, Giorgio Stella, recounts how Nicholas de Marco, Genoese Captain for land and sea in Pera, captured a large Greek galley with 300 men on the feast of St Michael the Archangel, patron of Pera, 29 September 1379⁽⁷³⁾. On 27 September 1380 Pietro Cornaro, Venetian ambassador to Milan, passed on to the Doge the news contained in a letter from a friend of his in Genoa: a Sicilian ship had just arrived from Romania, where the Emperor was still besieging Pera, although with only a small naval force⁽⁷⁴⁾. Undoubtedly a number of the Venetian ships which were aiding John V had been recalled to the Adriatic where they were more urgently needed. Towards the end of 1380 and the beginning of 1381 the hostilities must have drawing to a close and peace negotiations begun. On this point, though, the sources are not altogether clear. Giorgio Stella, after describing the naval battle of 29 September 1379, adds that John V and the Turks were so impressed with the Genoese fighting spirit that they made peace with them that same year⁽⁷⁵⁾. If the phrase, "that same year",

⁽⁷⁰⁾ B. X. 19, 15, p. 36; 27, 19, p. 46; MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 37, 5-9.

⁽⁷¹⁾ MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 34, 4-17.

⁽⁷²⁾ B. X. 19, 16, p. 36. He probably arrived in autumn 1382: R. J. LOENERTZ, "Pour l'histoire du Péloponnèse au XIV^e siècle (1382-1404)", *R. E. B.* 1 (1943), 163.

⁽⁷³⁾ STELLA, 1113 B-D.

⁽⁷⁴⁾ V. LAZZARINI, *Dispacci di Pietro Cornaro, ambasciatore a Milano durante la guerra di Chioggia* (*Mon. storici della R. Deputazione Veneta di Storia Patria*, ser. I, *Documenti*, 20; Venezia, 1939), no. 106, p. 133.

⁽⁷⁵⁾ STELLA 1113 E. But he would seem to exaggerate in presenting the Greco-Genoese armistice as a success of the colonists of Pera. Cydones,

could be taken in a rather wide sense (or if the battle had not taken place in 1379, but in 1380), his account would harmonize better with the other sources, although in speaking of a Greco-Genoese armistice he merits confidence, for it is certain that a reconciliation between John V and his oldest son would have been virtually impossible without a previous agreement with the Genoese of Pera, the chief supporters of Andronicus. This agreement must have taken place early in April 1381 for it was at about that time — before 24 April — that the Turks made peace with the Genoese⁽⁷⁶⁾ and it is most likely that the Greek Emperor arrived at an understanding with them at the same time as the Turks, his principal allies. The way was then open for an accord between the two Byzantine rulers, father and son.

Shortly before May 1381 a treaty of peace in due and proper form was signed by John V on the one side and Andronicus IV and his son John VII on the other. The agreement was drawn up, and perhaps written by Triboles⁽⁷⁷⁾ a personage whom we

at any rate, in alluding to the same event, presents it rather as a Byzantine victory: "The merchants [Genoese] also came to terms and, according to their custom, humbly genuflected before the Emperor. They admitted the shame they felt in appearing before His Majesty and did not hesitate to denounce as madness the war they had been waging until then. They solemnly swore that their alliance in the future would repair the unpleasantness of the past. They also promised that they would live in peace with us and would take up arms to defend the Great City [Constantinople] as though it were their own fatherland": Letter 219, 20-35. Cydones also declared that it was the Genoese, besieged in Pera, who were forced to sue for peace: Letter 220, 15-16.

(76) CRINAZZO, 178: On 11 April 1381 eight galleys under the command of Carlo Zeno and Michiel Steno left Venice and, after various adventures, were joined on April 24 by a galley from Negropont commanded by Antuon Ardoin. "et a di dito ad hore xxij. i deschoveri .ja. chocha et andò a quella e consela a hore .4. de nocte, la qual iera de Napolitani. Et da lor have per novella chome el Turcho aveva fato paxe con Çenovexi e con quelli de Pera et oltra dise chome Çenovexi non sperava de Romania aida de alguna galia, tanto iera quelle contrade a mala condicion".

(77) CYDONES, Letter 198, 26-29: "You will also see Triboles, become more important than ever, after the peace between the emperors. For it is he, in reality, who has reconciled the viewpoints of the two parties in writing and whose literary ability has consolidated the truce for us". The translation of G. Cammelli (ed. no. 8, 30-34) does not render this important phrase in its full force. The γράμματα of Triboles are not "letters", especially

find a bit later in the Morea as secretary, or perhaps chancellor, of the Despot Theodore⁽⁷⁸⁾. The text of the treaty has been lost, but its existence is known from a number of sources; Cydones, for example, alludes to it in several letters but without saying anything about its contents⁽⁷⁹⁾. Its approximate date and one of its principal clauses can be inferred from an act of the patriarchal synod which in May 1381 confirmed the agreement, threatening eventual transgressors with ecclesiastical penalties⁽⁸⁰⁾. Ducas also notes an important clause, which is not mentioned in the patriarchal document⁽⁸¹⁾.

The treaty was actually a compromise, for by it John V recognized Andronicus IV and John VII as heirs to the throne, and sacrificed Manuel II. Thereafter as *basileus* and heir apparent to the throne of Byzantium, Andronicus governed a territory comprising Selymbria, Daneion, Heraclea in Thrace, Rhaidestos and Panidos⁽⁸²⁾. He established his court with his family in Selymbria, which then became an imperial residence and a capital and remained so until 1399, for after the death of Andronicus in 1385 his son John VII succeeded him⁽⁸³⁾.

There is not a word about Manuel II in any of the sources which mention the peace treaty between John V and Andronicus IV. Yet, one point in particular would be of special interest, the compensation to be given to Manuel. He lost his rights to the

not private letters. If the negotiations had been carried on by correspondence they would have been imperial letters but, since the two residences, Constantinople and Pera, were so close, the negotiations could well have been conducted orally and the task of harmonizing the opposed viewpoints would have been done by the one who drew up the document, surely an *ὀρχηστρικὸν γράμμα*.

(78) CYDONES, Letter 421, to Theodore. Cf. also Letter 293 to the same and Letter 9 of MANUEL II (LEGRAND, p. 12) addressed to Tribolès in the Morea.

(79) CYDONES, Letters 155; 198; 201; 218; 219; 220; 222.

(80) *M. M.*, II, no. 344, p. 25-27.

(81) DUCAS, ch. 12, 4: p. 73, 25-28 (Grecu): 46, 6-10 (Bonn).

(82) DUCAS, *loc. cit.*

(83) *B. X.* 15, 50-54, p. 32-33; 18, 12-16, p. 35; *CHALC.*, I, 78, 12-19; R. J. LOENERTZ, "Fragment d'une lettre de Jean V Paléologue à la commune de Gènes 1387-1391", *B. Z.* 51 (1958), 37-40. For the peace of 1399 between Manuel II and John VII, cf. F. DÖLGER, "Johannes VII., Kaiser der Rhomäer 1390-1408", *B. Z.* 31 (1931), 31.

throne acquired in 1373. What did he receive in their place? It would seem reasonable to suppose that he was destined to resume the position he had held before 1373, that is, the lifetime governorship of Thessalonica and Macedonia, a supposition justified at first sight by the fact that Manuel actually did resume the government of Thessalonica. This conclusion, however, is rendered untenable by two well-attested facts: 1) Cydones makes it clear that Manuel, in order to go to Thessalonica, had to leave Constantinople secretly⁽⁸⁴⁾; 2) Isidore Glabas mentions that Manuel was not expected in Thessalonica when he arrived there⁽⁸⁵⁾. These two facts are inexplicable if Manuel, at the time of the agreement of 1381, had by an express clause, or even by a tacit understanding, recovered his rights to Thessalonica. If there were indeed no such clause, then the sacrifice imposed on Manuel was all the more costly and leads one to wonder whether the conflict between father and son, so manifest in 1387, had not its origins much earlier.

4. From the Byzantine Peace of 1381 to the Greco-Genoese Treaty of 1382

The Chioggia war between Venice and Genoa, of which the Byzantine civil strife was only one aspect, came to an end with the peace treaty sponsored by Count Amedeo VI of Savoy in Turin on 8 August 1381⁽⁸⁶⁾. The fortifications on Tenedos were to be levelled. The Genoese were to reconcile themselves with John V while the Venetians were to accept Andronicus' succession to the throne of Byzantium, and both Venetians and Genoese were to try to bring John V and his subjects back to the Catholic faith (either they had forgotten the Emperor's conversion some ten years previously or had ceased to regard him as a Catholic.

⁽⁸⁴⁾ CYDONES, Letter 203, 4-6; 243, 4; 247, 11.

⁽⁸⁵⁾ Sermon delivered on 26 November 1383, ed. B. LAOURDAS, 'Ἰσιδώρου ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης ὁμιλία εἰς τὰς ἐορτὰς τοῦ ἁγίου Δημητρίου, Ἑλληνικά, παράρτημα 5 (Thessalonica, 1954), 19-32; p. 31, 7-9.

⁽⁸⁶⁾ Text: *Liber Iurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, II, no. 256, p. 858-906.

perhaps because of the persecution of converts to Catholicism about which Pope Gregory XI had complained early in 1375).

While the peace treaty was being signed in Turin, the situation in Constantinople was showing no evidence of improving. Although the truce of April 1381 and the treaty between the two Emperors in May had put an end to the military operations against Pera and had secured the liberation of the hostages⁽⁸⁷⁾, relations between the recent adversaries were still strained and there may well have been some unpleasant incidents⁽⁸⁸⁾. Within the year negotiations were again undertaken with a view to establishing a more lasting peace, especially since, in the treaty of Turin, the Genoese had obliged themselves to come to an agreement with John V and to do their best to bring about a reconciliation between him and Andronicus IV. To implement this clause, Nicola Guarco, Doge of Genoa (1378-1383), on 30 April 1382 gave the necessary powers to two ambassadors, Pietro Lercari and Giuliano de Castro, who, together with Lorenzo Gentile, Podestà of Pera, were to negotiate with the Greeks⁽⁸⁹⁾. They probably arrived in Constantinople during the summer, and the treaty was signed on 2 November in the Palace of the Porphyrogenitus⁽⁹⁰⁾. But before analyzing the provisions of this treaty, it is necessary to study in some detail two letters of Demetrius Cydones which alone provide information on the activities of Manuel II between the truce of 1381 and his departure for Thessalonica in autumn 1382.

The two letters, no. 218 and 220, which are the first and third

(87) Their return is recalled in moving terms by Cydones a dozen years later: Letter 222.

(88) "... advertentes quemadmodum post pacem factam inter dictum dominum imperatorem Iohannem ex una parte et dominum imperatorem Andronicum eius filium ex altera parte, aliquae suspiciones et dubitationes remanserunt in cordibus eorum, et volentes ipsas sendare, tolere et extrahere de dictis eorum cordibus ..." From the preamble of the treaty of November 1382, cited in the following note. Because of the situation in Constantinople, Venice ordered her sailors to remain aboard ship in the port: Commission to the captain of the galleys of Romania, 14 August 1382: Venice, *Archivio di Stato, Senato, Misti* 37, fol. 106.

(89) Mentioned in the treaty of 2 November: text: BELGRANO, "Documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera" no. 26, p. 133-140.

(90) *Ibid.*

of Book XXII, were (according to the editor) addressed about May-June 1381 to the Emperor Manuel II during his sojourn in Turkey. It is most important to interpret them correctly and to begin by dating them correctly. Fortunately this is not difficult at all, particularly in the case of Letter 220, with which, for this reason, it is best to begin. Even a superficial reading of the letter reveals the following points: 1) The addressee is named and he is called *basileus*, not only in the address (which could leave room for doubt) but also in the text (line 29); 2) apart from him there are at least two other *basileis* who have just become reconciled (lines 4-5); 3) during the strife preceding this reconciliation Manuel II had taken an active and decisive part, going without sleep, counselling, engaging in combat on land and sea (lines 11-14); 4) he had been victorious and the enemy, besieged, had sued for peace (lines 14-16); 5) but at present Manuel is in a foreign land serving the barbarian (lines 8-9). After what has already been said about the civil war of 1379-1381, the land and sea blockade of Pera and the peace of April-May 1381, can it be doubted that this letter speaks precisely of this ensemble of events? As far as one can see, it was written soon after the conclusion of the peace between John V and Andronicus IV. It tells us this new and important fact, that Manuel II, without awaiting, so to speak, the formal signing of the treaty, left for Turkey. Perhaps he accompanied Murad to one of his residences, Adrianople or Brusa, when the siege of Pera, in which the Emir had taken part, was lifted early in April 1381.

In Letter 219 Cydones communicates to a very close friend (Rhadenos according to the editor) the good news that peace has been restored in the imperial family and between Byzantium and Pera. Evidently it is not mere chance if the two letters are found next to one another, for they are the second and third of Book XXII, nor is it likely that Letter 218, of particular interest here, belongs to a different epoch. Although it was written a short time earlier and is not as clear as Letter 220, still when read after this last the obscurities disappear. Read in the light of the information given by Letter 220, Letter 218 permits one to determine the following facts: 1) the letter was written in Constantinople, where the imperial palace is located and where the courtiers carry on their intrigues (lines 48 and 77); 2) the

emperor ruling in Byzantium is one whom Cydones had formerly served in an exalted position (line 54), obviously John V for whom Cydones had been chancellor and treasurer⁽⁹¹⁾; 3) the letter is written to another emperor, called by this title in the address and in the text (line 10); 4) this emperor, a very close friend, is celibate as is the writer (lines 32-33), without any doubt, Manuel II; 5) this emperor is far off and Cydones ardently desires his return to Constantinople (lines 76-77); 6) with him is a group of men who have left their wives behind in Constantinople (lines 33-37) — as much as to say, soldiers; 7) when this emperor (Manuel) left Constantinople Cydones had been ill, an illness which the prince had not taken seriously, but which he is now over (lines 11-14); 8) before Manuel's departure Cydones was praying to God for the common enemy, for the barbarian, but he has now ceased doing so (lines 15-19) — the barbarian, that is, Murad, had been their indispensable ally, and so Cydones had prayed for him, whereas now he is merely the master who profits from the service and tribute of Manuel and his companions in arms; 9) Cydones has just finished serving as interpreter in the negotiations between the emperor and the Genoese (lines 47 and 61) — the emperor being John V, the Genoese those of Pera and the negotiations most probably those which must have preceded and accompanied the treaty of peace between John V and the protégé of the Genoese, Andronicus IV, who had taken refuge in Pera.

If this interpretation of these letters is correct, then, at the conclusion of the civil war or soon afterwards, Manuel II was at the Ottoman Porte and during his sojourn there his father signed the peace treaty with his elder brother, thereby sacrificing the rights to the throne which his second son had acquired. Did Manuel know on what conditions peace would be established? Did he consent to these conditions and to what degree? To these serious questions the documents provide no answer. In recounting the sequence of events, then, the various possible answers must be taken into account and, unless new evidence comes to light to clarify the obscure points, our conclusions will not be completely free of doubt.

⁽⁹¹⁾ Chancellor (*mesazon*): Letter 50, 23; Treasurer: Letter 47, 38.

There is no way of determining the duration of Manuel's sojourn among the Turks, but it is certain that he returned to Constantinople before autumn 1382, for it was then that he secretly left the capital for Thessalonica⁽⁹²⁾. Probably he was in Constantinople for at least part of summer 1382 when the Greco-Genoese negotiations were in progress. As already mentioned, these negotiations culminated in the treaty of 2 November 1382, signed for the Genoese by the two plenipotentiaries, Lercari and de Castro, and by the Podestà of Pera. The Greek witnesses were Alexis Caballares, Thomas Ducas Alousianos, George Gudeles, Constantine Trichas, Theodore "Chonoxia" and Demetrius Caloidas (or Caludes: Kaloda)⁽⁹³⁾.

The original document, undoubtedly written on parchment, has been lost, although we know that the seal of the notary, Giovanni Allegretti, who wrote the Latin, was affixed, and that it had also been validated by the great wax seal of the commune of Pera. Fortunately though, a contemporary copy of the treaty on paper has been preserved in the archives of Genoa⁽⁹⁴⁾. The preamble recalls that after the peace (May 1381) made between John V and Andronicus IV "some suspicions and doubts remained in their hearts"; this new treaty is meant to confirm and consolidate that earlier one "so that they may live peacefully". The accord, therefore, between the two Emperors is, in a sense, guaranteed by the commune of Pera.

The essential clauses are the following:

1) John V obliges himself (a) not to wage war against Andronicus or John VII, his son, and to respect their territory;

(92) CYDONES, Letter 203, 4-6; 243, 4; 247, 11. The date will be justified in the following chapter.

(93) Thomas Alousianos was a friend and correspondent of Cydones: Letters 246, 208, 319. He had been a judge: *M. M.*, II, no. 597, p. 424. On 25 November 1383 he received Venetian citizenship: Venice, *Archivio di Stato*, *Privileggi* I, fol. 61. George Gudeles had been a chancellor like Cydones, who wrote Letter 357 to him. The others seem to be unknown.

(94) Genoa, *Archivio di Stato*, *Materie Politiche*, 2729 (formerly *Mazzo* 10), published by Belgrano: cf. above, p. 47, n. 89. On the reverse of this copy a fourteenth or fifteenth century hand has written: "M^o ccc^o lxxxii^o, Copia instrumenti pacis facte per interposicionem Ambaxiatorum communis Ianue et potestatis Peyre inter dominos Imperatores Constantinopolis, uidelicet Callojane ex una parte et chir Andronicum eius filium ex altera".

(b) to aid them against all aggressors except Murad-bey and his Turks; (c) to aid Andronicus *tanquam filium suum heredem et successorem imperii* in every war undertaken with his consent.

2) The Genoese of Pera oblige themselves (a) to aid John V in case he should be attacked by Andronicus and John VII; (b) in case he should be attacked by a third party — with the exception of Murad-bey and his Turks — they should get Andronicus to come to his assistance; (c) in case he should be attacked by John VII they will exert pressure on Andronicus to aid him.

The most interesting clause, as far as this history is concerned, is that regarding the Turks. The contracting parties form a sort of defensive alliance against all enemies except the most formidable, "Murad-bey and his Turks". Was this simple prudence? It would seem rather that it was an act of loyalty — of obligatory loyalty — of John V and Andronicus IV to their suzerain, Murad I, and, as will be seen, they remained faithful to their Turkish overlord. Manuel II is not named in the treaty although he was directly concerned — and injured. One would like to know his reactions. Although the sources leave no information on this point, there is at least one act which clearly indicated his discontent. Rather than adhere to the clause favoring the Turks, and apparently without waiting for the signing of the treaty, he launched himself upon his Thessalonian adventure.

CHAPTER III

THE "NEW EMPIRE" IN THESSALONICA

1. Thessalonica in the Fourteenth Century

Thessalonica, where Manuel II will establish himself and rule as emperor, wage war against the Turks, enter into conflict with his own subjects and finally be constrained by them to depart, was probably the one place in the Byzantine Empire where such events could take place. Its condition at the time and its memories of a recent past concurred to make it the ideal stage for the strange drama to be played there from 1382 to 1387. First of all, Thessalonica was the second city of the Empire. At the same time it was the only urban center left in Byzantine possession since the Turks had become masters of Didymotichus in Thrace and their Emir, Murad I, had established his residence at Adrianople⁽¹⁾. From that time its only communication with the capital was by sea.

Within its walls stood an imperial palace which had more than once provided lodging, not merely for passing guests, but also for princes of the reigning family and governors both of the city and of the region. Michael IX, crowned co-Emperor by his father, Andronicus II, died there in 1320. His brother, the Despot Demetrius Palaeologus, was its governor⁽²⁾. From 1350 to 1354 Thessalonica

(1) Adrianople was taken by the Turks around the beginning of 1361: R. J. LOENERTZ, "Etudes sur les chroniques brèves byzantines", *O. C. P.* 24 (1958), 156-157. Didymotichus must have fallen about the same time: Matteo Villani mentions the fact twice; in the year 1359 (*Istorie*, MURATORI 14, 567 D) and in November 1361 (*ibid.*, 672 E-673 A).

(2) F. DÖLGER, "Epikritisches zu den Facsimiles byzantinischer Kaiserurkunden mit Bemerkungen zur byzantinischen Despotenurkunde", *Archiv für Urkundenforschung* 13 (1935), 45-68, esp. 63-64: reprinted in DÖLGER, *Byzantinische Diplomatik* (Ettal, 1956), 75-101, esp. 95. Cf. also A. PAPADOPULOS, *Versuch einer Genealogie der Palaiologen* (Munich, 1938), p. 40.

was the capital of John V Palaeologus⁽³⁾. Afterwards, the dowager Empress, Anne Palaeologina, had it as a form of pension until her death⁽⁴⁾. Manuel II himself, still despot, held it in appanage from at least 1369 to 1372-1373. Two or three years later Demetrius Palaeologus, Grand Domestic, uncle of John V, and his son, the *protoprator* (John?), exercised authority there⁽⁵⁾. When the civil war of 1376 broke out, Theodore Palaeologus, fourth son of John V, was designated as its governor⁽⁶⁾.

Thessalonica, then, had a notable history as an imperial residence and as a regional capital. It probably also had local immunities and municipal institutions, and, if, perhaps, when Manuel came, it no longer possessed them (the silence of the sources obliges one to prudence), at least it could recall those that it had enjoyed (and even abused) in a not too remote past. In the sources the municipal autonomy of Thessalonica appears chiefly in connection with the social revolution of 1342-1349, an event which has not yet been thoroughly studied⁽⁷⁾. The internal forces which erupted in that bloody episode must surely have persisted when Manuel II, in the autumn of 1382, assumed power in the city for the second time. A few words, therefore, about those events would not be out of place.

On 26 October 1341 when the Grand Domestic, John Cantacuzenus, had himself proclaimed emperor at Didymotichus in Thrace, he counted upon his friend, Theodore Synadenus, governor of Thessalonica, to gain the allegiance of that territory. But opinions were

(3) CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 38-39: III, p. 276, 2-16; 285, 18-22; Nicephorus GREGORAS, *Byzantina Historia*, Bk. 24, ch. 5: III, p. 226, 10; CYDONES, Letter 77, 33-34.

(4) R. J. LOENERTZ, "Chronologie de Nicolas Cabasilas, 1345-1354", *O. C. P.* 21 (1955), 216-220. After the death of Anne, John V named as governor of Thessalonica George Synadenus Astros, who died shortly after taking possession of office: CYDONES, Letter 94, 22-30; 98. The next known governor after Astros was Alexis Lascaris Metochites, who had held the position before: Letters 7 and 8 of Manuel Raul, ed. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Emmanuelis Raul epistulae XII", *E. E. B. S.* 26 (1956), 150-163, esp. 153-158.

(5) CYDONES, Letter 188, written to Demetrius Palaeologus in Thessalonica in 1375-1376.

(6) MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 27, 14-20.

(7) A good summary of these events is given by Ihor ŠEVČENKO, "Nicholas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse: a Reinterpretation", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 11 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 81-84.

divided in the city. Finally the party opposed to Cantacuzenus gained the upper hand and expelled the governor together with the more prominent friends of the newly-proclaimed Emperor⁽⁸⁾. Three factors united the enemies of Cantacuzenus among themselves: 1) an extremely strong loyalty to the dynasty of the Palaeologi, that is, to the legitimate Emperor, John V, and to his mother, the Regent Anne; 2) popular hostility towards the great landowners, the *δυνατοί*, of whom Cantacuzenus was the perfect example and the natural protector; 3) the antipathy of at least one group against the hesychast monks and their theological defender, Gregory Palamas, who at precisely this period had come into conflict with the Patriarch John XIV Calecas and his synod⁽⁹⁾. Thanks to this threefold bond — loyalist, popular, anti-Palamite — this party, whose extreme wing soon came to be known as "Zealots", was able to seize power in Thessalonica. Apart from a very brief period in 1345⁽¹⁰⁾, they remained in power even when the usurper had entered the capital (2/3 March 1347) and had made an agreement with the Regent Anne, according to which John V should marry the daughter of Cantacuzenus, Helen, and should rule conjointly with his father-in-law. The Thessalonians rejected this accord as worthless, claiming that it had been extorted under pressure and that the young Emperor was really the prisoner of the usurper. They refused to recognize the authority of Cantacuzenus and closed the gates of the city to Gregory Palamas, who had been elected metropolitan of Thessalonica in summer 1347. For three years Thessalonica was in fact, if not *de jure*, an independent republic under two 'consuls', Alexis Lascaris Metochites, *Protosebastos*, son of the famous Grand Logothete, Theodore Metochites, and Andrew Palaeologus. In 1345 the latter had been in charge of the maritime quarter, a fact which had allowed him to mobilize the militia of that section. This force enabled him to suppress the insurrection of the nobles,

(8) CANTACUZENUS, Bk. III, ch. 38: II, p. 233, 9 - 234, 15.

(9) Cf. M. JUGIE, "Grégoire Palamas", *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XI, 2 (Paris, 1932), col. 1735-1776, esp. 1738-1739; "Palamite (Controverse)", *Ibid.*, col. 1777-1818, esp. 1778-1785. A more recent and detailed account is given by Jean MEYENDORFF, *Introduction à l'Étude de Grégoire Palamas* (Paris, 1959), 77 ss. esp. 95-107.

(10) R. J. LOENERTZ, "Note sur une lettre de Démétrius Cydonès à Jean Cantacuzène", *B. Z.* 44 (1951), 405-408, esp. 407.

partisans of Cantacuzenus, who had seized power for a few days after one of the 'consuls', the Grand Primicerius John Apocaukas, had caused his colleague, Michael Palaeologus, leader of the Zealots, to be assassinated. It was only in autumn or winter 1349-1350, when the city was threatened by Stephen Dušan, "Emperor of the Serbs and the Romans", that Alexis Metochites appealed to John Cantacuzenus and opened the gates of the city to him. Andrew Palaeologus retired to Mt Athos⁽¹¹⁾, an action which sheds a slightly different light on the picture of the revolutionaries drawn by their enemies. Even Cydones in a little-noticed phrase written some years later⁽¹²⁾, without excusing their undeniably violent excesses, admits that the 'Communards' of Thessalonica may have had some justification for their rebellion.

That, two decades later, the threat of renewed civil strife was still present is clear from a letter of Cydones written to the Grand Primicerius Phacrases, acting governor of the city after 6 April 1372⁽¹³⁾. What Cydones feared at that time actually came to pass some ten to fifteen years later during the reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica, when the city was again besieged by the Turks. For this reason the letter is worth quoting in full.

Never have I thus felt joy and grief as now when both have taken hold of me. Your letter was the occasion of the first, since your character affects the souls of those who love you. The cause of the second is the misfortune of our fatherland [Thessalonica], that it has not for long preserved the semblance of an apparent well-being, but before it could breathe freely again, its former illness has returned with added strength. For I have heard that the barbarian leader and his army stand before the gates together with the booty they have dragged along, and that the citizens who look down at them from the walls do nothing but weep⁽¹⁴⁾. That one cannot expect those plundering outside or injuring us ever to cease — whom would this not induce to grieve for the city as if it were already lying prostrate? Added to this is the fact that the damage to the city comes not only from the enemy, but far worse are those things it may expect from its own citizens. For

⁽¹¹⁾ CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 16: III, p. 109, 14-16.

⁽¹²⁾ CYDONES, Letter 77, 28-31, translated below.

⁽¹³⁾ Letter 77. On 6 April 1372 Manuel, governor of Thessalonica, had sailed away. *Chronicon Breve Thessalonicense*, ed. R. J. LOENERTZ, *Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance*, I (= *Studi e Testi* 186; Città del Vaticano, 1956), cap. 6, p. 175.

⁽¹⁴⁾ *Ibid.* The army and the barbarian leader must refer to this unsuccessful attack of the Turks of 10 April 1372.

everywhere the state of siege and the inability to drive off the enemy result in leading the citizens to turn against themselves. And you should realize that no city knows how to conduct itself with moderation on such occasions.

Who does not know that our city is a past-mistress of such evils? For this reason the wickedness of the people deprives me of words, though I am more fluent than most. Indeed, I fear that the Thessalonians may live up to their character, and may fight along with the enemy; while these are assaulting the walls, they may slaughter those within who could prevent this. Once more they may taste blood and may proceed to the deeds of that abominable day⁽¹⁵⁾. Because of this, I would now advise you to remove yourself from public affairs. For what can the skill of doctors avail when the sick are trying to destroy everything? Yet, since the Emperor has placed you in charge of things, you must stand firm against the blows of fortune and, on the one hand, call upon the only one able to prevent such evils and, on the other hand, make use of the powerful⁽¹⁶⁾, but in such a way as to give offense to nobody. Further, it is important to counsel the nobles that the present situation is not an occasion for grasping at some advantage, nor should they further provoke those who are desperate; rather, handling matters in a more popular way, they should endeavor to join together with the people.

Not at all will the most excellent Emperor be less concerned for the city which loves him and which he loves. But, having recalled that it too grieved with him when he was wronged and all that it suffered in defense of the common good — for it was from there that he set out to recover his patrimony⁽¹⁷⁾ — he will not think of rewarding it without adding to it, nor will he allow his greatness of spirit to seem less in the case of one city. But he will do everything to raise it up when it is falling. For when I began to speak to him of this matter, I found that he did not even want to discuss it because, he maintained, consultations would only waste time and would not free the city from danger. Indeed, he put everything else aside and is intent on only one thing, the salvation of the city.

Cydones wrote these lines in 1372 (if the letter is correctly dated by the editor); ten years later, when Manuel II arrived in Thessalonica, he found the city torn by rival factions which were disputing with one another for power. Unfortunately, Cydones, who has informed us of this, does not say anything about the nature — social or political, general or personal — of these rivalries.

(15) The murder of the nobles in summer 1345: *Chronicon Breve Thessalonicense*, cap. 5, p. 174.

(16) ὀνόματοι, the landed nobility.

(17) Cf. *supra*, p. 53, n. 3.

2. The Beginning of Manuel's Reign

The reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica can be divided into two periods of unequal duration. The first, marked by a series of successes in the war against the Turks, lasted until sometime before 19 September 1383, the day on which they captured Serres. The second period consisted of the four years during which the Turks besieged Thessalonica and which came to an end in April 1387 with the departure of Manuel and the surrender of the city. Both of these dates are certain, attested as they are by contemporary sources and confirmed by an entire series of converging facts⁽¹⁸⁾. It remains, then, to establish as accurately as possible the date of the beginning of Manuel's reign.

It is definite that Manuel was ruling as emperor in Thessalonica before 31 August 1383⁽¹⁹⁾. The question is: how long before? The date of the capture of Serres combined with information contained in Letter 247 of Demetrius Cydones permits one to establish the *terminus ante quem* of the beginning of his reign. In Letter 244 Cydones writes that Constantinople is buzzing with rumors about the victories of Manuel over the Turks and in Letter 247 he states that these reports have been verified. The most striking evidence of these victories is that one of Manuel's followers had sent some valuables taken from the Turks to his family in Constantinople and promised to send more in the spring (lines 25-27). The news of these victories stirred up a wave of enthusiasm in the capital among those opposed to the current imperial policy of appeasement. Men eager to do battle against the enemy from whom they had suffered so much as well as those hoping to enrich themselves with plunder prepared to join Manuel. Cydones warned him to fill his storehouses with provisions to feed this army of half-starved volunteers who would flock to his stand-

(18) For the capture of Serres, cf. below, p. 75, and for that of Thessalonica, p. 155; also cf. above, Chapter I, p. 6-8.

(19) During the preceding year he had bestowed the despotic insignia on Thomas Preljubović, Despot of Joannina, a privilege reserved to the emperor: *Chronicle of Epirus*, ed. S. CIRAC ESTOPAÑAN, *Bizancio y España, El legado de la basillisa María y de los despotas Thomas y Esaú de Joannina* (Barcelona, 1943), cap. 26, p. 48.

ards in the spring (lines 27-32). Since, however, the severe winter months would, practically speaking, put an end both to warfare and the shipping which was Thessalonica's only communication with the capital, the soldier could not expect to gain or to send more plunder nor could the volunteers, of whom Cydones speaks, hope to find passage until the following spring. Manuel's victorious campaign must, therefore, have taken place in early winter or, more probably, in autumn. This autumn must be either that of 1381 or 1382 for in the summer of 1381 Manuel was among the Turks and in autumn 1383 the prosperous period of his reign was over. The reading of the sources leaves one with the impression that the period of Manuel's successes was a brief one and that there is no room for two winters; he would, then, have arrived in Thessalonica in autumn 1382. Obviously, though, a general impression is not a proof, nor can it be easily communicated to the reader who has not read or examined a large number of the available sources from this special viewpoint. Manuel himself, however, in the funeral oration for his brother Theodore, provides the desired proof, which receives further confirmation from another letter of Cydones.

In the funeral oration for his brother, Manuel recounts how Theodore, appointed governor of the Byzantine Peloponnesus (between April 1380 and May 1381), did not want to take immediate possession of his province. Rather, "he decided to remain [in Constantinople] until, after he had done all he could and had fully accomplished his task, he should see the Emperor, his father, restored to his customary state, free from all anxiety and enjoying an absolute calm" ⁽²⁰⁾. Theodore Palaeologus did not believe that that moment had come before September 1382, for he arrived in the Peloponnesus only in 6891 *anno mundi* (beginning 1 September 1382) ⁽²¹⁾. Supposing that he left Constantinople in September or October, he still could have remained there long enough to assure himself that the Greco-Genoese negotiations then in progress had a good chance of success. The treaty, signed on 2 November 1382, stabilized the political situation in Byzantium which had been uncertain and fluctuating

⁽²⁰⁾ MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 34, 11-14.

⁽²¹⁾ *B. X.* 19, 16, p. 36.

since the agreement of May 1381. Clearly, Theodore wanted to remain by the side of his father until the treaty with Genoa, already signed or about to be signed, guaranteed the position of the old Emperor. And it was not until after Theodore's departure that Manuel left Constantinople for Thessalonica⁽²²⁾, at the very earliest, therefore, in September. But more probably it was later — the end of October or the beginning of November — for, during the Greco-Genoese negotiations of summer-autumn 1382, the question of the succession to the throne was necessarily raised. It would be very strange indeed if Manuel were so disinterested that he left the field before the issue had been decided.

Another argument in favor of this conclusion would seem to be found in Letter 264 of Cydones, sent to John Asanes, a good friend of his and a cousin of the Empress Helen Cantacuzena Palaeologina⁽²³⁾. Cydones was of the opinion that Asanes, who had sailed to Euboea and the Peloponnesus, had been gone too long and informed him that, as a result of his absence, his interests in Constantinople were suffering, his house was in disorder and certain enemies of his were seeking to ruin his political standing with those in power. Some calumniators wished to have the Emperor (John V) believe that Asanes intended to go "to Thessalonica, in the new empire"⁽²⁴⁾. This "new empire" in Thessalonica is obviously that of Manuel II, and if Asanes is accused — with or without reason — of wanting to go there, it would seem to imply that examples existed of such an emigration. Since Letter 264 was written in summer 1383 (according to the editor, whose reasons for this dating are indicated in the notes to the edition) this could well refer to the exodus foreseen by Cydones for the spring. The "new empire" in Thessalonica, then, would have begun the previous autumn, that is, 1382.

It can, therefore, be considered as certain that Manuel II left Constantinople and arrived in Thessalonica shortly before or shortly after 2 November 1382, the date on which the signing of

⁽²²⁾ Theodore, about to leave for the Morea, "was not easily separated from the arms of our father and mother and, I will add, from mine too": MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 36, 7.

⁽²³⁾ CYDONES, Letter 267, 101.

⁽²⁴⁾ CYDONES, Letter 264, 80.

the Greco-Genoese treaty appeared to bar him definitively from the imperial throne of Byzantium.

3. Assuming Power in Thessalonica

Manuel and his entourage — which amounted to a small personal army — employed some pretext or ruse and left Constantinople in great secrecy ⁽²⁵⁾. Later on, when events seemed to be proceeding well, his partisans in the capital represented this departure as a stroke of genius, but at the time they were strongly opposed to it. This was particularly true of Manuel's friend, Cydones, who at first criticized the action, for he maintained that Manuel was more urgently needed in the city where the quarreling between John V and Andronicus was endangering the security of the realm ⁽²⁶⁾. Pessimistic about conditions in Constantinople, Cydones saw in Manuel the only hope of the Empire. Although he regretted his departure, he did not regard it as a simple flight from difficulties but must have had some suspicion of Manuel's intentions. Cydones would set himself to pray while Manuel's task would be to engage in battle so that he would be for fatherland and race what Hector was for Troy ⁽²⁷⁾.

The letter of Cydones which ends with this prayer is the first addressed to Manuel after his departure. It is not absolutely certain that it was sent to Thessalonica, for it contains no allusion to the place where the addressee found himself and, consequently, it is not known whether Manuel went directly and immediately from Constantinople to Thessalonica. That he was not expected in Thessalonica is clear, not only from his clandestine departure, but also from the express testimony of Isidore Glabas, who assured his flock that the presence among them, at their head, of a prince exceptionally endowed to confront the terrible danger menacing them was a favor of divine Providence, all the more remarkable since it was unexpected ⁽²⁸⁾.

⁽²⁵⁾ CYDONES, Letter 203, 4-6 ; 243, 4 ; 247, 11.

⁽²⁶⁾ Letter 203, 21-24 ; 243, 4-19.

⁽²⁷⁾ Letter 203, 30-35.

⁽²⁸⁾ Homily of 26 November 1383, ed. B. LAOURDAS, 'Ἰσιδώρου ... ὁμιλίαι, p. 31, 7-9.

This favor of Providence was also very opportune, for the city, threatened by the Turks without, was prey to civil discord within. A brief and isolated phrase of Cydones informs us that Manuel, thanks to his skillful handling of the situation, reconciled the factions which were struggling for power in Thessalonica and that he persuaded the citizens to recognize himself as their ruler ⁽²⁹⁾. Since Manuel probably possessed no legal title to govern Thessalonica, it would be interesting to know how the representative of the imperial authority — if there was one — conducted himself in the presence of this seizure of power, peaceful but probably illegal. Unfortunately, however, Cydones does not discuss further the internal situation of the city, absorbed as he is in describing the effects produced in Constantinople by the news of Manuel's activities.

4. Victories of Manuel over the Turks

Soon the capital was full of rumors about victories gained by Manuel over the Turks, although Cydones complained that he had no way of verifying them ⁽³⁰⁾. He assured Manuel, however, that public opinion favored him and considered him as its champion in the struggle against the common enemy, even though his opponents in the city continued to babble about the benefits of an agreement with the Turks, an agreement equivalent to vassalage. The rumors about events in Macedonia became more persistent and, still complaining of the lack of precise information, Cydones told Manuel of the reports that had reached Constantinople.

This is what rumor has to say : on the one hand the barbarians flee, on the other hand the Romans attack ; those who caused alarm tremble, while those accustomed to lie cowering cause terror. Captures of fortresses are reported, release of captives and a powerful army capable of covering a great plain. Further, gates of cities closed already for a long time are opened and citizens sally forth from the walls and take prisoners. Fortune has thus changed completely to the opposite for us, and you are the one who has been able to perform these extraordinary deeds ; by your appearance alone you have raised up the long humbled spirits of your followers and per-

⁽²⁹⁾ CYDONES, Letter 247, 12-15.

⁽³⁰⁾ Letter 243, 19-27.

suaded the soldiers to imitate the valor of their ancestors. Indeed, even before this I was hoping for such news, for your nature promised even better than this and now I rejoice hearing that my prophecies have been fulfilled. But I regret that neither messengers nor letters have come from there rendering more certain for me those things which I was long desiring to hear.

I know that you look down on these deeds as something small and merely a prelude, that you would not take it upon yourself to be the bearer of these tidings to your friends, since the battles must first be fought and everything brought to its conclusion. Then is the time to write good news worthy of an emperor, that the barbarians have been fittingly punished for their insults, and to send letters announcing victory. Yet, may we see, O Liberator, that day in which we shall crown the messengers and publicly offer sacrifice to God on behalf of freedom ... The fact that in combat the barbarians showed their backs to the Romans till now has been likely only in prayer. Not that their valor is superior nor that we are worse by nature, but there was a certain penalty, resulting from our offenses against God, which, so it seems, God has now, through you, begun to remit. Indeed, what joy is greater than that on the occasion of reconciliation with God?

What sort of prayer befits the author of these deeds? Some would offer one sort, others another; but I would pray that you always add to your valiant beginnings and join trophy to trophy. Give, O Savior, victory to the Emperor, guiding him in his plans and in his deeds; send him your angel to prepare the way before him and to adorn it with trophies. Grant also to his followers and to those who share in his deeds to be of one mind both with him and with one another and to consider no prize more honorable than freedom. This will be realized if before the victory they should not quarrel over the rewards and suffer the fate of the cock that crows before winning ⁽²¹⁾.

It was not long before the rumors of Byzantine victories in Macedonia were authenticated by the captain of a ship forced by rough seas to seek shelter in the harbor of Constantinople. Immediately Cydones informed Manuel of the reactions caused in the capital by this news.

Owing to adverse winds, so he said, Loizos unwillingly put in at our port, a misfortune which I considered as good fortune, for he informed us of what I, who am not ignorant of your nature, was long ago convinced. But since I was unable to adduce any clear argument against the critics, I was thought to indulge in fictions. Now, however, his report has shut the mouths even of those who have no shame, and the praises of the Emperor advance without anyone daring to dispute them. Thus our city is full of stories about you, some acclaiming the departure which escaped the notice of all, for they say that skill was needed in the circumstances of that time. There are others who speak of how cleverly you handled those who were

⁽²¹⁾ CYDONES, Letter 244.

quarreling over position and won them over to be your willing followers by convincing them that the only hope of safety lay in absolute obedience to your commands. In the eyes of others, the great marvel is that your talents remain undamaged by the passage of time and that the actuality is proportionate to the promises. Those whose life is inspired by justice praise your exactness in judgements and your teaching those who hitherto thought violence the only way of life to yield to law.

There are others who gaze with amazement at the quantity of presents and the many gifts that accrue to you each day from those accustomed to plunder. Those who worship money, therefore, call this the crowning success of all human fortune and virtue. And, as you know, this wonderful city provides pasture for many a beast of this sort. In any case, because of this alone — if for no other single reason — they regard you as fortunate and blessed, not only because you have already enriched yourself but also because you have enabled your followers to exchange their former poverty for a marvellous affluence. For it is reported that one of your men has sent his family garments and gold objects from what was left over and promises to send more to his wife in the spring — more precious than the possessions one has are those which are hoped for. The news about the profits has not escaped the notice of the paupers among us no less than the tracks of the beasts escape the dogs. Thus it is the time of harvest for you, as with Joseph, to prepare pyramids of grain for those who will ask, for you may expect many such to come to you from here as though they were being sent out to form a colony. This report of ours has shaken even the great senate, and you may hear everyone singing of the talents, the silver and the stateras. Moreover, they all believe that it is foolish for anyone to remain here, as though expecting to be nourished by the columns, but he should hasten to him who suddenly turns beggars like Iruis into Kalliasces. Night and day, then, the continuous talk of the Romans is about your exploits, nor is it likely to stop at a certain time as in the case of Asanes, but your deeds will always be treasured in the memories of all.

But I rejoice for two reasons: first, that you are able and will be able to accomplish such feats, for I am persuaded that God, rewarding you for your virtue, will guide your every act. Secondly, I rejoice because my native land is fortunate to have such a ruler who by his own efforts has driven out the barbarians and who will grant it the honor of being the cradle of freedom for the Romans, for such it will be considered because this good had its beginning there. And I feel that I myself am not far removed from these praises since I too have a share in the honor of my fellow citizens ⁽³²⁾.

All of this was decidedly embarrassing to the imperial government, for the treaty of 2 November 1382, which was probably signed shortly before Manuel's victorious campaign, had reaffirmed Byzantine loyalty and subservience to the Turkish Emir

⁽³²⁾ CYDONES, Letter 247.

Murad. And now in Macedonia the second son of the Byzantine Emperor was waging war against the Turks and — worse still — he was winning. The wounds of the recent civil strife had not yet healed, and many of those who had fought with John V and Manuel against Andronicus must have been embittered by John's rejection of Manuel and his recognition of Andronicus as his successor. Furthermore, the anti-appeasement views of Manuel and of Cydones were shared by others in Constantinople, and these now saw in the Macedonian fighting the chance to translate their opinions into action and, by so doing, to protest against the philo-Turkish policy of the court which had reduced Byzantium to the condition of a vassal state of Murad. The news from Thessalonica fanned the dying embers of national pride into new life and a wave of enthusiasm for Manuel surged through the city. Many of those impoverished by the years of civil war or whose property had been ravaged by the Turks found their patriotism stimulated by the sight of the booty taken from the enemy and made ready to sail to Thessalonica in the spring.

Another letter of Cydones (no. 249), written about the same time, is almost a paean of victory, a rare indulgence for the Greeks of that period. "To us it used to seem wonderful enough if the barbarian returned home without having caused extensive damage" ⁽³³⁾. With rhetorical flourish Cydones described the sudden panic which gripped the Ottoman army and its headlong flight before the Greek onslaught. Granted that Cydones may exaggerate in his elation at the Byzantine victories, still there is a solid basis of fact in these three letters (244, 247, 249). They leave no doubt at all of a Turkish defeat at Manuel's hands, although the extent and nature of the victory are difficult to determine. Depressed by one defeat after another, the Greeks — such as Cydones — could well have magnified the slightest check to the steady Ottoman advance in the Balkans into a resounding triumph. For want, therefore, of more precise data, it is impossible to specify just what fortresses were captured, nor can we attain to any certainty about the size of the armies involved; it is hardly likely that Manuel could have assembled a very large force in so short a time.

⁽³³⁾ Letter 249, 7-8.

One phrase in Letter 244 requires a bit of attention: "Gates of cities closed already for a long time are opened; citizens sally forth from the walls and take prisoners" (lines 7-9). This does not indicate the capture of a Turkish-held city by Manuel, rather it betokens the relief of a city under siege. This is corroborated by some words in Letter 249: "Fear suddenly strikes the one making threats after the manner of Sennacherib as he is encamped about the city and commanding the gates to be opened" (lines 11-13). In their rout the enemy stripped off their armor and left gold, silver and their insignia behind in the tents (lines 16-19). All this can refer only to the siege of a Byzantine city, most probably Serres.

Serres, on the fertile Strymon plain some sixty miles northeast of Thessalonica, was the only other important city in the area still in Byzantine hands, although it had been under Serbian domination for a long period. After the death of the Serbian Emperor Stephen Dušan on 20 December 1355, his widow Helen (as a nun, Elizabeth) came to reside in or near Serres, where a sort of court was formed about her by a group of Greek and Serbian dignitaries, ecclesiastical and lay, and her influence was considerable. It was to her that John V had sent the Patriarch Callistus to negotiate an anti-Turkish alliance with the Serbs in 1363. Serres next became the capital of John Ugleša, the Serbian Despot in southeastern Macedonia, from about 1366 until he fell in battle at the Maritza River on 26 September 1371. In November of the same year, Manuel, then governing Thessalonica as Despot, entered the city and restored Byzantine rule.

The vacuum left by the Serbian collapse in 1371 was filled, at least for a short time, by the Greeks⁽³⁴⁾, and it would seem that Serres, although probably isolated by Turkish armies in the region, remained under imperial domination. That it was certainly in Byzantine hands in 1375 is shown by a document in the archives of the monastery of Kutlumas on Mt Athos⁽³⁵⁾. A decision of the Universal Judge Matarangos of 1341⁽³⁶⁾, in virtue of which

⁽³⁴⁾ Cf. P. LEMERLE, *Philippe et la Macédoine Orientale* (Paris, 1945), 214 ss.

⁽³⁵⁾ P. LEMERLE, *Actes de Kutlumas* (Paris, 1945), no. 33, p. 125-130.

⁽³⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, no. 19, p. 88-89.

a certain piece of property close to Serres, disputed between an individual and the monastery of Kutlumus, had been awarded to the convent, could not be implemented because of the Serbian conquest and domination. In August 1375, however, "since now our powerful and holy Lord and Emperor has recovered the rule of which he had been deprived", the monastery was once more able to present its case, and the Metropolitan of Serres, Theodosius⁽³⁷⁾, with other dignitaries decided in favor of the monastery. This judgement was confirmed in October on Mt Athos by the Protonotary Sotiriotes and another functionary of the imperial secretariate, who adduced a decision of the Emperors (John V and Manuel II) that the time of the Serbian domination did not count towards legal prescription⁽³⁸⁾.

While this testimony leaves no doubt that Serres was under Byzantine administration in 1375, one other document, which might seem to affirm the contrary, must be considered. In the first week or so of July 1372 Murad I issued a firman, taking under his protection the monastery of St John Prodromos on Mt. Meneceus near Serres⁽³⁹⁾. At first glance, this would imply that the Turks captured the city in spring or early summer 1372 and occupied it for some time afterwards, perhaps, as has been thought, until Manuel's attack in 1382⁽⁴⁰⁾. That a Turkish force attacked Serres during the first half of 1372 is not at all unlikely, since it could easily have formed part of the Ottoman campaign which included the assault on Thessalonica in April of that year⁽⁴¹⁾. However, the document issued by Murad does not necessarily

(37) Not Theodore, as the editor writes in his French summary of the document (also in *Philippe et la Macédoine Orientale*, 216). The Metropolitan, who signed the document in Slavic, wrote *Theodosije*. Furthermore, there is a note following the signatures: "είχε καὶ ὑπογραφήν τῆνδε σερβικήν ὁ ταπεινὸς μητροπολίτης Σερρών Θεοδόσιος".

(38) *Ibid.*, no. 34, p. 130-132.

(39) A. GUILLOU, *Les Archives de Saint-Jean-Prodrome sur le mont Ménécée* (Paris, 1935), 155.

(40) LEMERLE (*Philippe et la Macédoine Orientale*, 217) suggests that, if the Turks captured Serres in 1372, their occupation may have been purely military with the civil administration left in Greek hands. The Turkish chronicles provide inexact and contradictory information on this matter: F. BABINGER, *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, IV (1935), s. v. Serres.

(41) *Chronicon Breve Thessalonicense*, cap. 6, p. 175.

prove that he actually held Serres at that time, for the monastery of St John Prodromos was situated outside the city walls and during a Turkish siege or attack on the city it would obviously be exposed to pillage by Murad's troops. To forestall this danger the monks or a friend of the monastery who had access to the Turkish commander undoubtedly requested the protection of the Emir.

The supposition that the Turks held Serres at the time of Manuel's attack in 1382 has its origins in the history of Chalcocandyles: "When Manuel, the son of the Emperor of the Greeks, was governing Thermae in Macedonia, called Thessalonica, having taken hold of a certain commander in the region, he was detected conspiring against the city of Serres and, moreover, rebelling against Murad" (42). That Serres was Byzantine in 1375, however, and that in 1382 Manuel did not attack a Turkish-held city but relieved a Byzantine one under siege has already been shown, and it will be shown later that the only solidly established Turkish capture of Serres was in September 1383. Therefore, unless further evidence is brought forward, it seems that the city of Serres remained under Byzantine domination from November 1371, when Manuel recovered it from the Serbs, until 19 September 1383, when it fell to the Turks.

The foregoing discussion about Serres might appear superfluous, for nowhere is it explicitly stated that this city was the site of Manuel's striking victory of autumn 1382, nor, strictly speaking, can this be proved. Two reasons, however, seem to favor this assumption: the first is based simply on strong probability, and the second on a closer examination of the passage of Chalcocandyles cited above.

(42) CHALC., I, 42, 5-10. Previously he mentioned that Murad had captured Serres, leaving Lala Shahin (Saines) there as governor: *ibid.*, I, 33, 2-6. Lala Shahin was the first to have the title of Beglerbeg (Lord of Lords), given to him by Murad I after capturing Adrianople (1361). With the title he also received the governorship of Rumelia (European Turkey); he was succeeded by Timurtash and then by Khairaddin-Pasha: V. L. MÉNAGE, *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, I (Paris-Leiden, 1959), s. v. Beglerbegi. Later Murad reproached Manuel for "conspiring against a region (χωρὰ) which is now rightfully mine, although it was formerly yours": *ibid.*, I, 43, 6-7. The *Χρονικὸν περὶ τῶν Τούρκων Σουλτάνων* (ed. G. ZORAS, Athens, 1958), p. 25, 18, states that Murad was already ruling Serres at this time.

The details furnished by Letters 244, 247 and 249 of Cydones (rhetorical exaggerations apart) indicate that the city in question was a large and presumably important one. "Its gates had been closed for a long time", that is, its walls had proven strong enough to resist a siege of some duration. The besieging troops must also have been numerous, for their encampment before the city contained a sizeable quantity of personal goods and precious objects, more than would have been carried by a mere raiding party. There was so much, in fact, that when the Turks fled, the victorious Greeks found more than enough for themselves and sent what was left over to relatives in Constantinople. Furthermore, the city under siege could not have been very far from Thessalonica, since Manuel in 1382 had neither the time nor the troops to conduct an extensive and distant campaign. All of this points to Serres, the only Byzantine city of any importance in the region about Thessalonica.

The above passage of Chalcocandyles does not speak of an attack of Manuel against Serres, but merely that he was making plans to acquire the city, which the Athenian historian seems to have considered as already in the possession of Murad⁽⁴³⁾. While the chronology and the details of his narrative are inaccurate, it seems to be based on sources, which he has misunderstood. What emerges from his account is this: Manuel, while ruling Thessalonica, took steps to obtain Serres; he was rebelling against Murad; this aroused the Emir's anger and he sent Khairaddin-Pasha to punish the Greek prince and to capture Thessalonica, which he succeeded in doing⁽⁴⁴⁾. The important point here is that a hostile (*i. e.* anti-Turkish) action of Manuel having something to do with Serres is connected with the wrath of Murad and the subsequent expedition of Khairaddin which got under way in 1383. The hostile action of Manuel was not a conspiracy or actual attack directed against a Turkish-held Serres, since the city was not yet in their possession. It could only have consisted in an assault on Turkish forces near Serres, forces which, according to the testimony of Cydones, were engaged in besieging the city.

Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the sources and the

(43) Cf. preceding note.

(44) CHALC., I, 42, 5-13; 44, 1-2.

consequent impossibility of attaining absolute certainty, some idea may be formed of events in autumn 1382. An Ottoman force, which most probably already controlled large areas of the Macedonian countryside, had laid siege to Serres. Manuel II, recently arrived in Thessalonica, mustered what forces he could and proceeded to capture some fortified places in the region. He then fell upon the Turkish army besieging Serres, perhaps a surprise attack, if Cydones' description of panic is correct. With the cooperation of the citizens who made some effective sorties, he put the enemy to flight. While Cydones' account of the rout (Letter 249) may rely more on imagination than fact, the plunder taken from the Turkish camp, some of which was sent to Constantinople, is decidedly in the factual order.

After the victorious campaign of 1382, which must have come to an end in late autumn or early winter, Manuel returned to Thessalonica to make preparations for the coming spring when he knew he could expect to have more men under his command and when he could also expect to encounter stronger Turkish forces. In the midst of his preoccupations he found time to attend to some correspondence. Cydones had asked him to procure a manuscript of Plato from Mt Athos, which the Emperor promised to do, "seeing that [Plato] is unsuitable for monks who have long ago renounced the world's wisdom". "But I feel ashamed," he added, "seeing this old man [Plato] braving the sea when it is already the middle of winter, and you, on the other hand, disdaining your fatherland and us, dwelling in the [monastery of St George in the] Mangana and taking your rest there" (45). Manuel asked his friend to come immediately to Thessalonica for he felt the need of his company and his assistance. "The time is ill for us, the endeavors are still in labor and our situation here is uncertain, for as Isocrates remarks, the future is invisible" (46).

Cydones replied with some advice on obtaining the manuscript from the monks and explained why he could not come to Thessalonica; he was held back by "adamantine shackles", an allusion presumably clear to Manuel although not to the modern

(45) MANUEL, Letter 3, 9-10; 22-25 (LEGRAND, p. 3-4).

(46) *Ibid.*, lines 39-41.

reader — perhaps the imperial authority (of John V) is intended.

[The monks] wish to profit by your desire, otherwise they would have thrown it [the copy of Plato] away to someone who had not even requested it. Now, if you should deal with them gently they will call the transaction a sacrilege and will appear indignant. But if the emperor shall demand, and they realize there is no refusing, you will see those now harsh giving in and thanking you for having asked. Only be insistent with them. ... He [Cydones] desires your sight more than the thirsty the fountains. It is not, as you say, the Mangana which holds him — to me this is a chain weaker than the spider's — but those adamantine shackles which you know and by which you yourself are still hindered in many things ⁽⁴⁷⁾.

Eventually, probably in spring or summer 1383, the copy of Plato arrived, and Cydones immediately wrote to thank his imperial benefactor.

He [the copy of Plato] showed throughout the clear marks of his long misery; all soaked through, all torn, the externals neglected, the inside shrunk, dark stains all over, and in such a state that one would not have realized what he once was. If Homer had seen it he would have said what he said of Ajax: Plato perished when he drank salt water. What makes the tragedy even more sorrowful is that after having received his freedom he had to experience pirates and share the fate of prisoners — and this on the threshold of his fatherland so that this also causes him to resemble the former Plato. And, so it seemed, he was destined to be a slave to the barbarians, so that no Greek, even though long dead, may escape the insolence of these offscourings. ... It is my prayer, therefore, that the power which enabled you to free this man from slavery may show itself in the case of the common foe, that through you freedom will return to the whole nation ⁽⁴⁸⁾.

Manuel's answer to this letter, written in spring or, more probably, summer 1383, indicates that his troubles with the Thessalonians had already begun. Apparently the enthusiasm stirred up by the victories of the previous autumn had already subsided, perhaps owing to some military reverses, but more likely owing to the expenditures and sacrifices demanded of the population to support a large number of soldiers, grown larger in spring by the arrival of volunteers from Constantinople, many of whom (according to Cydones) brought little more than the

⁽⁴⁷⁾ CYDONES, Letter 276, 24-35.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ CYDONES, Letter 259, 5-22.

clothes on their backs. In any case, the Thessalonians' love of freedom diminished as the cost of maintaining it rose.

For it is not possible, I think, it is not possible for a person to rule over your fellow citizens if they continue in their present attitude unless he should first rain gold on them as Zeus did for the Rhodians in the myth. They hold such a great flow of words in reserve that if one liked to call them all Suidases he would not be wrong. On the other hand, there is no doubt that they are almost all beggars, and it is easy to count those who do not go to bed hungry. Indeed, I need either the wealth of Croesus or an eloquence above average so that I can persuade them to bear poverty with good repute rather than to desire riches, the cause of so much evil. They need to be convinced that it is better and far less shameful to suffer willingly the lot of slaves for the sake of their own freedom than, after they have become slaves in spirit, to gain what belongs to free men. But it is neither possible to rain down gold nor to chance upon the treasures of Croesus. The tablet is full of all sorts of words and I realize that there is need of someone to arrange them in the proper order. Obviously, there is need of you, as you can do just this better than anyone else — it is you who are clearly needed. Become then another Daedalus by suddenly coming to our side to help ⁽⁴⁹⁾.

Cydones, however, did not go to Thessalonica, though the volunteers, whose arrival he had predicted the previous autumn, did arrive. Impelled by patriotism or by the desire of gain, they sailed to Thessalonica to swell the ranks of Manuel's army of liberation. This emigration must have continued all during the spring of 1383, if not later, for towards the end of summer the enemies of John Asanes could delate him to the Emperor for intending to join Manuel, an accusation which would be more credible if others were actually doing so ⁽⁵⁰⁾. How many of these volunteers were there? Cydones, who is our only source for this episode, merely remarks that they were "many" and constituted the cream of the Byzantine nobility, so much so that he feared that if they lost there would be nothing left of the Empire: "It would be swept away as a plant pulled out by the roots" ⁽⁵¹⁾. Perhaps typical of these was Theodore Cantacuzenus to whom Cydones entrusted a letter of presentation to Manuel ⁽⁵²⁾.

⁽⁴⁹⁾ MANUEL, Letter 4, 5-31 (LEGRAND, p. 5-6).

⁽⁵⁰⁾ CYDONES, Letter 264, 79-80.

⁽⁵¹⁾ Letter 248, 31-35.

⁽⁵²⁾ Letter 250, 4-25. Cf. also Letter 254, written a few months later, in which Cydones chides him for being a poor correspondent. Apart from

I am not sending you this letter simply to be of assistance to Cantacuzenus, whom you yourself would warmly welcome without anyone urging you, but I decided to write since I thought it would be unjust towards you and shameful on my part if I were to pass over in silence his friendship for you. Indeed, you were aware of his sentiments before this, and you frequently called him a friend letting him know your opinion by the way you addressed him. However, the friendship was then merely a matter of expression, whereas now when the situation demands it, he has not hesitated to confirm his former words by deeds. ... For on hearing that you were beset by arms, cares and difficulties in your enterprises, he realized that it was an occasion when true friends were needed. So he stopped thinking of his wife and paid no attention to his children; he neglected his household and disdained the gifts and the expectations he could hope for from the Emperor and set his heart on one thing alone, to hasten to share your lot. With all of us he prays that God may grant you success, but if something grievous should befall you, even this he is joyfully prepared to prefer to the pleasant things here. And such a strong love of you has pervaded him that there were those who called the vehemence of his eagerness even madness and who kept reminding him of the adage, "Do nothing to excess". But he scorned those who do not place a friend before all else. Moreover, it was clear that, if he were unable to set out by ship, he would not hesitate to run through waves and even fire, if only he could enjoy your sight and your conversation. Thus, in order to please you, he would both do and suffer everything.

With the arrival of Theodore Cantacuzenus and others of like sentiments, the military strength of the "new empire" in Thessalonica must have been more reassuring. In fact, during the spring or summer of 1383 there took place a combined sea and land battle in which Manuel's forces inflicted a severe defeat on the Turks. To Cydones' question on events in Thessalonica, some who had just arrived from there disagreed on many details,

... except that they all as with one voice sang of the naval battle and the battle on land connected with it and the victory gained in both. They also said that the number of the fallen and of the prisoners was large, further, that the entire conduct of the combat ought to be ascribed to the Emperor, who is capable of transforming Thessalonians into the likes of those who fought at Marathon and to accustom them to pursue those whose very name formerly caused terror ⁽⁵³⁾.

these two letters, nothing else is known about him. Since they speak of him only as a friend of the Emperor (if he had been a relative, there would surely have been some allusion), he could not be the Theodore Palacologus Cantacuzenus who was a maternal uncle (or possibly cousin) of Manuel II.

⁽⁵³⁾ Letter 312, 15-22. This letter is found in Book XXIX, containing

Actually, there were at least two naval actions, for in his *Discourse to the Thessalonians*, delivered in autumn 1383, Manuel recalled to his subjects the victories they had gained over the Turks both on sea and on land. On sea there had been two battles, one between galleys and one between lighter craft of the type used by pirates. The Thessalonians, declared the prince, should be encouraged by these successes, particularly by the victories gained on land, even more significant than the naval battles, for it is on land that the Turks are in their element⁽³⁴⁾.

Apart from these allusions to Manuel's successes, the sources provide no clear information on either Byzantine or Turkish military operations in Macedonia before mid-September 1383, when Serres fell to the Turks. But the Byzantine victories must have succeeded in delaying the Ottoman counter-attack, since in the summer Cydones could describe Manuel's realm as the "new empire", the implication being that its condition was still prosperous or, at least, not yet seriously endangered. The fact that volunteers were continuing to arrive in Thessalonica also points to the same conclusion; very few would have risked everything to clamber aboard a sinking ship. However, the prosperous period of Manuel's reign was not destined to last much longer and towards the end of summer, if not earlier, the tide began to turn against him.

5. The Turks Capture Serres and Lay Siege to Thessalonica

The defeat inflicted by Manuel on the Turks in autumn 1382 must have come as a shock to Murad, not accustomed to such

Letters 309-318, all of which (except for 317, undated) belong to the years 1384-1385, but it is out of place here. That it was certainly written in spring or summer 1383 is proved by two facts: 1) Cydones was still thinking of moving to Thessalonica (lines 10-12), which was no longer probable after the fall of Serres in September 1383; 2) Manuel alludes to the naval battle in his *Discourse to the Thessalonians* in autumn 1383: ed. B. LAOURDAS, "Ο "Συμβουλευτικός πρὸς τοὺς Θεσσαλονίκεις" τοῦ Μανουὴλ Παλαιολόγου", *Μακεδονικά* 3 (1955), p. 300, 23-32.

(34) LAOURDAS, *loc. cit.*

reversals, and he determined to repress what he considered, not without some justification, an insurrection of one of his vassals⁽⁵⁵⁾. He ordered Khairaddin-Pasha, soon to be appointed Beglerbeg of Rumelia and the first Ottoman Grand Vizier, to advance against Thessalonica, capture the city and bring Manuel to him⁽⁵⁶⁾. More than simply a punitive expedition against a rebellious prince, this campaign was meant to bring about the definitive subjugation of Macedonia to the Ottoman Emir. Perhaps as early as spring 1383, certainly in the summer, Khairaddin took the offensive and by September must have been master of large sections of Macedonia⁽⁵⁷⁾. The cities and fortresses still resisting were under attack and Manuel later regretted that he had not sufficiently provided for their defense⁽⁵⁸⁾. Supposedly, however, the Emperor opposed some resistance to the Turkish advance — but on this the sources are silent. Perhaps there were pitched battles, perhaps merely a series of skirmishes. In any case, the victories he had gained in the spring were not enough to stem the Ottoman tide, and the fortunes of the “new empire” entered their critical — and final — phase.

At about this time Cydones wrote to his former pupil Rhadenos, who was with Manuel in Thessalonica, to console him on the death of his brother. Towards the end of the letter he mentioned that his own affairs were proceeding well enough, but that the never-ending inroads of the enemy were causing him to grow more despondent each day.

I am deeply concerned about your situation which is now beginning to be troubled by storms from all sides. For those who share the danger are neither few nor merely ordinary, but so many and of such quality that if they should fail, even to a small degree, the commonwealth of the Romans will immediately be swept away as a plant pulled out by the roots. And the one who is worth all of them is the Emperor who has brought all to his

(55) CHALC., I, 42, 5-10. Manuel was conspiring against Serres “and moreover rebelling against Murad”.

(56) CHALC., I, 42, 10-13. On Khairaddin cf. F. TAESCHNER - P. WITTEK, “Die Vezirfamilie der Ġandarlyzāde (14/15. Jhdt.) und ihre Denkmäler”, *Der Islam* 18 (1929), 60-115. The various Greek spellings of his name are given in MORAVCSIK, *Byzantinoturcica*, II, 337.

(57) Monastir and Prilep in Northern Macedonia were taken in 1382-1383: TAESCHNER-WITTEK, “Die Vezirfamilie”, 73.

(58) MANUEL, *Discourse to the Thessalonians*, ed. LAOURDAS, p. 295, 1-5.

side. Mindful of his valor alone, God will, I think, hold back the rush of the barbarians advancing in every direction (⁵⁹).

Manuel's most striking success of the previous autumn had been connected with the city of Serres and it was there, in the autumn of 1383, that he suffered his first serious defeat. For the second time in two years Serres was besieged by the Turks, and finally fell on 19 September 1383 (⁶⁰). The city was pillaged by the victorious troops, and many of the inhabitants, including the Metropolitan, Matthew Phacrases, were led away into captivity (⁶¹). Soon after news of the disaster reached Constantinople, Cydones wrote to a friend in Thessalonica, probably Rhadenos.

What can one do in the midst of this terrible tempest? The oncoming waves seem much higher than those which have passed; before we can catch our breath after a blow, another strikes and destroys us. It is not only you who suffer, but for a long time the barbarians have been laying their plans for our destruction also. For it is impossible that after they have desired what is of less importance, they will renounce what is greater and most profitable. After the message about Serres, therefore, and the great plunder and their revelries at the expense of our fatherland, fortune has sent us another and more bitter blow, that of Chortiatou, which has cut us to the heart. And you know how much one could prophesy from that; rather prophecy is not necessary, for the future evils are obvious to all. Furthermore, when I think of the Emperor, the type of man he is, and the fate he must struggle against, how almost submerged he is forced to navigate among the rocks, I find no example of such distress (⁶²).

Chortiatou is a village some six miles east of Thessalonica on the slopes of the mountain of the same name, apparently then (although no longer) on the road to Serres (⁶³). Outside the village there was an imperial monastery, which had been occupied by Latin Cistercian monks for a short period after the Fourth

(⁵⁹) Letter 248, 30-36.

(⁶⁰) *B. X.* 16, 5, p. 33; 20, 4, p. 37; 21, 5, p. 38; 22, 1, p. 41; 32, 1, p. 61.

(⁶¹) Isidore Glabas, Metropolitan of Thessalonica, wrote to Matthew shortly after news of his imprisonment had reached Thessalonica: Letter 1, ed. S. LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ἐπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης ὀκτὼ ἐπιστολαὶ ἀνέκδοτοι", *N. E.* 9 (1912), p. 353-358. In 1387 Matthew had been a prisoner of the Turks for four years: *M. M.*, II, no. 374, p. 77-79.

(⁶²) Letter 289, 4-16.

(⁶³) Cf. T. TAFEL, *De Thessalonica eiusque agro dissertatio geographica* (Berlin, 1839), 252-254.

Crusade, and was later resettled by Greek monks⁽⁶⁴⁾. This monastery also possessed some property (*metochion*) a few yards outside the eastern wall of Thessalonica just below the citadel, and it was at this place, also called Chortiatou, that the Turks broke into the city in 1430⁽⁶⁵⁾. Which of these places — the mountain, the village, the monastery, the *metochion* — is referred to in the letter of Cydones? To this no definite answer can be given, but what is clear is that Chortiatou was the site of some disaster for the Greeks. Perhaps this consisted in a Turkish assault on Thessalonica near the *metochion* of Chortiatou which, although repulsed, inflicted heavy losses on the defenders. The more likely supposition, however, is that the setback occurred in or near the village of Chortiatou, through which the Ottoman army would be expected to pass on its way from Serres to Thessalonica. There may well have been a fortress there (perhaps the monastery itself served this purpose), which formed one of the main links in the defensive chain around Thessalonica. It is not improbable that Cydones is alluding to the Turkish capture of this place and the consequent pillaging of the monastery.

After their victories at Serres and Chortiatou, the Turks, undoubtedly now masters of the *ager Thessalonicensis*, could concentrate on Thessalonica itself. Probably towards the end of September or the beginning of October they appeared beneath its walls, but before undertaking a full-scale siege, Khairaddin demanded the surrender of the city. Manuel rejected his ultimatum and the Ottoman commander then set about organizing the siege; by the beginning of November at the latest the city was surrounded and completely cut off by land⁽⁶⁶⁾.

(64) TAFEL, *loc. cit.*; also cf. E. BROWN, "The Cistercians in the Latin Empire of Constantinople and Greece", *Traditio* 14 (1958), 63-120, esp. 78-81.

(65) A. VAKALOPOULOS, "Ἡ παρὰ τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην Βυζαντινὴ μονὴ τοῦ Χορταίτου", *E. E. B. Σ.* 15 (1939), 280-287.

(66) That is, if one can take literally the words of Isidore Glabas, "the most evil net of the impious has encircled us on all sides", in his homily of 2 November 1383: ed. LAOURDAS, *Ἰσιδώρου ... ὁμιλίαι*, p. 49, 12. The notice of the *cod. Marcian. gr.* 408 states that the siege lasted four years, ending with the capture of the city in April 1387; the siege, therefore, began in 1383. The life of St Athanasius of the Meteora speaks of the siege lasting three years (ed. N. VEIS, *Βυζαντις* 1 (1909), p. 259). However, these are round numbers and if the siege lasted about three and a half years, both could be correct.

CHAPTER IV

THESSALONICA UNDER SIEGE, 1383-1387

From autumn 1383 until April 1387 Thessalonica was besieged by the forces of the Ottoman commander Khairaddin-Pasha. Although completely cut off by land, the city retained free access to the sea and it was this which enabled it to resist for so long: by ship provisions could be brought in, embassies sent and received and an avenue of flight for the final hours kept open. Gradually, however, the effects of the siege began to be felt, particularly upon the city's markets which, with the Thessalonian hinterland isolated by the Turks, found themselves doing very little business. This together with the expenditures involved in maintaining a large body of soldiers led to considerable discontent among the population. In fact, the eventual fall of Thessalonica can be attributed to this discontent and the resultant lack of cooperation of its citizens more than to any other single cause, for the military position of Manuel, at least during the first two years of the siege, was by no means hopeless.

Early in the siege Cydones sent Manuel a letter, a few passages of which may not be out of place here.

This is not the first time that a great city has borne the arrogance of the barbarians, nor that fear has forced it to close its gates to the enemy, nor that it has looked down from its walls to see its suburbs being devastated, nor had its once flourishing market reduced to misery. Indeed, now is not the first time that the better men have been enclosed within walls by the worse nor that conquerors have heard the insults of those often vanquished. In fact, Babylon suffered all this from Cyrus, and we have read that Rome was deprived of many of its citizens by Hannibal; the Athenians, after Marathon and Salamis, wept on beholding from their towers Acharnes laid waste by the Lacedaemonians. ... Let us not, then, be astonished if Thessalonica's turn has come to experience those trials which occur often in life. We should not cut ourselves free from the good anchor of our hopes and give ourselves over to the tempest, but should stand firmly before the break-

ing waves and arm ourselves against discouragement in the face of the enemy. Let us try to bear that which we must, knowing that we shall not mitigate the present evils by sorrow. ... We ought also to bear in mind the diverse vicissitudes which necessarily characterize this mortal world, how they never cease from continual fluctuation and changing to the opposite. There is no reason, then, to give up hope that we too shall return to our former condition and enjoy our accustomed security and tranquillity. For, if on occasion the completely unexpected happened and has come to pass, how, when it is something reasonable, would one not rather take heart, especially since there are still so many valiant men who, provided only that they act in unison, would easily shake off like dust those who are now arrogant? The common danger, one would think, would invite them to harmony if they had not determined to treat one another as enemies. But apart from this, one can find in the course of history many cities which, after long and difficult sieges, not only have been freed from their tormentors but have also turned about and inflicted far worse on their enemies ⁽¹⁾.

1. The Turkish Ultimatum and the Discourse of Manuel to the Thessalonians

When the Turks had taken Serres and most of the less important places in the vicinity of Thessalonica, they appeared before the gates of the city and — perhaps even before their actual arrival — their commander sent an ultimatum to the inhabitants: either pay a heavy tribute or be put to the sword. This ultimatum was delivered between 19 September (the date of the capture of Serres) and 26 October 1383, for on the latter date Isidore Glabas, Metropolitan of Thessalonica, alluded to the cruel dilemma as a problem posed, but, so it seems, not yet resolved. On that day in the presence of Manuel II he pronounced [in the Cathedral of Thessalonica the customary panegyric for the feast of the martyr St Demetrius, patron of the basilica and the city ⁽²⁾. After celebrating the past benefits of St Demetrius to the Thessalonians, the preacher asked why the miracle-worker was now so tardy in manifesting his power. The sins of the Thessalonians, he replied, have aroused God's wrath and as a punishment He has placed them at the mercy of the infidel.

But for my part I do not consider it of small consequence and that it has been brought about by Providence in vain that the most excellent

⁽¹⁾ CYDONES, Letter 299, 13-57.

⁽²⁾ LAOURDAS, 'Ισιδώρου ... ὁμιλία, Homily I, p. 19-32.

Emperor, endowed as he is with many graces, has, beyond our expectations, taken charge of our destinies to be our defender, and this just at the moment when the infidel had imposed the heavy burden of tribute upon us — either to pay or to be slaughtered by them. For God, either deeming us so deserving of his mercy and kindness, has sent him down to us, employing him as an instrument and minister of his assistance for us; or else we merit extermination and destruction, and so that nobody might seek the cause of this in the absence of a prudent and energetic defender, he has removed this excuse and has not left us without a counsellor of almost superhuman capabilities ⁽³⁾.

In these words of the Metropolitan three points are of some significance: 1) the fact that Manuel governs Thessalonica at this critical moment is a favor of Providence, all the more noteworthy since it was unexpected — a clear allusion to the unlooked-for arrival of Manuel the previous autumn. 2) The Turks gave the Thessalonians their choice between the payment of an extremely heavy tribute (surely annual and perpetual) and death. This means that if their conditions should be refused, the Turks intended to attack and take the city by force. 3) To reply to this threat and to make the proper decisions, the citizens relied on the exceptional qualities of Manuel, whom the preacher refers to as “defender” (προστάτης) and “counsellor” (βουλευτής). This last expression should be noted, for “counsellor” is not one of the epithets ordinarily applied to a monarch in relation to his subjects. If the prelate employs it on such a solemn occasion he must have his reasons and, without great risk of error, these reasons may be surmised. Manuel had just given the Thessalonians the counsel rendered necessary by the Turkish ultimatum, and he had done this in a formal public address, “an advisory discourse” (Συμβουλευτικός) ⁽⁴⁾. In his letter which accompanied a copy of the discourse sent to Cydones, Manuel justified this literary exercise on the grounds that the Thessalonians were in need of counsel ⁽⁵⁾. The answer of Cydones, written in autumn 1383, ends with this prayer:

⁽³⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 31, 7-17.

⁽⁴⁾ Ed. B. LAOURDAS, “Ο “ Συμβουλευτικός πρὸς τοὺς Θεσσαλονίκεις ” τοῦ Μανουὴλ Παλαιολόγου ”, *Μακεδονικά* 3 (1955), 290-307; text: p. 295-302, hereafter cited simply as *Discourse*. The full title in the manuscripts is Συμβουλευτικός πρὸς τοὺς Θεσσαλονίκεις, ἡνίκα ἐπολιορκεῖντο (p. 295).

⁽⁵⁾ “ ἦν γὰρ χρεία βουλῆς ”: MANUEL, Letter 11, 18 (LEGRAND, p. 15),

Savior, grant to the Emperor the occasion to compose and to pronounce panegyrics instead of the counsel (συμβουλή) which he has just given. For him there will be more ambition in his eloquence; for myself more pleasure in listening. For at the moment my pleasure has been considerably lessened because I see that my fellow citizens had need of exhortations when their own safety was at stake ⁽⁶⁾.

Before replying, therefore, to the Turkish ultimatum, which he had no intention of accepting, Manuel wanted to assure himself of the firm support of his subjects. To this end he called together an assembly which represented more or less faithfully the people of Thessalonica. Assemblies of this sort (ἐκκλησία τοῦ δήμου) were sometimes convoked in time of crisis to decide on urgent measures or to have those already determined upon ratified by the citizens ⁽⁷⁾. Summoned by the ringing of church bells, the population gathered in some open place, such as the hippodrome, for the meeting ⁽⁸⁾.

The orator addressed himself to the people of "the land of Philip", that is, Byzantine Macedonia, although Thessalonica was all that remained of it at the time ⁽⁹⁾. At the beginning of his address Manuel formulated the program of the assembly in very general terms: he and his subjects were to study together the means to employ "to avoid base servitude to the

⁽⁶⁾ CYDONES, Letter 262, 90-94.

⁽⁷⁾ This assembly was also called κοινὴ ἐκκλησία: CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 5: III, p. 34, 5-6; ἐκκλησία πάνδημος: *Ibid.*, ch. 17: p. 117, 12. Manuel himself twice refers to this assembly as σύλλογος (*Discourse*, p. 296, 25; 298, 35); twice as βουλευτήριον (*Ibid.*, p. 299, 30 and 34); once as ἐκκλησία (*Ibid.*, p. 295, 2). On this institution in Thessalonica, cf. O. TAFRALI, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle* (Paris, 1913), 71-75; G. I. BRATTIANU, *Privilèges et Franchises Municipales dans l'empire byzantin* (Paris-Bucharest, 1936), 116.

⁽⁸⁾ The sources provide several instances of such assemblies: in late summer 1345 when John Apocaucas, governor of Thessalonica, declared himself openly for Cantacuzenus: CANTACUZENUS, Bk. III, ch. 93-94: II, p. 573, 10-574, 20. In 1350 John Cantacuzenus came before the assembly to justify his actions: *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, ch. 17: III, p. 117, 8-25. In Constantinople he convoked the people to deliberate on replenishing the treasury: *Ibid.*, ch. 5-6: p. 34, 2-40, 21. On 20 September 1368 the people of Constantinople were called to the hippodrome to listen to the reading of letters from the pope: *B. X.* 47, 30-31, p. 81.

⁽⁹⁾ "οἱ τῆν τοῦ Φιλίππου εἰκάτε": *Discourse*, p. 295, 1.

barbarians" (10). At the end of what could be called the exordium he developed this thought a little more by declaring that, "since the assembly has been called into being so that each one might express his views on how to drive off the present and possible future evils", he would do his duty by giving his own opinion (11). A few lines further on he specified more clearly the nature of those present and future evils: the barbarians — not once does he pronounce the name of the Turks — seek to impose upon the free Thessalonians the yoke of servitude (12). Right in the middle of the discourse, the orator denounced the cowardice and the folly of certain individuals, not very numerous (*ἥλιοι*), who imagined that the meeting was held to determine whether they should *accept* the unacceptable and treacherous proposition of the Turks (13). Both the prince and the assembly convoked by him were, therefore, confronted by a Turkish proposal, precise, express and concrete, evidently the same one which Isidore Glabas summarized in those dramatic terms: pay or die. It is in the light of this significant fact, the existence of a definite Turkish ultimatum, that Manuel's discourse should be read. Since the speech is lengthy and extremely rhetorical (the extant text is clearly not that actually delivered by the Emperor, for before a popular audience he would surely have employed an idiom more intelligible to all), it seems sufficient to summarize it as follows:

I. *Exordium* (295, 1 - 296, 24).

The Thessalonians have been assembled to deliberate on the means of avoiding servitude to the barbarians, who have already subjected the rest of Macedonia. It would have been better to have convoked this assembly earlier when the enemy was attacking and besieging the other cities in the region, for in providing timely assistance to those cities, the Thessalonians would have ensured their own security. Nevertheless, Manuel did not then call his subjects together because he did not think he could stir them to action as long as their own city was not directly threatened. At the moment, however, with the danger close at hand, he fears that his exhortation might seem superfluous.

(10) *Discourse*, p. 295, 3.

(11) *Discourse*, p. 296, 24-28.

(12) "ζητοῦσι ... ζυγὸν ὑμῖν ἐπιθεῖναι δουλείας": *Discourse*, p. 296, 30-31.

(13) *Discourse*, p. 298, 33-35.

II. *First Thesis* (296, 24 - 299, 35).

For all men, but especially for the Thessalonians, it is preferable to die rather than lose their freedom, above all when the master is a barbarian.

1. Since the assembly has been called into being and each one may give his opinion, Manuel will give his. The barbarians seek to impose the yoke of servitude on his hearers, a yoke which is always burdensome and shameful for all men whom God has created free, but which is doubly heavy and shameful when the master is a tyrant and a barbarian and when the people subjected are accustomed to freedom, as is the case with the Thessalonians who are exempt even from the tribute which the free Romans pay to their emperors. (296, 24 - 297, 11)

2. The cities already fallen were the cause of their own misery and of the success of the enemy because, in the face of an ever-alert foe, each one remained indifferent to the lot of its neighbor and, on seeing the destruction of others, did not even take thought for its own safety. This indolence must come to an end. The Thessalonians should recall that they are Romans, that their fatherland is that of Philip and Alexander, and that their ancestors have subdued powerful nations, of whom the Turks were merely the lowly and despised servants. (297, 11-34)

3. They should take heart, then, and conduct themselves as a people which does not depend on any human aid. The barbarians, more inclined to pleasure than desirous of glory, willingly endure sufferings and privations in order to conquer the Thessalonians. These, therefore, should be motivated by a greater ambition and should exert themselves to drive off the enemy, who has for so long a period waged an unjust war against them. (297, 34 - 298, 4)

4. It would be an unbearable humiliation for the traditional pride of the Thessalonians not to enjoy a greater freedom than the other cities from the Danube to Euboea, even in Turkish Anatolia, which still belong to the Roman Empire. (298, 4-15)

5. If the barbarians claim that they wish only to tax the possessions of the Thessalonians, it would still be shameful even to think of accepting, although necessity could be alleged in excuse. But they actually demand far more: they want to reduce the citizens of Thessalonica to the condition of slaves even though they are cunning enough not to state this openly. It is a ruse all too manifest, for it is the same one they have employed to deceive and subdue the other cities. (298, 15-26)

6. Great are the insolence and the folly of the barbarians if they think their old tricks will enable them to subject the Thessalonians. Great, too, are the cowardice and ignorance of those individuals who imagine that this assembly has been called to see whether the propositions of the barbarians should be accepted. If they should actually accept them, they would really deserve the slavery which would follow. No, this will not be. The Thessalonians must battle even to the death for that glory which a slave can neither acquire nor, once it is lost, recover. (298, 26 - 299, 5)

7. The cowards and fools against whom these words are directed are not very numerous. Moreover, Manuel is certain that the majority of his hearers would prefer to suffer death rather than fall under the yoke of barbarian masters. The barbarians are also unbelievers and exert pressure to make unbelievers of their subjects, pressure so strong that only martyrs can resist. (299, 6-23)

8. The orator and his audience, then, prefer death to slavery, and so do all men except those who have the intelligence of a child and the courage of a weak woman and who do not see any difference between the life of a free man and that of a slave. Such a person is a disgrace to his nation; if such a one should exist in Thessalonica he should correct himself immediately in order to obtain Manuel's pardon. (299, 24-35)

III. *Second Thesis* (299, 35 - 301, 39).

It is necessary to try to obtain from the enemy peace conditions which will effectively guarantee life and liberty. If this cannot be done, the enemy's proposals must be rejected and, after first seeking to render God propitious, the Thessalonians must have recourse to arms.

1. Since the audience is now convinced that slavery is worse than death, the principal aim of the orator has been attained. But he will go further by indicating the appropriate means for safeguarding both liberty and life, which is even better than dying for freedom. To this end the Thessalonians must be ready to suffer, to engage in battle, to pay no heed to wounds and to persevere tenaciously in whatever activities are demanded. When glory and life are at stake, human nature is capable of supporting almost anything. (299, 35 - 300, 13)

2. If financial means could bring about events which would oblige the enemy to make peace, it would be a joyful advantage. What we now possess is the fruit of our labor. To purchase the necessary time for labor is not to pay out money, it is to take it in. (300, 13-20)

3. There is no reason for despair. Have not the Thessalonians, without adequate military preparation, but thanks to their protector, St Demetrius, gained several victories over the barbarians? There have been battles between galleys, actions carried out with small pirate craft, battles on land where the Turks are in their element. With courage, bravery and appropriate strategy, will not the Thessalonians be able to accomplish even more? (300, 20-32)

4. If someone should raise the objection that the enemy is more powerful and that it is necessary to send envoys to negotiate a peace treaty with him, Manuel agrees, but on one condition: that it be a real peace treaty, not merely a form of slavery disguised by the name of treaty, as the fisherman's hook is hidden under the bait. This deceit has been the instrument *par excellence* of the Turkish rise to power. (300, 32 - 301, 8)

5. If the envoys return with a peace treaty, the Thessalonians should express their gratitude to Providence and they may look for the proximate

ruin of the barbarian. For human fortune is changeable and the past evils were a punishment for offenses against God. But, once they have become reconciled with God, the chastisement will cease. (301, 8-21)

6. If, therefore, the ambassadors succeed in negotiating a truce, it will presage a better future. If, on the contrary, God should harden the heart of the barbarian, as He did in the case of Pharaoh, this may also be another way of manifesting His power. Although they should take all the necessary steps, Christians should not forget that the final outcome depends on God and that He never abandons the just. This is proved by the example of Jericho [where faith caused the walls to collapse] and of Nineve, which averted destruction by penance. But it is not for Manuel, a simple layman and sinner, to preach penance to others. (301, 21-39)

IV. *Peroration* (301, 39 - 302, 23).

Through the intercession of St Demetrius may God grant to the orator and to his audience the grace of this penance which brings with it all the goods of this world and of the next. May the Thessalonians do all in their power to avoid slavery, to which they should prefer even death, for this is not the worst of evils, but the last and it soon puts an end to all other evils. Thus many men have thought and will continue to think, above all others, the inhabitants of those cities subjected to the barbarians who would rather be dead than endure their present slavery. It is necessary, therefore, to sacrifice everything to escape this fate, which, so Manuel believes, he has demonstrated to be the worst of all evils.

In this summary of Manuel's *Discourse* four points should claim our attention; the first three are treated in the discourse while the fourth is a question which the reader will spontaneously ask after having considered the second and third points. These four points are: 1) the victories of the Thessalonians over the Turks, which have been discussed in the preceding chapter. 2) The Turkish ultimatum. 3) The embassy which Manuel agreed to send to negotiate with the Turks. 4) The result of these negotiations.

The Turkish ultimatum necessarily contained three clauses: a) the Turkish demands; b) certain threats in case of refusal; c) certain concessions or promises in case of acceptance. Isidore Glabas, who is silent on this third point, sums up the demands and the threats in the blunt and eloquent phrase: pay the tribute or be slaughtered. This means that if the Thessalonians should refuse to pay the tribute demanded of them, the Turks would attack the city and, after capturing it, the Ottoman commander,

whether he wished it or not, would have to allow his men to pillage and destroy, to take prisoners and demand ransom without restraint. From one end of the *Discourse* to the other Manuel presupposes this threat suspended over the heads of his audience; it is one of the alternatives, slavery or death.

That Manuel actually sent an embassy to the Turkish camp to discuss peace conditions can be held as certain, for in agreeing with the supposed objection, he is speaking with the authority of emperor and his agreement is a statement of his intention, namely, to send such an embassy. But exactly what his envoys were authorized to propose to the Turkish commander cannot be ascertained. Certainly he had no intention of permitting the Turks to enter the city and establish some sort of military occupation, but he may have been willing to settle for a compromise, including the payment of tribute and the recognition of some form of Turkish suzerainty. In any event, the Turkish reply must have been negative, for the siege ended, not with a treaty, but with Manuel's flight, the capitulation of the city and its occupation by the Turks.

2. Discord in Thessalonica

The principal reason for Manuel's failure and for the fall of Thessalonica can be sought not so much in Turkish military strength, but rather in the discord and lack of cooperation of the inhabitants themselves. During the brief Turkish attack on the city in 1372, Cydones, who knew his fellow citizens well, had feared an outbreak of civil strife and violence with more damage caused by the population within the city than by the enemy without⁽¹⁴⁾. These forebodings were realized during the siege of 1383-1387. In late summer or autumn 1384 he could blame Manuel's reverses on 'external causes': "Moses and those with him were unable to command their errant followers and the virtue of the leaders was defeated by the wickedness of their subjects" (15).

(14) Letter 77, 13-31, translated above, p. 55-56.

(15) Letter 273, 21-23.

The Thessalonians, fiercely attached to their own freedom, nonetheless found it difficult to unite in a common effort to gain or to defend that freedom. The hostility between the powerful land-owning class and the common people, which had culminated in the violent social upheaval of mid-century, undoubtedly still persisted and served only to aggravate the situation, rendering all the more difficult Manuel's endeavor to face the Ottoman menace. As soon as events took a turn for the worse, the Thessalonians began to grumble, criticize and propose their own views on meeting the crisis; each one had something to say. According to Manuel, they were all 'walking dictionaries', and he almost despaired of being able to convince them to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure the defense of the city ⁽¹⁶⁾. There were some, in fact, who publicly declared that it would be better to come to terms with the enemy rather than carry on what they considered a senseless struggle. Among these, so Cydones had heard, were some prominent personages in Thessalonica, who "do not hesitate to proclaim openly in public that the attempt to free our native land from the Turks is clearly to war against God" ⁽¹⁷⁾.

In this regard the sermons of Isidore Glabas are worth noting, for, while one may allow a certain amount of exaggeration in the pulpit, all the same, the catalogue of sins he ascribes to his flock is revealing. He has relatively little to say about personal or carnal failings, but he does lay great stress on the social or public sins: greed, lack of charity, selfishness, fraud, injustice and robbery — all symptoms of civil discord. "For we have often waged war against our own people; fathers have ignored nature and treated their sons more cruelly than beasts, and brothers have forgotten natural love for those to whom a common womb gave flesh. They have armed themselves against one another and have been cut down by one another's swords, and all these evils have continued among us" ⁽¹⁸⁾.

⁽¹⁶⁾ MANUEL, Letter 4 (LEGRAND, p. 5-6).

⁽¹⁷⁾ CYDONES, Letter 324, 39-42.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Sermon for the Eighth Sunday of Luke (in the Latin Church, the Twenty-seventh after Pentecost), delivered on 15 November 1383: *cod. Vat. gr.* 651, fol. 28v-41v; parts of this sermon taken from *cod. Angelicus* 51 (a copy of the Vatican *ms.*) have been published by LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου

More significant, perhaps, are the Metropolitan's repeated exhortations, both in sermons and in letters, to bring his flock to unite behind the Emperor and to obey him ⁽¹⁹⁾. These exhortations, as well as his tactful efforts to show that the peril facing Thessalonica ought not to be blamed on Manuel's policy, indicate clearly enough that there was disunity, lack of cooperation and criticism ⁽²⁰⁾. Isidore also found it necessary to justify the stern measures taken by Manuel to enforce his rule and to secure the funds needed for defense. "If the present uneven force of events necessitates some repression, that should be set down, not to the intent of his imperial mind, but to the pressure of the present situation" ⁽²¹⁾.

The extremely summary account of the siege given by Chalcocandyles agrees with the other sources in depicting the discord which reigned in Thessalonica. (Actually, he makes no mention of a siege but rather gives the impression that the mere approach of Khairaddin's army sufficed to bring about the surrender of the city.) "The conditions in the city were bad and he [Manuel] had no success at all, for the inhabitants, oppressed by him, treated him with insolence so that he had to depart in great haste by sea" ⁽²²⁾. It was, in fact, the discontent and the antagonism of his subjects which, in April 1387, compelled Manuel to flee. That summer from his temporary refuge on Lesbos he wrote a letter to his friend Cabasilas (probably Nicholas Chamaetos Cabasilas the mystic). Tormented by the mid-summer heat, he was even more afflicted by thoughts of his failure. After recalling the part he had played in the civil war of 1379-1381, he continued :

... ἐπιστολαί ", p. 349-351. This citation is taken from *cod. Vat. gr. 651*, fol. 37 (= LAMPROS, p. 350, 5-10).

(19) LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ..., ἐπιστολαί ", Letter 7, p. 385, 20 ss.

(20) "But if we should fall short of our good hopes, brethren, we should reckon the failure as due to our own faults and not to this golden and imperial person. When the members, rotten with disease, even though the head commands what is necessary, look on without movement or action, not for this cause is the head to be blamed": LAOURDAS, Ἰσιδώρου ... ὁμιλίαι, Homily I, p. 32, 9-13.

(21) *Ibid.*, p. 31, 32-34.

(22) CHALC., I, 42, 14-18. According to the Χρονικὸν περὶ τῶν Τούρκων Σουλτάνων, p. 25, 23-24, "the Thessalonian Christians were friends of the Sultan Murad", but Manuel denies this in his letter to Cabasilas.

In your fatherland [Thessalonica] I continued the battle against the enemies of the faith. But those on whose behalf I night and day chose death ought to have responded in like manner or at least to have felt grateful to me because of the dangers undergone for them. ... But they campaigned for the enemy, not so much by thinking or doing anything ignoble or false, but by busily weaving fancy plots against me as if I were tyrannizing over them — indeed, they were always accusing me of this and asserting that they were not inclined to give up their own freedom shamefully⁽²³⁾.

The picture which these sources draw of the Thessalonians is scarcely a flattering one. Unfortunately, it seems to be, in its general lines at least, an accurate likeness. However, as in the history of the Zealot Revolution, there is here, too, another side to the picture, and — once again — it is Cydones who suggests that all was not as black as might be thought. That the Thessalonians were hostile and refused to cooperate with Manuel is undeniable, but that such were the sentiments of all of them all during the siege is not true. Cydones had judged his fellow citizens rather harshly on several occasions, yet, when the city finally fell to the Turks, he found a few good words to write about them.

In the struggle against the barbarians they have given proof of valor and intelligence : they called in allies, obeyed their ruler without any jealousy or friction ; they shored up, as it were, the walls of the city by their mutual union and discipline and devoted more care to it than to their individual interests. Still, they have been defeated by one whom nobody, as we know, has thus far overcome. As someone has said, to die of starvation is most miserable ; for just as life is impossible without breathing, so one who lacks the most necessary nourishment can accomplish nothing. Nobody, therefore, could blame them and they would correctly be considered not as evil, but as unfortunate. This has happened and will happen to many other men and cities, to surpass their adversaries in valor and yet to be vanquished by fortune⁽²⁴⁾.

(23) Edited by R. J. LOENERTZ, " Manuel Paléologue, épître à Cabasilas ", *Μακεδονικά* 4 (1956), 35-46. This citation is found on p. 38-39, lines 21-28.

(24) Letter 332, 19-29.

3. Isidore Glabas, Metropolitan of Thessalonica

The role played by the Metropolitan of Thessalonica during the siege is not altogether clear and, for want of more detailed sources, several questions must be left unanswered. Two points, however, seem to justify the insertion of a special section about Isidore Glabas in this chapter: the first is the dispute about the secularization of church property in which both he and Manuel were necessarily involved; the second is Isidore's departure from Thessalonica less than a year after the beginning of the siege.

Within a month or so after the siege had begun, Isidore concluded one of his homilies with a forceful attack on those who were making inroads on ecclesiastical property. "Whenever we appropriate what belongs to the common benefactor of all, I mean those things which have been ascribed to the houses of God, and we think we shall become strong because we allow the fighting men to devour these goods, what sort of judgement shall we merit from God in our necessities"?⁽²⁵⁾ To the objection that this sequestering of church revenues was necessary for the defense of the city, the prelate replied that the only real strength of the Thessalonians was to be found in God and that by taking what belongs to Him they would find that instead of an ally, they would have made Him their enemy. Isidore then continued:

I am compelled to speak in this fashion because of certain men who are urging this most just Emperor to make changes in what has been allotted to the houses of God. For in many ways and on various occasions he has manifested his zeal for divine things and the great desire he cherishes to better the situation of the churches. And this is shown no less than on previous occasions by the present great struggle on behalf of St Sozon. I mean, as you well know, the property which has of old been granted to our most holy Church and which has been proved to remain in the possession of that Church, even though some high ranking dignitaries drag it off to other purposes. And if he [Manuel] has not now accomplished the ends he had in mind as quickly as he would have liked, owing to the pressure of events, yet he would furnish even in this no small marks of the divine favor. But

(25) "ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ πάντων ἀφαιρῶμεν εὐεργέτου, αὐτὰ λέγω τὰ τοῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ προσγραφέντα οἴκοις, καὶ ἰσχυροὶ γενέσθαι νομίζομεν ὅτι μαχίμοις ταῦτα συγγωροῦμεν κατεσθίειν ἀνδράσι, πόλας ἂν τῆς παρὰ Θεοῦ ῥοπῆς εὐπορήσαιμεν ἐν ἀνάγκαις;" *cod. Vat. gr. 651, fol. 40v.*

I will not cease to condemn what is hated by God, not even if they threaten to cut out my tongue, nor will I cease according to my strength to proclaim what is loved by God. The continuously flowing time will bear witness to this, if the divine favor has still determined that we remain here ⁽²⁶⁾.

Particularly in the mouth of the Metropolitan, the words, "this most holy Church", must refer to the Cathedral or Diocese of Thessalonica. St Sozon, then, would be the name of some property belonging to the Cathedral (or Diocese), perhaps an estate or farm attached to, or deriving its name from, a nearby church or monastery, but apart from its mention in this sermon, it is otherwise unknown ⁽²⁷⁾. In any case, the controversy referred to by Isidore is, in its broad outlines, clear enough: church property, which in this case belonged to his own Cathedral, had been requisitioned for military purposes, apparently to pay the troops defending the city. This sort of thing had been going on for a while — it is not the first time Isidore had assailed the practice ⁽²⁸⁾ — and the Metropolitan was determined to put an end to it. The question naturally arises: what was Manuel's role in the affair?

Actually, this was not the first time that Manuel had appropriated ecclesiastical possessions in an effort to extract himself or others from a difficult situation. During his first term as governor of Thessalonica, while he was yet Despot, he seems to have had recourse to the treasures of the church to extricate his father from financial embarrassment in Venice ⁽²⁹⁾. Shortly afterwards (in autumn 1371) he had secularized half of the property belonging to monasteries on Mt Athos and in Thessalonica to provide for

⁽²⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, fol. 41-41v (= LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ... ἐπιστολαί", p. 350, 28-351, 12).

⁽²⁷⁾ St Sozon, whose feast is kept on 7 September, was martyred in Lycaonia under the Emperor Maximian: F. HALKIN, *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca*, II (Bruxelles, 1957), 245. There was a church in Constantinople dedicated to him: R. JANIN, *La Géographie Ecclésiastique de l'Empire Byzantin*, I, tome III, *Les églises et les monastères* (Paris, 1953), 496.

⁽²⁸⁾ E. g. in his first homily on St Demetrius, 26 October 1383: LAOURDAS, Ἰσιδώρου ... ὁμιλίαι, p. 29, 38-39; in his second homily, 29 October: *ibid.*, p. 39, 18-26.

⁽²⁹⁾ Cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Jean V Paléologue à Venise (1370-1371)", *R. E. B.* 16 (1958), 224-226.

defense against the Ottoman peril⁽³⁰⁾. That he had experienced no scruples on the matter in the meantime is shown by the fact that some years later (in 1390) he again made use of ecclesiastical valuables in order to furnish security for a loan from the Hospitalers⁽³¹⁾. In autumn 1383, therefore, ruling Thessalonica with the added authority of emperor and with the Turks at the city gates, he would surely not hesitate to employ the same means to obtain the needed funds — despite the protests of the Metropolitan. Since Manuel was probably present when Isidore inveighed against the alienation of ecclesiastical revenues, the prelate, for obvious reasons, would not have attacked him directly. Rather, he centered his fire on certain counsellors who were urging "this most just Emperor" to secularize the property of St Sozon, and he excused Manuel for not having been able to rectify the situation, "owing to the pressure of events". One wonders whether this dispute had anything to do with Isidore's subsequent departure.

In the last line of the sermon cited above Isidore Glabas hinted at his eventual departure from Thessalonica. He had made no effort to conceal his plans⁽³²⁾, news of which had reached Constantinople, for the Patriarch Nilus had written to dissuade him⁽³³⁾. Isidore paid no heed and in spring 1384 sailed for the capital; further letters of the Patriarch to persuade him to return were of no avail. Finally, in September 1384 the Patriarch and his synod suspended the Metropolitan of Thessalonica from his functions for having abandoned the church and the flock committed to him, a dereliction of duty especially grave in the cir-

⁽³⁰⁾ This is clearly stated in a *prostagma* of Manuel himself dated December 1408: ed. V. Moštin, *Akti iz svetogorskih arhiva, Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Spomenik* 91 (drugi razred 70) (Belgrade, 1939), p. 164-167. Cf. also G. OSTROGORSKIJ, *Pour l'Histoire de la Féodalité Byzantine*, French transl. by H. Grégoire (= *Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae, Subsidia*, I; Bruxelles, 1954), 155-179; Ihor ŠEVENČKO, "Nicholas Cabasilas' "Anti-Zealot" Discourse: a Reinterpretation", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 11 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 79-171. Could this discourse of Cabasilas have been directed, at least in part, against Manuel?

⁽³¹⁾ LOENERTZ, "Jean V Paléologue à Venise", 226 and 231-232.

⁽³²⁾ "While we were there [in Thessalonica] we frequently spoke of our departure (φύγην)": Letter of Isidore to Dositheus Carentenus of 14 September 1385: LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ... ἐπιστολαί", p. 381, 18.

⁽³³⁾ *M. M.*, II, no. 378, p. 85.

cumstances, for "when those Christians were struggling for their lives and subjected to such danger, you fled and betrayed them" (34).

Notwithstanding Isidore's assertion that he would soon return (35), the Thessalonians made no secret of their disapproval of his flight, and their sentiments found expression in a letter of Dositheus Carentenus, a priest in Thessalonica, which was written on 14 July 1385 but arrived in Constantinople only on 12 September (36). This letter produced immediate results: within two days Isidore replied to Dositheus and, in addition, sent a pastoral letter to the Thessalonians (37). In the latter he apologized for his absence which, so he asserted, had been prolonged against his will: nonetheless, this separation had not diminished his affection for his flock nor made him oblivious of their sufferings. After again promising to return to them soon, he exhorted them, "as I have often preached to you, beloved, both by word and by letter", to obey the Emperor [Manuel], who is God's minister: whoever disobeys the Emperor rebels against God: their only hope of escaping the terrible dangers now confronting them consists in their being united with their ruler: only in this way will they be able to defeat the barbarians.

The letter to Dositheus Carentenus, written the same day, furnished a more detailed answer to the accusation that he had willingly abandoned his flock. The Metropolitan repeated that his absence was prolonged against his will and he gave six proofs of this:

(34) "ἀφ' οὗ παρητήσω τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν": *ibid.*, p. 85-86. Taking παρατεῖναι in its strictly classical sense, L. PETIT ("Les évêques de Thessalonique", *E. O.* 5 (1901), 94-95) thought that Isidore had resigned. He was followed in this view by LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ... ἐπιστολαί", p. 402, and N. VEIS, "Αἱ προσχέλαι ἐπεγραφαὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Δημητρίου Θεσσαλονίκης καὶ ὁ μητροπολίτης αὐτοῦ Ἰσιδωρος Γλαβᾶς († 1396)", *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 7 (1928/29), 145. But παρατεῖναι must here have the meaning of the modern παρατεῖω, to abandon, for if Isidore had resigned or even offered to do so, there would have been no reason for the Patriarch to suspend him.

(35) In his letter to the Thessalonians of 14 September 1385, he wrote: "I have formerly written to you that, God willing, I would return after a short time": Letter 7, LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ... ἐπιστολαί", p. 382, 11-12.

(36) From Isidore's reply: Letter 6, *ibid.*, p. 379, 8-9.

(37) Letters 6 and 7, *ibid.*, p. 379-386.

1) The procuring of the provisions; 2) the fact that my brother has come to you because of these, for you know well that only something inevitable leads me to suffer separation from him; 3) the not inconsiderable expenditure for these and the concern that solemn and official documents might be issued by the rulers so that we could return to you — the intermediary was the good Lascaris Nestenkos; 4) other not small gifts which truly put our power to the test; 5) our servile but certainly willing encounter and homage when he bearing the second position of authority after the great one entered Constantinople; 6) our other frequent passing of time about the palace ⁽³⁸⁾.

All this he has done solely that he might be allowed to see Thessalonica, but his efforts have been in vain, for he is prevented from returning by a command of the Emperor, whom, so he argues, the canons of the church oblige him to obey ⁽³⁹⁾. If, perchance, these arguments should not succeed in convincing the Thessalonians, they may rely on the testimony of their fellow citizens, Tzymiskes, Climaticus, Rosostas and others; "this indeed is the truth, we remain here against our will" ⁽⁴⁰⁾. As a final proof of his sincerity he adds that, just as he had foretold his departure from Thessalonica and it actually took place, why should they doubt him now when he foretells his return ⁽⁴¹⁾?

Many points in this *apologia* remain obscure. What, for instance, were the provisions for which his brother came to Thessalonica ⁽⁴²⁾? Were they some of Isidore's personal belongings sent there as an indication that their owner would soon follow? Could they be provisions procured by Isidore for the population of the beleaguered city? Further, for what end did he make expenditures, distribute gifts and spend time about the imperial palace? It is not impossible that he may have been engaged on a mission for Manuel II, presumably to effect a reconciliation and to obtain aid: it would be a delicate enough task, one requir-

⁽³⁸⁾ Letter 6, *ibid.*, p. 380, 2-12.

⁽³⁹⁾ Canon 16 of the *Prima-Secunda* synod of Constantinople, 861: G. A. RHALLIS and M. POTLIS, *Σύνταγμα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων*, II (Athens, 1852), p. 696. Isidore cites this *ad sensum* making it say more or less the contrary of what it actually says.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ... ἐπιστολαί", Letter 6, p. 380, 12-381, 2.

⁽⁴¹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 381, 17-27.

⁽⁴²⁾ On the brother of Isidore, cf. VEIS, "Αἱ πασχάλαι ἐπεγραφαί", 142, n. 3.

ing the distribution of money in the right places and it would be a topic preferably not discussed by letter. Could the imperial command retaining him in the capital have been that of Manuel II? Such a supposition, however, is rather unlikely, for the relations between Manuel and Isidore were not unmarred by serious differences: the dispute over secularization of church property and the fact that Manuel would soon make unionistic overtures to the pope, a project to which Isidore, a convinced hesychast (and consequently anti-Latin), would be unalterably opposed. On the other hand, if he were forced to remain in the capital by order of John V, one would expect that the same Emperor could have prevented the Patriarch from suspending him. A further problem is presented by the fifth argument of Isidore. Who was the second in authority after the great one, that is, after the Emperor John V? The phrase could refer to Andronicus IV or, if the visit occurred after June 1385 (when Andronicus died), to his son, John VII, who also bore the imperial title and was recognized as successor to the throne. Finally, the possibility of a visit of Manuel II to the capital should not be excluded, but it is strange that such a visit has left no trace in the correspondence of Cydones. The scarcity of sources, however, renders impossible an adequate explanation of this entire episode, and the suspicion arises that the Metropolitan of Thessalonica himself preferred the relative comfort of Constantinople to the rigors of a siege and the prospect of capture by the Turks.

In one respect the efforts and expenditures of Isidore were successful, not that he returned to his see, but he was restored to his dignity and function of metropolitan. In March 1386 he reappeared as a member of the patriarchal synod⁽⁴³⁾. This surprising reinstatement was probably brought about by order of John V, for relations between Isidore and the Patriarch Nilus remained cool. In a letter to the Metropolitan of Old Patras, written sometime after his rehabilitation, Isidore mentioned that he spent most of the time in his cell, going to the *patriarcheion* only when asked to assist at feasts or to perform necessary services: otherwise he preferred not to present himself there "because of the past", but that is finished with and he now caused scandal

(43) *M. M.*, II, no. 370, p. 73.

to nobody⁽⁴¹⁾. Still, despite his repeated promises, he did not return to Thessalonica until two or three years after it fell to the Turks⁽⁴²⁾.

4. The Administrative and Literary Activity of Manuel II during the Siege

Notwithstanding the predominantly military preoccupations necessitated by the siege, Manuel II was also obliged to concern himself with the general routine procedure of the civil administration. In addition to these duties he devoted what time he could to his literary and rhetorical interests. An account, then, of his brief reign in Thessalonica would be incomplete without some reference to these two aspects.

Manuel's passion for the ancient Greek classics and his own accomplishments as a *littérateur* have already been mentioned, and the troubled circumstances of his five years in Thessalonica did not cause his activity in this field to slacken. First of all, there are his letters (several of them cited in these pages), which are not so much personal letters as brief literary essays on a variety of topics — classical literature, religion, philosophy and occasionally contemporary events and matters of a personal nature. In general, there is little spontaneity in these letters, overburdened as they are with classical allusions and written in conscious imitation of ancient models. Manuel must have spent much time in composing them, searching for the *mot juste* or the proper turn of a phrase, and in this he would seem to have been successful (although clarity is not his strongest point), for his letters occupy an important place in the history of Byzantine literature. His concern, however, for purity of style and his adherence to the classical rules of rhetoric are more obvious in his *Discourse to the Thessalonians*. Whatever may have been the

(41) LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ... ἐπιστολαί", Letter 5, p. 376-379. The only chronological indications are: 1) Isidore received the letter to which this is the reply on 19 November; 2) that August the plague in Constantinople had caused many deaths.

(42) Cf. above, p. 17.

original form of his address, he took pains to rework it, to polish it and to see that his friends — and posterity — saw only the revised version, in which Cydones found "a certain echo of Demosthenes".

During this period his literary interest manifested itself in other ways also: he procured, for example, a volume of Plato from Mt Athos for Cydones (although this was before the siege began), and he may well have taken advantage of his proximity to the Holy Mountain to enlarge his own library. It was, too, at about this time (probably 1383-1385) that Manuel had the letters, he received from Cydones copied into a book, with blank pages left for future letters⁽⁴⁶⁾. The good-natured reproaches of Cydones, who saw no reason for preserving "my foolish scribblings", went unheeded, and the Emperor entrusted the task of transcribing the letters to Acacius, characterized by Cydones as an intelligent and religious man (perhaps a monk)⁽⁴⁷⁾.

Most of the administrative activity of Manuel II during his reign in Thessalonica was connected with military problems and with foreign relations, which will be discussed in the two following chapters; only those acts bearing more directly on internal matters will be considered here. The position of Manuel at this time must not be lost sight of: not only did he pursue a foreign policy diametrically opposed to that of his father, John V, but within the confines of Thessalonica he acted with full authority. Although, strictly speaking, only associate Emperor, he performed acts such as the issuing of chrysobulls in his own name which were usually reserved to the head emperor. He was, in effect, an independent sovereign. For the administration of his small realm an imperial bureaucracy was necessary and was probably recruited on the spot from among his own retinue, although very few of his ministers are known by name. Acacius, whom the Emperor had engaged to copy the letters of Cydones, may well have been one. In 1383 Rhadenos, the favorite disciple of Cydones and a native Thessalonian, was appointed by Manuel to be one of his counsellors⁽⁴⁸⁾. The imperial secretary would seem to have been

⁽⁴⁶⁾ CYDONES, Letter 326, and Manuel's reply, Letter 10 (LEGRAND, p. 14).

⁽⁴⁷⁾ Letter 263, 10-11.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ CYDONES, Letter 270, 40-45.

Demetrius Cabasilas⁽⁴⁹⁾, and the position of chancellor (perhaps also that of treasurer) may have been held by Mouzalon, who, according to Cydones, was troubled by the impositions of the Turks and by difficulties encountered in his daily service of the Emperor⁽⁵⁰⁾.

Of the administration of Thessalonica during Manuel's reign only three official documents are known, three chrysobulls having to do with the convent of the Nea Moni in the city. This "New Monastery" had been founded around 1360 by Macarius Choumnos who, called by the Emperor sometime before 1374 to head the famous monastery of Stoudiou in Constantinople, left the community in charge of Gabriel, later to become metropolitan of Thessalonica⁽⁵¹⁾. Gabriel energetically set about completing the still unfinished construction, but his plans for the embellishment of the convent seem to have been larger than his resources, and the financial state of the monastery, already insecure when Macarius departed, must have been a source of anxiety for the new higoumenos. In fact, despite a series of donations the convent's economic condition came to such a pass that it later (before 1415) became necessary to place it under the dependence of one of the larger and wealthier monasteries of Mt Athos, the Grand Lavra. In 1382-1383 Macarius returned to Thessalonica and soon afterwards, in the monastery he had founded, he died in the arms of his disciple and successor. Gabriel remained in Thessalonica until at least January 1384⁽⁵²⁾, and "when there was no hope left that the city would not be taken by the enemy, and it was clear that he would soon be led into slavery", he fled from the city together with several other monks, who established themselves

(49) In 1386 Cydones wrote a letter to Demetrius asking him to show it to the Emperor if he thought it opportune and if Manuel were not too occupied with the defense of the city: Letter 329, 4-9.

(50) Letter 323, 11-14. The date is difficult to determine although, both from its position in Book XXX and its contents, it seems to have been written between 1383 and 1386.

(51) In recent years a number of articles have dealt with Macarius Choumnos, Gabriel and the Nea Moni; a good account of these studies is given by G. I. THEOCHARIDES, "Δύο νέες έγγραφα ἀφορώντα εἰς τὴν Νέαν Μονὴν Θεσσαλονίκης", *Μακεδονικά* 4 (1957), 315-320.

(52) In the document of Alexis (cited below) dated January 1384, Gabriel is mentioned as the present higoumenos.

in the monastery of Chora in Constantinople⁽⁵³⁾. Their example was followed by others, including the Archbishop of Thessalonica, Isidore Glabas. Cydones, in a letter to Rhadenos, has left a brief account of this exodus which probably continued during spring and summer 1384.

My advice for you is always the same : not to give in to dreams, but to get away from the conflagration while yet possible, and I do not think the Emperor will hinder you. Attached as he is to many men of worth, whose company pleases him more than yours, and whose virtue he thinks will profit the city as much as towers, even these he has already allowed to pack up and leave. And now these have left behind to the Turks all that for which they expended great labors, and as immigrants they make their home in [the monastery of] Chora, which they call the "Newer Monastery". Not only do they run away, but they also draw many others after them each day — whom it is not shameful even for you to imitate — even though these are obligated rather to despise death because of the habit they wear and more than all others to remain faithful to the city and to arm its future defenders by their prayers to God and their exhortations⁽⁵⁴⁾.

Although he had entered the monastery at an extremely tender age, Gabriel received a good education, perhaps in one of the better schools of Thessalonica. Apart from his learning and piety, he proved to be a capable administrator, and his successes seem to have aroused feelings of envy in others. Whatever the cause, he was cordially disliked by some of his colleagues, for example, Philotheus, superior of the Nea Moni after Gabriel's departure, and Isidore Glabas⁽⁵⁵⁾. But he knew how to make friends with the powerful such as the Caesar of Thessaly, Alexis

⁽⁵³⁾ The Encomium of Gabriel (unedited) in the *cod. Vat. gr. 1107*, fol. 253v-272v, states on fol. 263v : "τῆς οὐκ ἀγαθῆς τύχης λαμπρῶ τῷ ῥολίζῳ κατὰ τῶν ἀθλίων πνευσάσης Ῥωμαίων καὶ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἔτι καθεκτῆς οὐσης, ἀλλ' ἄρδην ἅπαν θ' ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη τὰ ἡμέτερα χειρὶ περ οὐκείᾳ κατενεγκεῖν ἀπειλούσης καὶ τῆς Θεσσαλονικέων πόλεως δεινῶς πολιορκουμένης καὶ μηδεμίας ἐλπίδος λοιπῆς οὐσης τοῦ μὴ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλῶναι τε καὶ θάπτον ἐξανδραποδισθῆναι, ἀνάγκην ὁ μέγας ὑφίσταται καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς θαυμαστοὺς προλιπεῖν πόνους καὶ τὴν Κωνσταντίνου καταλαβεῖν ἐλπίδας σωτηρίας ὑποτεινουσάν χρηστοτέρας."

⁽⁵⁴⁾ Letter 324, 25-36.

⁽⁵⁵⁾ Cf. the sarcastic remarks of Isidore Glabas in the three letters he wrote to Philotheus : LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρου ... ἐπιστολαί", Letters 2-4, p. 359-375, esp. p. 360, 5-12.

Angelus, and with Manuel II, from whom he received two letters ⁽⁵⁶⁾.

In connection with Gabriel's monastery of the Nea Moni Manuel II issued three chrysobulls, one of them in 1384 and two at an uncertain date between 1382 and 1387. The original documents are no longer extant but the reference to them in other acts leaves no doubt as to their existence. Ordinarily, however, the granting of a chrysobull, the most solemn form of imperial document, was reserved to the principal emperor, and if an associate emperor (which was Manuel's dignity at this time) issued one, it could only be to confirm one granted by his senior colleague ⁽⁵⁷⁾. Still, Manuel issued chrysobulls in his own name and without any reference (as far as we know) to any act of the head Emperor, John V.

The first of these chrysobulls is referred to in an act of donation (παραδοτικὸν γράμμα) of Alexis Angelus, Caesar of Thessaly, to the convent of the Nea Moni ⁽⁵⁸⁾. The original document of Alexis has been lost but, probably in 1394 when a dispute over the donated property arose between the Nea Moni and the monastery of Akapniou, a copy of it was made and authenticated as agreeing with the original by the Metropolitan of Thessalonica, Isidore Glabas ⁽⁵⁹⁾. The document declares that Alexis, because of his friendly relations with the late higoumenos of the Nea

⁽⁵⁶⁾ Both written during Gabriel's episcopate in Thessalonica: MANUEL, Letters 52 and 58 (LEGRAND, p. 78-79; 87-88).

⁽⁵⁷⁾ For a general study, cf. F. DÖLGER, "Das byzantinische Mitkaiserthum in den Urkunden", B. Z. 36 (1936), 123-145 (reprinted in DÖLGER, *Byzantinische Diplomatik* (Ettal, 1956), 102-129). One exception to this rule is furnished by a chrysobull of John VII of August 1408: F. DÖLGER, *Aus den Schatzkammern des Heiligen Berges* (Munich, 1948), p. 22 and no. 13, p. 52-54; also cf. DÖLGER, "Johannes VII., Kaiser der Rhomäer 1390-1408", B. Z. 31 (1931), 35, n. 4. Regarding the second chrysobull of Manuel II cited below, cf. further remarks of DÖLGER in V. LAURENT, "Une nouvelle fondation monastique des Choumnos: la Nēa Moni de Thessalonique", R. E. B. 13 (1955), 122, n. 5; also cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Un protagma perdu de Théodore I Paléologue regardant Thessalonique", E. B. Σ. 25 (1955), 170, n. 1.

⁽⁵⁸⁾ Text: THEOCHARIDES, "Δύο νέα έγγραφα", p. 321-322. More will be said about Alexis in the following chapter.

⁽⁵⁹⁾ *Ibid.*, 324-326.

Moni, Macarius Choumnos, as well as with the present higoumenos Gabriel and the other monks dwelling there, wishing to assist the convent, grants to it his *castron* of Kolyndros, which he possesses in virtue of a chrysobull of the Emperor Manuel Palaeologus and of the Despot Theodore, brother of the Emperor. Alexis, however, retains the *castron* until his death, at which time it is to pass to the ownership of the monastery.

The document was signed by Alexis and dated as of January, the seventh indiction: this could only be in the year 1384⁽⁶⁰⁾. Alexis received his title to Kolyndros δι' ὀρχομωτικοῦ καὶ χρυσοβούλλου of the Emperor Manuel and the Despot Theodore. Two documents are to be distinguished here: a ὀρχομωτικὸν γράμμα (πρόσταγμα) of Theodore granting the *castron* to Alexis and a χρυσόβουλλος λόγος of Manuel probably confirming the grant (the two are more clearly differentiated in the second document of Alexis, cited below). Theodore had been designated as governor of Thessalonica in 1376 but was unable to exercise any authority there until after escaping from prison in June 1379. Between this date and his appointment to rule the Morea in 1380-1381 he could — whether or not he personally visited Thessalonica — have signed the act giving Kolyndros to Alexis. Manuel, however, had no particular authority in Thessalonica at that time; the chrysobull, then, confirming Alexis' title to the *castron* must have been issued between November 1382, when Manuel arrived there, and January 1384, the date of Alexis' donation to the Nea Moni.

The second chrysobull is also known from an act of donation to the Nea Moni by Alexis Angelus; dated December 1389, it is very similar to the first one⁽⁶¹⁾. Alexis had received the hereditary right to the *monydrion* (small convent) of St Photis in Thessalonica from the generosity of the Emperors, a grant confirmed by a *prostagma* of the Despot Theodore and then further guaranteed by a chrysobull of the Emperor Manuel Palaeologus: now, after having reached an agreement about his property with the Turks, he gives the *monydrion* to the convent of the Theotokos, called the Nea Moni, for the salvation of his soul and that of his wife, the Caesarissa Rhadosthlava Angelina.

(60) *Ibid.*, 322-324.

(61) Text: LAURENT, "Une nouvelle fondation", 129-130.

The *monydrion* dedicated to St Photis⁽⁶²⁾, had, therefore, been bestowed on Alexis by the Emperors, presumably John V and Manuel, sometime before his right to the property was confirmed by Theodore, governor of Thessalonica (effectively, June 1379-1380/81). As in the case of the *castron* of Kolyndros, this was done by a *δικομωτικὸν γράμμα* of Theodore, which was later confirmed by a *χρυσόβουλλος λόγος* of Manuel II. The date of this chrysobull can be placed only between Manuel's arrival in Thessalonica in 1382 and the city's capture by the Turks in 1387.

The third chrysobull is mentioned by Manuel himself in a *prostagma* which he issued in March 1415⁽⁶³⁾, of which the following is a summary.

The palace (*αὐλή*) of my late uncle Sir Guy [de Lusignan] was given by my grandmother, Anna, to the convent of Sts Cosmas and Damian, which possessed it for some years, the act of donation having been confirmed by chrysobull of my late father. Later, as I was in the Peloponnesus on my way to Venice, my late aunt, ... Cantacuzena, asked me to give her this palace, which I did. Then, as events turned out differently, I recalled it to the treasury and gave it out in *pronoia* to certain ones. Meanwhile nobody informed me that it had first been given to the convent of Sts Cosmas and Damian. Still later, I granted it by chrysobull to the Nea Moni for the soul of the late Emperor, my grandfather, John Cantacuzenus, and the Nea Moni has possessed it for thirty one years until today. Now, during my visit to Thessalonica, the nuns have come to me with the official documents of my grandmother and my father and wish to have the property restored to them. The judges to whom I sent the case reported that this was true but that the improvements to the property made by the monks of the Nea Moni also had to be considered. Bearing all this in mind, I have now decided to divide the property into two equal shares, giving one to the Nea Moni and the other to the convent of Sts Cosmas and Damian.

The chrysobull of Manuel referred to was, then, delivered thirty one years before the present *prostagma*, that is, in 1384 (March?). Furthermore, John Cantacuzenus, for whom the monks were to pray, had died in 1383.

(62) St Photis was the sister of St Photina the Samaritan, martyred with other companions in the time of the Emperor Nero: F. HALKIN, *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca*, II (Bruxelles, 1957), 208. The existence and location of this *monydrion* are otherwise unknown.

(63) P. LEMERLE, "Autour d'un *prostagma* inédit de Manuel II: l'aulè de sire Guy à Thessalonique", *Silloge Bizantina in onore di Silvio-Giuseppe Mercati*, *Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici* 9 (1957), 271-276; text: 274-276.

These three chrysobulls issued by Manuel II during his five year reign in Thessalonica indicate (but do not conclusively prove) that he consciously acted with full independence of Constantinople, and that, practically speaking, he was not so much an associate Emperor as a rival Emperor, a situation which appears even more evident when one examines his conduct in the field of foreign relations.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE TURKS

1. Relations with other Greek States: Epirus and Thessaly

After the death of the Serbian Emperor Stephen Dušan in 1355, his realm which included most of Northern Greece crumbled into several principalities and petty jurisdictions. The half brother of Stephen, Simeon Uroš Palaeologus, forced to leave the Despotate of Epirus which he had been governing in the late Emperor's name, established himself in Kastoria where, in opposition to the son of Dušan, Stephen Uroš V, he had himself proclaimed emperor. About 1359 he extended his rule over Thessaly (Vlachia) and transferred his residence to Trikkala⁽¹⁾. Meanwhile, the Albanians had overrun the entire Despotate of Epirus with the exception of the city of Joannina whose citizens requested Simeon to provide them with a strong ruler. Simeon suggested his own son-in-law Thomas Preljubovič, then residing in Arta, and Thomas gladly accepted the offer, entering Joannina in 1366/67⁽²⁾. At the death of Simeon Uroš (the date is unknown but it was probably in the late thirteen sixties), his oldest son John succeeded him on the throne in Trikkala. All that is known about John's reign, however, is that in November 1372 he issued two *protagmata* in favor of Nilus, *Protos* of Stagi in Thessaly, and that between that date and November 1381 he abdicated and

(1) Most of this information is taken from the *Chronicle of Epirus*, ed. S. CIRAC ESTOPAÑAN, *Bizancio y España, El legado de la basiliisa María y de los déspotas, Thomas y Esaú de Joannina*, II (Barcelona, 1943), p. 35-53.

(2) *Chronicle of Epirus*, VIII-IX, p. 39-40.

was clothed with the monastic habit in the monastery of the Meteora⁽³⁾.

His place as ruler of Thessaly was taken, not by another emperor, but by Alexis Angelus, who bore the title of Caesar, and who is known only from a few charters and one or two references in chronological sources. Alexis first appears on the historical scene in November 1381 on the occasion of a local synod or ecclesiastical tribunal presided over by Nilus, Metropolitan of Larissa⁽⁴⁾. The synod, which regulated a property dispute in favor of the monastery of the Mother of God of the Great Gates in Thessaly, was convoked by "the very holy Caesars, Alexis Angelus and his honored wife Mary, who, by the Providence of God and the mercy of our powerful, holy and pious Lords and Emperors, honorably hold the governorship of the bark of Vlachia"⁽⁵⁾. In a document which the Caesar (the Lord of Thessaly) signed by his own hand this formula is equivalent to an explicit act of homage. The Emperors are those of Byzantium; John V, Andronicus IV, Manuel II, John VII, for the plural allows of no doubt (John Uroš Palaeologus was no longer emperor and he had neither successor nor colleague on the throne). The document was also signed by the ex-Emperor, John Uroš, now the monk Joasaph⁽⁶⁾. Unfortunately, this act tells us nothing of the origins of Alexis's authority but it makes clear that Thessaly had

(3) The document of November 1381 cited in the following note presents him already as a monk.

(4) Léon HEUZEY, "Jugement synodal en faveur du couvent de la Panaghia des Grandes-Portes", *Revue des Etudes Grecques* 32 (1919), 302-319; text: 306-317. For the correct date, 1381, cf. M. LASCARIS, "Byzantinoserbica saeculi XIV. Deux chartes de Jean Uroš, dernier Némanide", *Byzantion* 25-27 (1955-57), 294, n. 1. Also cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Notes sur le règne de Manuel II à Thessalonique 1381/82-1387", *B. Z.* 50 (1957), 390-396.

(5) HEUZEY "Jugement synodal", p. 306. His full name was Alexis Angelus Philanthropinus: N. VEIS, "Σερβικά καὶ Βυζαντινά γράμματα Μεταώρου", *Βυζαντινὰ* 2 (1911/12), 1-100; no. 24, p. 98-100.

(6) His name occurs twice in the document: first, in the list of those present: "the most holy Emperor, more venerable among the monks, Joasaph" (*Ibid.*, p. 306), and in the list of signatures: "John Uroš Palaeologus, by reason of the divine and angelic habit named Joasaph, monk" (*Ibid.*, p. 314).

transferred its allegiance from the Serbian to the Byzantine Empire.

Alexis's contacts with Byzantium, however, go further back than this, for he had received the title to some property in or near Thessalonica from the Byzantine governor, the Despot Theodore, sometime between June 1379 and April-May 1381⁽⁷⁾. This suggests, but does not solidly prove, that Alexis had already shifted his loyalty to Byzantium. In any case, he remained in the Greek political sphere, acknowledging the Emperor as his suzerain. During the years 1382-1387, however, it was not the Emperor John V in Constantinople that he recognized, but the Emperor Manuel II in Thessalonica. This is implied in the two grants made by Alexis to the Nea Moni (cited in the previous chapter): his property rights in Thessalonica were confirmed by chrysobulls of Manuel II. The Caesar of Thessaly, therefore, considered Manuel as his overlord, at least in the practical order⁽⁸⁾. Did this relationship have any further consequences? For example, did Alexis furnish any military aid to Manuel in his struggle against the Turks? On this point the sources are silent. But, whether he did or did not, his realm was invaded by Khairaddin's forces in 1386 and Larissa was captured⁽⁹⁾. Could this have been meant as a punishment for Alexis's support of Manuel? At any rate, the Lord of Thessaly seems to have weathered the storm, and sometime after December 1389 he departed from the stage of history as mysteriously as he had entered⁽¹⁰⁾.

At about the same time that Alexis made known his allegiance to Byzantium, Thomas Preljubović, Despot of Epirus, also acknowledged Greek instead of Serbian suzerainty. Brother-in-law

(7) Cf. the two documents of Alexis in favor of the Nea Moni in Thessalonica, cited at the end of the previous chapter.

(8) According to Chalcocondyles (I, 48, 6-7), Manuel was at this time ruling Macedonia and Thessaly.

(9) TAESCHNER-WITTEK, "Die Vezirfamilie", 75 and 84.

(10) In August 1388 he decided a monastic property dispute: VEIS, *op. cit.*, no. 6, p. 24-27. His act of donation to the Nea Moni of December 1389 (cited above) is the last sign of life we have of him. His kinsman (or brother) Manuel succeeded him as ruler of Thessaly, for a document of Joasaph, Metropolitan of Larissa, in 1392/93 speaks of his lord, the "Caesar Manuel Angelus Philanthropinus": VEIS, *op. cit.*, no. 9, p. 36-38.

of the ex-Emperor John Uroš Palaeologus, whose father had installed him in Joannina, capital of the Despotate, he had more than held his own against the repeated assaults of the Albanian chieftain, Ghin Boua Spata. To obtain further support against the inroads of his redoubtable adversary and to expand his own realm, he made a pact in June 1380 with the Ottoman Beglerbeg, Lala Shahin, with whose support he took a number of towns ⁽¹¹⁾. In spring 1382 this alliance resulted in more conquests both for Lala Shahin and for Thomas ⁽¹²⁾. Within the year, however, he made a sudden change in his foreign policy: he recognized Manuel II in Thessalonica as his overlord, thus breaking off his alliance with the Turks. The reasons for this move are not completely clear, and the historian can do no more than present the facts together with a possible interpretation of them.

The same year [6891 *anno mundi* = 1382/83] on the eighth of September the Metropolitan, Lord Matthew, came to his own throne, continuing to hold also the throne of Naupactus. The same year Lord Gabriel, the very revered higoumenos of the Archimandreion, was sent to the Emperor, Lord Manuel Palaeologus; he returned to Joannina with the Archon Mangapha and they invested him [Thomas] with the despotic insignia. After the prelate had celebrated the divine liturgy, he received the possessions of his own church ⁽¹³⁾.

The political separation of Epirus from Byzantium had also had its effect on the church, bringing the see of Joannina into the orbit of the Serbian patriarchate. The submission of Thomas Preljubović to the Byzantine Empire, then, involved a reconciliation with the Greek Church as well. Whether at the insistence of Manuel II or in order to placate his Greek subjects, Thomas allowed Matthew, Metropolitan of Joannina, to take

⁽¹¹⁾ *Chronicle of Epirus*, XXIII, p. 46.

⁽¹²⁾ *Ibid.*, XXV, p. 47-48.

⁽¹³⁾ *Chronicle of Epirus*, XXVI, p. 48. Gabriel became Metropolitan of Joannina in 1386 (*Ibid.*, XXXIII, p. 50-51). The Archimandreion is the monastery of the Dormition in the same city. Mangaphas (or Mangavanos) is otherwise unknown. This embassy must have occurred after the beginning of November 1382, since before that Manuel was still in Constantinople and the envoy of Thomas would have been sent to John V, not to Manuel.

possession of his bishopric and had him celebrate the solemn liturgy which accompanied his investment as despot⁽¹⁴⁾.

With the disintegration of the Serbian Empire of Trikkala, from the ruler of which he had received the despotate, Thomas may have felt that his own claim to Epirus had become shaky, and in order to legitimatize it he sought recognition from Byzantium, for the title of Despot could be conferred only by the Emperor. However, why did he send his envoy to Thessalonica instead of to Constantinople? Perhaps merely because Thessalonica was closer, but there may also have been other reasons. He may have discovered that his alliance with Lala Shahin was a two-edged sword and, that while some towns fell to himself, others fell to the Turk. In any case, their joint campaign of spring 1382 is the last record we have of his cooperation with the Ottoman forces. It is not impossible that news of Manuel's victory over the Turks in the late autumn of 1382 had reached Joannina — perhaps the commander of the defeated Turkish army was Lala Shahin himself. Thomas might have been so impressed by this victory that he hastened to align himself with the young Emperor. Much of this, however, is mere conjecture. What is certain is that Thomas Preljubović, whatever his motives, by accepting the insignia of Despot from Manuel II acknowledged him as his overlord and brought Epirus back into the Greek political sphere.

The submission of Epirus to Manuel II does not seem to have had any practical consequences, and although Thomas had — at least implicitly — committed a hostile act against the Turks, he suffered no harmful effects. However, his perennial enemy, Ghin Boua Spata, was not so fortunate, for in September 1384

(14) The wanderings of Matthew are a bit difficult to trace. In July 1367 he was transferred from the see of Leukas to that of Naupactus, but since this city was then in Latin hands he was to reside in Arta: *M. M.*, I, no. 235, p. 493-494. In June and September 1380 he had the title of Kernitza: *M. M.*, II, no. 335-336, p. 9-12. In March 1381 he was transferred to the see of Joannina: *M. M.*, II, no. 342, p. 23-25. But he still held the see of Naupactus and in 1382/83 or later he left Joannina to reside in Arta, possibly owing to some conflict with the Despot Thomas: *Chronicle of Epirus*, *loc. cit.*

Timurtash led a large Ottoman army against Arta and returned home with many prisoners ⁽¹⁵⁾. This shocked Spata into proposing to Thomas that they make a mutual alliance against the Turks, but the Despot of Epirus refused; either he was unwilling to reconcile himself with the Albanian or he had come to realize that the Ottoman Emir, and not the Greek Emperor, was the real power in the Balkans. In any case, it made little difference, for on 13 December just before dawn Thomas was murdered by his palace guards. Immediately Spata made another assault against Joannina, and at about the same time a Florentine, Esau Buondelmonti, brother of the Duchess of Cephalonia, was chosen to succeed Thomas Preljubović as ruler of Epirus, and within six weeks he married Mary, his predecessor's widow ⁽¹⁶⁾. The following year he sought and obtained recognition as despot, not from Thessalonica, besieged by the Turks, but from Constantinople, and he also paid a visit to Murad I, presumably in Adrianople ⁽¹⁷⁾. Epirus, therefore, became, under Byzantium, a subject state of the Turks, and whatever support Manuel in Thessalonica might have looked for from Joannina never materialized.

2. Relations with Constantinople

The treaties of May 1381 and November 1382, which definitively barred Manuel from the succession to the throne, hardly augured good relations between John V and his second son. In fact, at about the time that the second treaty was signed, Manuel let his irritation be known in unmistakable fashion: he secretly left the capital and established himself as independent Emperor in Thessalonica. There he waged war against the Turks with whom his father was not only at peace, but whose Emir he re-

⁽¹⁵⁾ *Chronicle of Epirus*, XXVII, p. 48.

⁽¹⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, XXIX-XXX, p. 49. Practically nobody, including his wife Mary, was overwhelmed with grief at Thomas's violent passing. This and the fact that at the time of the murder Esau, who seems to have been acquainted with Mary before this, found himself conveniently close to Joannina permit one to entertain a few suspicions. But that belongs to another story.

⁽¹⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, XXXII and XXXIII, p. 50-51.

cognized as his suzerain. Furthermore, Manuel's audacious and rebellious act had induced others to follow him so that — at least, according to Cydones — the *élite* of the Byzantine nobility abandoned Constantinople for Thessalonica. The old Emperor's displeasure can be gathered from the fact that in the fall of 1382 those who were even suspected of joining Manuel were punished for disloyalty and treason⁽¹⁸⁾. Even the mail was not safe, for a couple of years later Cydones alleged as an excuse for not writing often to Rhadenos the fact that letters from Thessalonica were opened before he received them⁽¹⁹⁾. All of this could not be expected to encourage cordial feelings between father and son.

Not long after Manuel's departure, however, John V had even more trouble with another son, Andronicus IV. A mere treaty — in fact, two treaties — could not easily have smoothed over the previous bitter relations between the two: John's blinding and imprisoning of Andronicus; Andronicus' disobedience, two armed rebellions and the imprisonment of his father. The intervention of the Church and the threat of ecclesiastical penalties had very little effect; neither did the almost excessive concessions made by John succeed in satisfying Andronicus, who would be content with nothing less than the immediate possession of the Empire.

The treaty with Genoa of November 1382, which was drawn up "so that they [John and Andronicus] might live peacefully", stipulated that neither one of them should wage war against the other. On the bottom of the page containing the contemporary copy of the treaty preserved in the Genoese Archives the scribe added some ten lines, of which the first three read as follows:

Know that not only were the above articles not observed, but the afore-said Emperor Lord Andronicus took one fortress and the Lord Emperor [John V] went forth in order to defend his territory. And he [Andronicus] advanced against his father with his whole force and God preserved the Lord Emperor [John V] from the wrath and evil intent of his son⁽²⁰⁾.

(18) In summer 1383 Cydones wrote to John Asanes in Euboea: "Certain men are also trying to convince the Emperor [John V] that you intend moving to Thessalonica and the New Empire. Since you were here, you are quite aware how much harm this brought to those last year who were suspected and you know that they were punished". Letter 264, 79-82.

(19) Letter 305, 18-25, written in spring or early summer 1385.

(20) Text: R. J. LOENERTZ, "Fragment d'une lettre de Jean V Paléolo-

The rest of the note is a fragmentary copy of a letter addressed by John V to the Commune of Genoa between 1387 and 1391 in which he accused the Genoese of Pera of violating the treaty by openly favoring Andronicus IV and his son John VII in their plots against him. Although peace may have reigned for some time after the compromise of November 1382, certainly by spring 1385, if not before, the antagonism between John V and his oldest son again erupted in armed strife. Apparently Andronicus took the initiative by capturing a fortress belonging to his father in the vicinity of Melitias, about halfway between Constantinople and Selymbria, the former's residence⁽²¹⁾. The old Emperor regarded this as a declaration of war and took the field once more at the head of his army. The battle, which was fought near Melitias, was bitter and bloody and for some time the issue was uncertain, for John V and his followers barely escaped being slain; finally, however, Andronicus was defeated and retired to Selymbria⁽²²⁾.

Sometime after this combat and before the death of Andronicus at the end of June 1385, Cydones wrote to Manuel:

I do not know what to write so as neither to cause grief to you nor distress to myself, for in speaking of events there I should give outright utterance to the desires and victory songs of the enemy, and in recalling what is happening among us I should record other and worse facts, if, that is, the admission of slavery by those who have completely submitted to the enemy is much worse than the condition of those who have not yet endured this, but who still carry on the struggle for freedom against them and do not despair of seeing better days. For these reasons I was inclined to remain silent, wishing to spare myself the unpleasantness of discussing such matters. On the other hand, aware of my obligation to write to you and not wishing to deny you this debt, which on being paid will perhaps bring you also pleasure, I refrain from recalling those disagreeable topics I spoke of and only

gue à la commune de Gènes 1387-1391", *B. Z.* 51 (1958), 37-40. It was formerly published by L. T. BELGRANO, "Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera", *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 13 (1894), no. 26, p. 133-140. Belgrano, however, does not seem to have understood the nature of the document.

(21) *B. X.* 15, 22-25, p. 32. Sometime before this Andronicus had sent John VII to Murad to request a fortress, perhaps the same one: Note to Genoese treaty cited above, LOENERTZ, "Fragment d'une lettre", line 4. Melitias (the ancient Melantias) is a village in Thrace eighteen miles from Byzantium on the river Athyros.

(22) *Ibid.*, also letter of Cydones translated below.

pray — in words which He knows — to Him who directs our affairs, that He will grant you the grace to better the lot of your subjects according to your intentions and will grant me the opportunity to speak to your sacred person whom I have for a long time desired to see — if it will ever be possible for me to attain to this desire, I do not know.

May, therefore, God grant this boon which would be a remedy for our many sorrows. The other things have taken hold of us again like a periodic attack of illness, the old and ever new evil, I mean the war of nature. For it was necessary that this, too, should not leave us, so that we might be struck from all sides. Since I know that many messengers will come to you, I do not, then, intend to speak about this, so that I may not once more seem to be telling a tale of misfortune, which was just what I was saying I would be careful not to write. This only I want you to know, that you pointed out many seers who were foretelling that grief would come to the Emperor unless you were at his side. And the prophecy has turned out worse than all expectation. For the Emperor has often fought against many adversaries for the sake of glory, whereas now for the first time he struggles for his life against his own son. As a result, even those who then loudly proclaimed that your departure would not harm the Emperor, not even those men can now go on being impudent, since neither would your brother have begun his rebellion against his father, the Emperor, if you were present, nor, if he had dared anything of the sort, would he have gone unpunished. You have, therefore, with the testimony of friends, the added witness of your enemies ⁽²³⁾.

Another letter written soon after this describes the same sad state of things in the capital:

To the foreign wars there has now been added civil strife, which formerly spread destruction everywhere and which the fault of all of us has now pushed to a point beyond repair. Nature is disregarded; family ties are merely a name; the one means of life is to betray one's own race and fellow citizens. Even now utter disaster was just barely averted only because God, by enforcing his law in favor of parents, snatched the Emperor and the others from a most shameful death ⁽²⁴⁾.

Back in Selymbria after his defeat near Melitias, Andronicus fell ill and, on 28 June 1385, brought his turbulent existence to an end; he was buried in the monastery of the Pantocrator in Constantinople ⁽²⁵⁾. The old Emperor's troubles, however, were

⁽²³⁾ Letter 308.

⁽²⁴⁾ Letter 309, 83-89.

⁽²⁵⁾ *B. X.* 15, 25-27, p. 32; 52, 39-40, p. 89. The latter, which also mentions the day of the week (Wednesday), is clearer and more exact. The

not yet over, for Andronicus' son, John VII, inherited both his father's residence of Selymbria and his hostility towards John V. In this the young John received the open support of the Genoese of Pera, who rendered him the ritual acclamations and honors due to an emperor. Furthermore, when John V had sailed by the walls of Pera on his return from Melitias, neither the municipal authorities nor the citizens accorded him the customary honors⁽²⁶⁾. The political import of these gestures was obvious and would have its effect a few years later when John VII, with Genoese support, seized power in Constantinople for some months. That story, however, lies beyond the scope of the present study.

During this period of renewed civil war the relations between John V and Manuel II grew no better, becoming particularly unpleasant towards 1386-1387 as John saw that his son's bold action would soon bring about the loss of Thessalonica, the second city of his Empire. The strong opposition, especially in ecclesiastical circles, to Manuel's negotiations with Pope Urban VI (which occurred at about this time) and the consequent discourteous reception of the papal legate in Constantinople must have had its influence on John and only served to widen the breach between father and son⁽²⁷⁾. In fact, John contemplated drawing up an official document of reproach against his son, which Cydones, who had composed the extremely laudatory proemion to the chrysobull of 1371/72, hoped he would not have to write⁽²⁸⁾. Probably early in 1387, when the fall of Thessalonica was imminent, the Emperor called a council to decide on Manuel's fate; Cydones, because of his close friendship with Manuel, was excluded⁽²⁹⁾. Still, while John was determined that Manuel should not go

same date is also found in two short notices in a *Horologion* preserved in the monastery of Leimon on Lesbos; ed. M. GEDEON, "Ἀναγνώσεις ἐκ τοῦ Ὁρολογίου τῆς τῶν Ἀκοιμήτων μονῆς", *Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Ἀλήθεια* 23 (1903), 380-382.

(26) "Item post mortem imperatoris domini Andronici exaltauerunt et fecerunt laudem nepoti meo in Peyra... Ego autem, rediens de exelcitu traniui per Peyram per mare et mihi non leuauerunt laudem nec fecerunt illa que erant consuedi facere": note to Genoese treaty cited above, lines 4-7.

(27) Cf. CYDONES, Letters 327 and 334. The negotiations with the Pope form the subject of the following chapter.

(28) Letter 346, 4 ss.

(29) Letter 342, 16-21.

completely unpunished, he did not wish to reject him altogether — he knew he could not stand alone against the ambitions of his grandson, John VII. So he promised to restore Manuel to his position as heir and successor to the throne⁽³⁰⁾, thus, at least implicitly, rejecting John VII and the Genoese treaty of 1382 (which he might well have considered already violated by Andronicus' attack of 1385 and by continued Genoese hostility).

At this time Manuel, aware that he must leave Thessalonica, thought of fleeing abroad or to the Peloponnesus. Cydones, however, sought to dissuade him and advised him to return to Constantinople and his aged father who needed him. "But even if some previous unpleasant incident seemed to separate you for a short time, when you see one another again, nature will easily remedy this" ⁽³¹⁾. John V, angry at what he considered disobedience on Manuel's part, did not place the blame fully on his son, but on certain counsellors of his whom he held responsible for the entire affair in Thessalonica and for the ultimate loss of the city. Certain courtiers had also, according to Cydones, profited by Manuel's absence to feed fuel to the Emperor's suspicions. Cydones concluded his letter to Manuel (from which these details are taken) with an appeal for him to return :

Only return and show that you have decided to submit to your father, the Emperor, and that you are willing to obey his commands. And do not reckon it a dishonor for yourself if he orders you to return with few followers. For you should not think that his intention is to lessen your position, but it is rather to purge your entourage of men who, so he believes, have persuaded you to rise up against him, and at the same time he desires a token of your obedience for the future. If he should receive this, he will surpass the expectations of all in his generosity towards you⁽³²⁾.

⁽³⁰⁾ Letter 342, 71-72.

⁽³¹⁾ *Ibid.*, 67-69. In a tortuous sentence of his Letter to Cabasilas, Manuel makes a veiled allusion to the discord between himself and his father: ed. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Manuel Paléologue, épître à Cabasilas", *Μακεδονικά* 4 (1956), p. 46, 314-319.

⁽³²⁾ Letter 342, 76-83. Also cf. Letter 332.

3. The Alliance of Manuel with Theodore and with Nerio Acciajuoli against the Turks and the Navarrese

Obviously the main concern of Manuel during his reign in Thessalonica was the Ottoman army encamped outside the city. His first hopes of reconquering Macedonia for Byzantium had been rudely shattered in September 1383, and he had been forced onto the defensive by his powerful adversary, Khairaddin-Pasha. Even before he set foot in Thessalonica, however, Manuel must certainly have realized that he could not wage war against the Turks by himself, and, probably in 1382 while he was still in Constantinople, he worked out a common anti-Turkish strategy with his brother Theodore, Despot in the Morea⁽³³⁾. Whenever it was actually formulated, the alliance between the two brothers was certainly in effect by 1384, and it was also expanded to include Nerio Acciajuoli, Lord of Corinth and soon to become first Florentine Duke of Athens. But before we consider this entente in any detail, it would be well to recall briefly the problems Theodore had to face when he arrived in the Morea late in 1382⁽³⁴⁾.

The long reign of the Despot Manuel Cantacuzenus (1348/49-1380) had brought a certain amount of order and prosperity to the Peloponnesus⁽³⁵⁾, but troubles began afresh shortly after

⁽³³⁾ Chalcocondyles (I, 48, 3-7) says that this "conspiracy against Murad" was determined upon when Theodore, on his way to the Peloponnesus, visited Manuel in Thessalonica. Manuel himself, however, later declared that when his brother sailed from Constantinople for the Peloponnesus, he was on hand to bid him farewell: *Fun. Or.*, 36, 7.

⁽³⁴⁾ This account of conditions in the Morea and in Latin Greece is based chiefly on the following works: R. J. LOENERTZ, "Pour l'histoire du Péloponnèse au XIV^e siècle (1382-1404)", *R. E. B.* 1 (1943), 152-196; K. SETTON, *Catalan Domination of Athens 1311-1388* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948); D. A. ZAKYTHINOS, *Le Despotat grec de Morée*, I (Paris, 1932); II (Athens, 1953). The detailed study of K. HOFF, *Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf die neuere Zeit* (Leipzig, 1867/68), will not be referred to since his conclusions are either repeated or corrected by the above authors. The book of M. SILBERSCHMIDT, *Das Orientalische Problem zur Zeit der Entstehung des türkischen Reiches nach venezianischen Quellen* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1923), contains practically nothing about the events which interest us here.

⁽³⁵⁾ ZAKYTHINOS, *Le Despotat*, I, 95-113.

his death on 7 April 1380, when his elder brother, the ex-Emperor Matthew, took over the reins of government provisionally⁽³⁶⁾. Advanced in years, Matthew was not covetous of power and remained loyal to the oath of fidelity he had taken to the Palaeologi. With the approval of his father, the ex-Emperor John Cantacuzenus, who, as the monk Joasaph, had come to live with his son in Mistra from 1381 until his death in 1383, he asked John V to send Theodore to govern the Morea. At least, so declared Manuel Palaeologus⁽³⁷⁾, but it is not unlikely that — whether at Matthew's request or not — John V had already decided to establish his own family there. In any case, the Peloponnesus needed a firmer hand at the helm, for the death of Manuel Cantacuzenus had unloosed a series of disorders which the aged Matthew was unable to check. A political poem, composed in 1389 and inscribed on the wall of the Church of the Holy Virgin of Parori near Mistra, sheds some light on conditions in the Morea at the time of Theodore's arrival and during the first seven years of his reign there⁽³⁸⁾.

Theodore Palaeologus, Despot of imperial lineage, came to us as Lord of this region, having left his fatherland, Constantinople. The inhabitants were extremely disobedient, hostile, evildoing, treacherous to authority; these most wicked contrivers of all manner of evil were full of envy, lies, quarreling and murder; they spurned oaths, ravaged others' property and loved only dissension; everything they did was stained with blood. They wished to drive him from his throne, to have him flee the country or to slay him, and so to rest without a master. They clearly turned the glory of their fathers to shame; they made themselves tributary to the Latins. O Justice! With them they willingly uprooted everything. They did these things, my friends, for five long years, alas, always breathing war against authority.

⁽³⁶⁾ B. X. 19, 15, p. 36; 27, 19, p. 46; MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 37, 5-10.

⁽³⁷⁾ *Fun. Or.*, 36, 3-4.

⁽³⁸⁾ The Church has since been destroyed, but in 1730 the Abbé Fourmont made a copy of the inscription, first published by G. MILLET, "Inscriptions Byzantines de Mistra", *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 23 (1899) 97-156; text: 151-154. Unfortunately, Millet kept the unintelligible order of the verses as copied by Fourmont. The text has been re-edited, following the correct verse order by R. J. LOENERTZ, "Res Gestae Theodori Ioann. F. Palaeologi", *E. E. B. Σ.* 25 (1955), 207-210. For further comments as well as a French translation, cf. LOENERTZ, "Histoire du Péloponnèse", 159-161. The present citation is taken from the edition by Loenertz, lines 1-19.

Cydones, in a letter to Matthew, written in autumn 1382, also admits, although he phrases it more delicately, that the Despotate was in a disturbed state and a prey to armed raids. But he trusted that the situation would soon be remedied, for Matthew would be able to profit from the counsels of his father (John Cantacuzenus) and would be aided in his task by Theodore, who was already on his way to the Morea⁽³⁹⁾. Actually, Matthew was in a sense responsible for much of the disorder, for the chief trouble-maker in the region was his son, John, to whom he had given several fortresses⁽⁴⁰⁾. John, who had the title of despot, was determined that it should not remain merely honorary; he aimed at nothing less than gaining control over the entire Despotate. To further his ambitions he rebelled against his father and won over many of the Latin and the Greek feudal lords to his cause. With mercenary bands of Navarrese and Turks his sudden attacks spread terror throughout the Morea⁽⁴¹⁾.

(39) "And we also hope to receive good news soon: that the barbarians have been punished for their evil incursions, that their arrogance has ceased, that Laconia is now ordered by laws better and wiser than those of Lysurgus. For we believe that you will be able to achieve this, thanks, on the one hand, to the advice of the Emperor, your father, and on the other hand, with the collaboration of the son of the Emperor, who is hastening to you": Letter 241, 39-43; cf. the analysis of this letter by LOENERTZ, "Histoire du Péloponnèse", 163-165. Manuel also describes the disorder in the Morea at some length: *Fun. Or.*, 34, 4-5 and 37, 1-39, 18.

(40) MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 39, 5-6 and 37, 8-12. Matthew Cantacuzenus had two sons, John, who had the title of despot, and Demetrius, who had that of sebastocrator: CANTACUZENUS, Bk. IV, ch. 49: III, p. 358. 2-5. Which of the two rebelled against his father? Manuel II in his funeral oration does not give the name. K. HOPF (*Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 13) declared, without adducing any proof whatsoever, that it was the Sebastocrator Demetrius, and he was followed in this opinion by ZAKYTHINOS (*Le Despotat*, I, 117-118). However, G. GEROLA ("L'effigie del Despota Giovanni Cantacuzeno", *Byzantion* 6 (1931), 379-387) has shown, on the basis of an icon now in Venice which contains a representation of "the Despot John Cantacuzenus", that it was most probably John who claimed to hold authority in the Morea and was, therefore, the one whom Theodore had to contend with. A recent article, however, has ignored the conclusions of Gerola and lists Demetrius among the Despots of the Morea without any reference to the actual Despot John (R. GUILLAND, "Etudes sur l'histoire administrative de l'Empire Byzantin: le Despote", *R. E. B.* 17 (1959), 52-89, esp. 72).

(41) MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 39, 1-18.

Theodore's first and most pressing problem, then, on his arrival in the Peloponnesus was to put down this insurrection, but just when matters had reached a crisis, the rebellious son of Matthew died⁽⁴²⁾. The providential departure of his formidable adversary, however, did not solve all of the new Despot's problems, for not a few of his vassals had been infected by the rebellious spirit of his cousin and had allied themselves with the Navarrese adventurers commanded by Mahiot de Coquerel, Bailie, and Peter of San Superano, Captain, who held the Principality of Achaia in the name of Jacques de Baux, Prince of Achaia and last Latin Emperor of Constantinople⁽⁴³⁾. To repel their constant raids, as well as the incursions of Turkish pirates along the coast, both of which were wreaking havoc up and down the once prosperous peninsula, Theodore had very few resources, either in money or in troops⁽⁴⁴⁾. His first attempt (as far as we know) to bring the hostile Greek feudal lords under control was both ill-advised and unsuccessful, for he aimed his attack against the powerful Mammonas family, who, in addition to large estates on the mainland, held the Gibraltar-like stronghold of Monembasia. To deprive them of this fortress, he offered to give it to Pietro Grimani, Venetian Castellano of Coron and Modon, in recompense for his valuable assistance to John V, Manuel and himself during the civil war of 1379-1381, when Pietro was Venetian Bailie in Constantinople⁽⁴⁵⁾. Pietro willingly accepted the grant, which the

(42) MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 39, 19-40, 1. Matthew himself retired from public life and died either in 1383 a few days before his father, or in 1391: *B. X.* 52, 53, p. 89; the text of this chronicle, however, is not clear, and Gerola (*op. cit.* 386, n. 4) opts for the second date.

(43) "Omnes barones sui sunt sibi rebelles et sunt cum Navarensibus": Letter of James, Bishop of Argos, to Cardinal Angelo Acciajuoli of Florence, written before March 1385: *D. O. C.* no. 574, p. 611-613. Also cf. no. 575, p. 613. In a letter to Theodore written in 1383, Cydones also alludes to "the war" which engaged the Despot in the Peloponnesus: Letter 293, 72.

(44) MANUEL, *Fun. Or.*, 35, 17-23.

(45) Deliberation of the Venetian Senate, 29 March 1384: Venice, *Archivio di Stato, Senato, Misti* 38, fol. 107v.

"Capta. Cum nobilis vir Ser Petrus Grimani, Castellanus Coroni et Mothoni, scripsit Dominio quod, sicut notum est, dum esset baiulus Constantinopolis, ipse cum honore Domini se optime gessit in factis domini Calojani Imperatoris Constantinopolis, subiciendo personam suam nonnullis periculis

Signoria permitted him to receive without difficulty, but he was unable to take possession of Monembasia, owing to the resistance of the inhabitants, led by the Mammonas family ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

While Theodore was engaged in an uphill struggle to assert his authority in the Morea, the situation in Thessalonica had changed from victory and optimism to defeat and despair. Manuel's successful campaign of autumn 1382 gave way to the Ottoman reconquest of Macedonia, the capture of Serres and the siege of Thessalonica itself in autumn 1383. With Khairaddin's forces tightening their grip about the city, Manuel's position became daily more critical, yet it was not utterly hopeless, for in mid-1385 he still disposed of sufficient troops and also held some territory and fortresses outside Thessalonica. It is difficult, however, for want of sources, to form a clear picture of military operations in or about Thessalonica during this period. In general, the Turks seem to have been content to blockade the city by land, thereby hoping to starve the defenders into submission. Perhaps, too, the strong walls of Thessalonica daunted them, so that Khairaddin was unwilling to risk his men in a direct frontal assault. Still, it is not likely that the two armies remained idle all this time: for one thing, the Turks, who had to live off the countryside, must have raided several villages and must also have had to subdue some isolated Byzantine strongholds; on the other side, Manuel may have tried to send aid to those places under attack and have attempted a few sorties from the city. Even though Manuel retained control of the sea, his troops were still fairly effectively bottled up within Thessalonica, where the scarcity of provisions began to be felt. Added to this was the mounting discontent of the population and the feeling of frustration at being unable to prevent the Turks from ravaging the surrounding countryside. During the spring and summer of 1384 many

pro bono statu ipsius domini Imperatoris et filiorum suorum, scilicet Chiermanuli et Chiertheodori, qui ad presens est despotus Musistre. Unde ipse dominus Chiertheodorus volens in aliquo remunerare dictum Ser Petrum Grimani de laboribus suis obtulit sibi donare terram Malvasie, quam idem Ser Petrus Grimani noluit acceptare absque consensu et beneplacito nostri Domini. Vadit pars, quod dictus Ser Petrus Grimani possit acceptare et recipere dictam terram Malvasie".

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Cf. ZAKYTHINOS, *Le Despotat*, I, 125.

of the clergy, including the Archbishop, fled from the city, and an atmosphere of gloom must have settled upon Thessalonica. That autumn Cydones in a letter to Rhadenos, despaired of the situation.

The arrogance of the barbarian is spreading everywhere like fire and can be extinguished only by the power of God; as far as one can see, we are close to the fate of the Jews. The Emperor, valiant as he is, has not been able to accomplish what he chose to do. Still, he should be praised for his decision, for he has frankly thrown the dice on behalf of all, and he wished to purchase the safety of others at the price of personal dangers. His setback should be imputed to many other external causes, not to him⁽⁴⁷⁾.

At about this time, that is, during the year 1384, the alliance between Manuel, Theodore and Nerio Acciajuoli took shape or, at least, if it had been agreed upon before this, its results now became apparent. The inclusion of Acciajuoli in the pact may have been Theodore's idea, for they both had one redoubtable foe in common, the Navarrese. To consolidate their accord, Theodore married Bartolomea, the daughter of Nerio and Agnese Saraceno, who was reputed to surpass in beauty all the other women of her time⁽⁴⁸⁾. The marriage was celebrated sometime before November 1384, perhaps even in 1383⁽⁴⁹⁾. The plan of action agreed upon by the Florentine Acciajuoli and the two Greek princes was basically very simple: Manuel would aid Theodore and Nerio against the Navarrese in the Morea; both Nerio and Theodore would assist Manuel against the Turks around Thessalonica⁽⁵⁰⁾. Nerio's own plans, however, were more ambitious,

(47) Letter 273, 13-20.

(48) CHALCOCANDYLES, relying on what others had said, records her surpassing beauty twice: I, 194, 7-9 and 195, 20-22. There is no evidence that Bartolomea was the illegitimate daughter of Nerio and his mistress Maria Rendi as had been thought. Cf. SETTON, *Catalan Domination*, 170-172.

(49) Bartolomea is called *despina* (*despoina*, the wife of a despot, although the more correct term would have been *basilissa*) in the letter of James, Bishop of Argos, cited above, which describes conditions before he left Greece on 15 November 1384. A letter of Cydones to Theodore, written (as far as one can judge) in 1383, also alludes to this marriage, which did not seem to please the nobles in Mistra: Letter 293, 52.

(50) Many details regarding this triple alliance are found in a letter of the Dominican Bishop of Argos, James Pigalordi, to Cardinal Angelo Acciajuoli of Florence, written from Venice in January or February 1385 (ed.

and he cast covetous eyes upon what was left of the Catalan Duchy of Athens, including the County of Salona (the modern Amfissa), which was then held by Helen Cantacuzena, the widow of Don Luis Fadrique of Aragon (who had died in 1382) and a first cousin of Manuel and Theodore⁽⁵¹⁾. The triple alliance, then, was directed against three adversaries: the Turks who were besieging Thessalonica, the Navarrese in the Morea and the few remaining Catalan strongholds north of the Gulf of Corinth.

During 1384 warfare on a large scale had not yet broken out; theoretically the Navarrese were at peace with Nerio, but they had no great love for the Lord of Corinth and were waiting for an opportunity to cause him trouble. At the same time, this did not prevent them from raiding Theodore's territory and assisting his unfaithful vassals, for continued friction among the Greeks would keep the Despot occupied and prevent his assisting Acciajuoli. For his part, Nerio wanted to avoid open conflict with the Navarrese (at least, for a while) and, although he sup-

D. O. C., no. 574, p. 611-613). The Bishop had sailed from Greece on 15 November 1384 on a mission from Nerio to Cardinal Angelo, but on arriving in Venice he fell seriously ill and was unable to visit the Cardinal personally. His month's confinement to bed (except for one brief respite: on learning of Angelo's elevation to the cardinalate he jumped out of bed with joy — cured of his ailment — but quickly suffered a relapse) and the fact that he had to re-embark for the East on 15 March forced him to inform Angelo of the situation in Greece by letter. James wrote a long and newsy letter, concluding with the suggestion that, since the Latin patriarchate of Constantinople was then vacant, he would appreciate the new Cardinal's good offices in obtaining that dignity for him, where, so he asserted, he would be in a better position to serve the interests of the Acciajuoli family.

(51) "Tenia el Conde de Sola guerra con un Reyner de Accioli, y en ausencia del Vizconde de Rocaberti, confederandose Reyner con el Emperador de Salonique, y con el Despoto de la Morea, siendo primos de la Condesa, y con los Francos que habitauan en la Morea, ayunto muchas compañías de gente de cauallo, con apellido de yr contra los Turcos, que estauan en las fronteras de Salonique": G. ZURITA, *Anales de la Corona de Aragón* (Saragossa, 1668), II, 387b. This brief account, based on documents probably now lost, has been analyzed in some detail by R. J. LOENERTZ, "Une page de Jérôme Zurita relative aux Duchés Catalans de Grèce", *R. E. B.* 14 (1956), 158-168. Zurita makes one mistake in this citation: the Franks of the Morea, that is, the Navarrese, were on the side of the Countess of Salona (Sola) and were by no means allied with Nerio, rather, they were his principal enemies.

ported Theodore, he did so with little enthusiasm, explaining to the Navarrese that his attacks were not directed against them, but against the rebellious subjects of his son-in-law; this, he maintained, was not contrary to the truce between them⁽⁵²⁾. However, if Theodore were to control his own realm effectively, the conflicts among his nobles and their defiance of his authority would have to cease. The situation is briefly described in the political poem of Parori: "He wanted to exalt the lordship of the Romans, which was being undermined by the men of the region, who set themselves above the authority of the Despot in order to attack each other and to set all aflame. This led to daily slaughters and bitter tears, which brought confusion to us and strength to the Latins" (53). More energetic measures had to be taken, both by Theodore and by Nerio, even though it meant full-scale warfare against the formidable warriors from Navarre.

During the winter of 1384/85 both sides made their preparations for the coming conflict. Nerio hired mercenary troops wherever he could find them, and Theodore received a contingent of a hundred cavalymen from Manuel in Thessalonica⁽⁵⁴⁾. Manuel, at any rate, was carrying out his part of the bargain. If he could spare that many soldiers, it would indicate that the situation in Thessalonica was not as alarming as one might gather from Cydones' letters. Yet, his generosity may have been motivated by other considerations: a cavalry force penned up within

(52) "Navarenses ut video qui sunt in Amorrea non diligunt eum [Nerium] et libenter nocent sibi si possent in aliquo magno. Sed non audent se discoperire. in parvis ipsi faciunt guerram cum dispoto, cuius facta male vadunt, quia omnes barones sui sunt sibi rebelles et sunt cum Navarensibus. dominus Nerius iuvat dispotum sed non multum ferventer, et excusat se Navarensibus, quod non iuvat dispotum contra Navarenses, sed contra barones Grecoz dispoti qui sunt rebelles et hoc non est contra capitula pacis": Letter of James of Argos, p. 612.

(53) Ed. LOENERTZ, "Res Gestae Theodori", lines 30-35.

(54) "Credo quod erit guerra inter Navarenses ex una parte et dominum Nerium [et] dispotum ex altera. cuius signum est, quia modo venerunt nova de Argo quod Navarenses ex una parte parant se ad faciendam guerram fortiozem quam possunt dispoto isto novo tempore et dispotus parat se; et alia et quod c. equites venerunt sibi de civitate Thesalonice ubi dominatur frater suus, et quod dominus Nerius colligit undique potest homines armorum. itaque dubito, quod guerra erit": Letter of James, *ibid.*

the walls of a besieged city was relatively useless, and the men themselves may not have been disposed to take on the humbler task of manning the ramparts; added to this was the difficulty of providing fodder for their horses⁽⁵⁵⁾. In addition to the mounted troops sent by his brother, Theodore was also able to muster at least two hundred more cavalymen, many foot soldiers and a large number of Turkish mercenaries, while Acciajuoli disposed of a force of eight hundred Albanian cavalry and some seventy "lances"⁽⁵⁶⁾. The Navarrese leaders, Mahiot de Coquerel and Peter of San Superano, for their part, had not been idle, and were able to put thirteen hundred mounted knights into the field.

The conduct of the campaign, which got under way in the spring of 1385, is somewhat difficult to follow both because of the scarcity of sources and because Acciajuoli embarked on some private expeditions of his own. Although Theodore was unable to drive the Navarrese from the sections of his territory they had occupied⁽⁵⁷⁾, he seems to have sent some of his troops to support his father-in-law in his invasion of the Catalan Duchy of Athens; at least, Peter IV, King of Aragon and Duke of Athens, complained of Greek and Turkish assaults on his Duchy⁽⁵⁸⁾. The letter containing the complaint (dated 17 July) is addressed, surprisingly

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(55) For example, in 1345 during the civil war in Thessalonica, the cavalymen of the garrison refused to take their places on the city walls on the plea that they did not know how to fight behind walls: CANTACUZENUS, Bk. III, ch. 94: II, p. 578, 17-21.

(56) Letter of James of Argos, *loc. cit.*

(57) In mid-April he asked Venice for aid in order to recover the territory occupied by the Navarrese: *Appendix*, doc. A. In a letter to Theodore written in the first half of 1385 (before 28 June), Cydones referred to the war which Theodore was then waging against the "Westerners", that is, the Navarrese: Letter 313, 22. He also mentioned the Despot's fighting against his own rebellious subjects: lines 25-30. In the same letter he said that he had heard of the truce Theodore had concluded with some of the rebels: lines 63-64.

(58) "Super facto autem Grecorum atque Turcorum qui ... cotidie locis nostris Athenarum ducatus parant insidias et alia que possunt inferunt detrimenta": *D. O. C.*, no. 575, p. 613. That the Greeks and Turks referred to were under Theodore's orders, however, cannot be affirmed with certainty, particularly since there is no other testimony pointing to his complicity in Nerio's attack against Athens.

enough, to Aragon's former mortal enemies, the Navarrese commanders, Mahiot de Coquerel and Peter of San Superano, now — since they had found a common foe — his *fidelissimi servitores*. In fact, the Aragonese King had good reason to be worried about his far-off Dukedom, for Nerio continued his advance in Attica with the city of Athens and its Acropolis as his target.

While the Florentine stood on the threshold of the greatest success of his career, his two allies, Manuel and Theodore, were making little or no headway against their respective adversaries, the Turks and the Navarrese. Early in 1385 the two princes came to the conclusion that they needed outside assistance and that the most likely power to provide such aid (for a price) was Venice⁽⁵⁹⁾. Accordingly, Manuel despatched an ambassador to the Republic of St Mark with a series of requests which were discussed by the Venetian Senate on 18 April 1385⁽⁶⁰⁾.

Manuel requested *pro evidentissima necessitate sua* two large ships (of a type suitable for transporting cavalry), two hundred sets of armor, twenty thousand arrows and seventy crossbowmen to be hired for a period of three months, for all of which he would make payment in Negropont. He also wanted a loan of six thousand ducats (or whatever amount the Signoria would give him), for which he would consign some of his territories and fortresses to the Republic as security. The Emperor further suggested that an agreement be worked out so that the Venetian galley at Negropont would come to his assistance when needed, and that his own galley would do the same for the Venetians of Negropont. The Byzantine ambassador then presented Theodore's proposition: in exchange for support against the Navarrese, the Despot would cede to the Republic some of his territory in the Morea. The final petition of Manuel is somewhat surprising, for he requested Venice to use its good offices to bring an end to the war between himself and Murad. The previous requests

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(59) Presumably the two brothers conferred about the military situation by letter, although a personal encounter between them cannot be completely excluded.

(60) Edited in *Appendix*, doc. A. An extremely abridged version of this document (wrongly dated 1384) is given by N. IORGA, "Veneția în Marca Neagră", *Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, ser. II, tom. 36 (1913-1914), p. 1067, doc. XIV.

indicated clearly that both he and Theodore fully intended to continue their respective struggles. Perhaps the Emperor merely wanted to arrange a truce or an armistice with Murad in order to gain time or else, in the event that the Signoria refused to grant the armaments he wanted, it would at least help him in negotiating an honorable peace treaty with the Turkish Emir.

This list of requests presented by Manuel sheds some light on the situation in Thessalonica early in 1385, not quite half way through the siege. It implies that the besieged defenders of Thessalonica were short of weapons and, although apparently they had enough cavalry, they were in need of trained cross-bowmen. It also points out the sad financial state of Manuel's realm; the secularization of ecclesiastical property had not sufficed to place his treasury on a firm footing. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact that in exchange for the hoped-for loan, Manuel offered as security some of his territories and fortresses (*de locis et fortificiis suis*). In mid-1385, therefore, some places outside the beleaguered city were still in his possession. Where these were located is unknown, but, if the Serenissima were to be interested, they must have been along the coast or on one of the islands, such as Lemnos or Thasos⁽⁶¹⁾. Possibly one of these places was Kitros, on the coast some thirty miles southwest of Thessalonica, which was captured by Khairaddin in 1386⁽⁶²⁾.

The Venetian Senate's answer to each of these petitions was, practically speaking, negative. They hesitated to send the arms and ships requested to the East since, in case they might not be actually needed there, their transportation and maintenance would constitute a large and useless expense for the Republic. Yet, if it would please the Emperor to forward the money for

(61) As is well known, Venice was not interested in large territorial holdings, but only in strategically located naval bases for the support and provisionment of her military and commercial fleet. In 1381 when Venice was forced to cede Treviso and Ceneda to Duke Leopold of Austria, Caresini justified the cession in these words: "Ducalis excellentia prudentissima meditatione considerans proprium Venetiarum esse mare colere, terramque postergare; hinc enim divitijs et honoribus abundat, inde saepe sibi proveniunt scandala et errores": CARESINI, p. 58, 11-13.

(62) TAESCHNER-WITTEK, "Die Vezirfamilie", 75 and 84. It is not clear just who possessed Kitros at the time of its capture.

those items to Venice, they would comply *alacriter et libenter*. In any event, however, the crossbowmen could not be provided for at least a year. As far as the loan of six thousand ducats was concerned, the Senate noted that the documents presented by Manuel's ambassador did not empower him either to receive money or to promise Byzantine territory as security, but if Manuel were to give him these powers (*sindicatum ad plenum*), then they would think about the proposition⁽⁶³⁾. The mutual assistance project between the galley of Manuel and that of Negropont was rejected as absolutely impossible because the Venetian galley had at all times to remain close by the island for its defence. As to supporting Theodore against the Navarrese, the Signoria wanted to gather further information from its governors in Coron and Modon before coming to any decision. Finally, the members of the Senate professed their great desire for the tranquillity and welfare of the Emperor and promised that, in the event that they should send an envoy to Murad, they would instruct him to do what he could to bring about an armistice between Manuel and the Emir.

Obviously Venice was not enthusiastic about supporting Manuel in what the shrewd businessmen of the Lagoons must have considered a very risky undertaking, for, always well informed about events in Romania, they knew full well the precarious state of Manuel's Empire in Thessalonica, and could not afford to become embroiled in conflict with the Turks at this time. The Lion of St Mark was still licking his wounds after the Chioggia war with Genoa and was already beset by new problems closer to home, chiefly the threat of war with Hungary⁽⁶⁴⁾. The Serenissima was also having difficulties in renewing its commercial agreement with John V and would not want to antagonize him

(63) That same day, 18 April 1385, the Senate rejected (on the fourth ballot) an offer of John V to give Venice a fortress (*fortilicium*) in Constantinople: Venice, *Archivio di Stato, Senato, Misti* 39, fol. 65v. Cf. THIRIET, *Régestes*, 694, p. 168, where he gives the results of the final voting as 42 yes, 47 no, 10 *non sinceri*. Actually, this last ballot counted 42 *de parte suprascripta* (in favor of the motion), 57 *capta de non* (contrary), and 10 *non sinceri* (abstained from voting).

(64) Cf. M. SILBERSCHMIDT, *Das Orientalische Problem zur Zeit der Entstehung des türkischen Reiches nach venezianischen Quellen* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1923), 21 ss.

by supporting his more or less rebellious son⁽⁶⁵⁾. Above all other considerations, though, was the effect that aid to Manuel would have on the Republic's relations with Murad, for while Venetian sympathies might possibly lie with the Christian Emperor of Thessalonica, their commercial interests dictated that they continue in their friendly policy towards the Turkish Emir. Any open support of his enemy — Manuel — could seriously prejudice the negotiations then under way (or already concluded) for commercial privileges in the Ottoman domains⁽⁶⁶⁾. Furthermore, as far as assisting Theodore was concerned, the Signoria feared that this could easily alienate the Navarrese and induce them to sell Zonchio (Navarino) to the Genoese, which would have been disastrous to Venetian interests⁽⁶⁷⁾.

Although Manuel would make one more effort (also unsuccessful) to obtain western aid, his fortunes — and his Empire — continued to decline. His brother Theodore, rebuffed by Venice, carried on the struggle in the Morea as best he could, until finally in 1387/88 a series of setbacks forced him to call in Turkish forces commanded by Evrenos Bey, with whose help he routed his enemies, causing in the process more damage to his own subjects than had the Navarrese or his rebellious nobles⁽⁶⁸⁾. The third partner, Nerio Acciajuoli, however, was continuing his advance in Attica up to the walls of Catalan Athens, and as early as 7 July 1385 he referred to himself as Lord of Corinth and of the Duchy of Athens⁽⁶⁹⁾. At the same time Venice was concerned for the security of Negropont because Nerio was aiding a large

(65) THIRIET, *Régestes*, 665, p. 161 and 678, p. 165.

(66) Cf. THIRIET, *Régestes*, 667, p. 162; 672, p. 163; 677, p. 164; 678, p. 165.

(67) *Ibid.*, 688, p. 167 and 719, p. 173.

(68) Cf. LOENERTZ, "Histoire du Péloponnèse", 167-169. The political poem of Parori (ed. LOENERTZ) recounts: "Against his will he recruited an army of powerful men, like wild beasts ready for battle, sons of Agar, to confront the Latins" (lines 54-56). "Who could recount the deeds, readers, although the Christian people suffered terribly as this judgement was inflicted on the adversaries. Or what do all of you think of the destruction of enemies, how swiftly it came? He captured cities, struck the foe and like Sampson he appeared in victory" (lines 63-69).

(69) *Dominus Choranti et Ducaminis*: Venice, *Archivio di Stato. Senato. Misti* 39, fol. 110v; THIRIET, *Régestes*, 700, p. 170.

number of Turkish ships in the Gulf of Aegina⁽⁷⁰⁾, almost certainly corsairs whom he had persuaded (or hired) to harass his Spanish — or perhaps even his Turkish — enemies. That winter, in fact, he inflicted a severe naval defeat on the Turks with the aid of Venetian ships from Negropont⁽⁷¹⁾. It is not clear, however, whether the defeated fleet belonged to Turkish pirates or whether it flew the banner of the Ottoman Emir Murad; if the latter were the case it would imply that Nerio was still loyal to his alliance with Manuel, but there is no indication of Byzantine cooperation in the battle, and the fact of Venetian participation seems to rule out the likelihood of the Turkish fleet's being in the service of Murad. Engaged as he was in consolidating his position in Attica and in besieging Athens, Nerio was unable to prevent the Navarrese from capturing his castle of Vostitsa (on the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth between Patras and Corinth), which they took sometime during this period — before June 1387⁽⁷²⁾. But even this did not stop him from penetrating into the lower town of Athens in winter 1386/87 and, on 2 May 1388, from capturing the Acropolis⁽⁷³⁾.

During the last two years of the siege of Thessalonica (1385-1387), Manuel seems to have accomplished nothing of any military importance, while the Turks advanced from victory to victory. Khairaddin, who had been appointed Beglerbeg of Rumelia in 1385/86⁽⁷⁴⁾, apparently felt so confident of capturing Thessalonica that he was able to absent himself for some time, for that same year he founded mosques in Gallipoli and in Serres⁽⁷⁵⁾. Whether

(70) *Ibidem*.

(71) The news of the victory, which was brought to Venice by a certain Giovanni Alberto, just arrived from Athens, induced the Senate to write a congratulatory letter to Nerio and to assure him of the continued support of the Signoria against the common enemy: Deliberation of the Venetian Senate dated 6 February 1386: Venice, *Archivio di Stato, Senato, Misti* 40, fol. 17-17v; THIRIET, *Régestes*, 707, p. 171.

(72) "Quant les Navarrois prirent le chasteau de la Votisse...": *Mémoire* of Fr. Jehan de Paris, O. Carm., of 30 June 1387, ed. L. DE MAS LATRIE, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, II (Paris, 1852), p. 411, doc. II.

(73) SETTON, *Catalan Domination*, 177 and 182.

(74) In the year 787 of the Hegira (= 12 Feb. 1385 - 1 Feb. 1386): TAESCHNER-WITTEK, "Die Vezirfamilie", 75.

(75) *Ibid.*, 77-78.

he was personally present or not, his troops ranged as far as the Albanian coast where, on 18 September 1385, they defeated Balša Balšić, Lord of Valona⁽⁷⁶⁾. The following year Pločnik and Nish also came under Ottoman domination⁽⁷⁷⁾, and Berrea was taken by the forces of the new Beglerbeg⁽⁷⁸⁾. Khairaddin himself led an expedition against what Byzantine or Serbian strongholds were still left in Macedonia and captured a number of places including Kitros and Larissa in Thessaly⁽⁷⁹⁾.

4. Peace Negotiations with the Turks

Although Manuel intended to rely primarily on military strength to defend his small realm from the Ottoman armies, he was not at all averse to the idea of negotiating an armistice or a peace treaty with the enemy. In fact, as soon as Murad's troops appeared before Thessalonica and demanded the surrender of the city, he had sent envoys to their commander to discuss the prospects of a truce. The failure of this legation, however, did not mean that there were to be no further negotiations with the Turks. It seems that Murad himself continued to present the Greek prince with the tempting prospect of a reconciliation, presumably offering to recognize Manuel's possession of Thessalonica in exchange for some form of homage and tribute. But that the Emir had no serious intention of keeping his promises soon became clear. In a letter to Rhadenos, Cydones spoke of the false hopes "with which that vile and accursed man has kept

(76) K. JIREČEK, *Geschichte der Serben*, II (Gotha, 1918), 111. The date is also given in two chronological notes found in manuscripts of Magdalen College, Oxford, ed. S. LAMPROS, "Ἐκθυμήσεων ἤτοι χρονικῶν σημειωμάτων συλλογὴ πρώτη", *N. E.* 7 (1910), no. 77-78, p. 145.

(77) *Serbische Annalen*, ed. J. BOGDAN, *Archiv für Slavische Philologie* 13 (1891), p. 521. Cf. JIREČEK, *op. cit.*, 118.

(78) *Anno mundi* 6894 (1385/86) is the date given by Thomas Xeros, Chartophylax of Trikkala: LAMPROS, *op. cit.*, no. 79, p. 146. Two short chronicles place the capture in the following year, 1386/87: *B. X.* 25, 7, p. 44 and *B. X.* 42, 29, p. 69, which specifies the date as 8 May 1387. These two chronicles, however, contain a number of errors and were written much later; the contemporary testimony of Xeros is, therefore, to be preferred.

(79) TAESCHNER-WITTEK, "Die Vezirfamilie", 75 and 84.

putting us off until now. May God, then, defend us against his treachery, and may he learn by sad experience how much better it would have been not to make false promises" (⁸⁰). About 1385 or 1386 Manuel himself recalled how he had been deceived by such false promises of Murad (⁸¹).

Since Manuel's direct contacts with the Turkish ruler had proved so disappointing, he tried a more indirect approach and, in mid-April 1385, asked Venice to mediate between himself and Murad to bring about a cessation of hostilities (⁸²). But, although the Signoria vaguely promised to consider the request, it is not known whether anything was actually done about it. John V in Constantinople, however, was more immediately concerned about ending the struggle between his son and Murad and about preserving Thessalonica as part of his Empire. In 1385 or 1386 he himself sent an envoy directly to Khairaddin in the Ottoman camp outside Thessalonica. The envoy, known only by the name of Palaeologus, was to negotiate a peace treaty between the Turkish commander and the Thessalonians (⁸³). His mission was shrouded in secrecy and, at the Emperor's orders, he quietly departed from Constantinople at night, much to the chagrin of Cydones, who had hoped to give him a letter for Manuel (⁸⁴). In addition to seeing Khairaddin, the envoy Palaeologus also visited Thessalonica and spoke with Manuel (⁸⁵), but, for some reason or other, his mission proved unsuccessful and no accord was reached between Manuel and the Turks.

There may have been one more attempt to come to an agreement with the Turks, for Cydones alludes to the possibility of such a step, though his words are far from clear: the news from Thessalonica had been growing more alarming and now, it seems,

(⁸⁰) CYDONES, Letter 285, 18-21, written in autumn 1383.

(⁸¹) MANUEL, Letter 8, 13-16 (LEGRAND, p. 11).

(⁸²) *Appendix*, doc. A.

(⁸³) "... the Emperor [John V] has chosen ambassadors to Khairaddin, to work out a peace between him and the Thessalonians": CYDONES, Letter 318, 21-22, written to Manuel in 1385-1386.

(⁸⁴) CYDONES, Letter 318, 24-36.

(⁸⁵) Cydones was disappointed that Palaeologus on his return to Constantinople had brought him no letter from Rhadenos in Thessalonica: Letter 316, 4-6. Palaeologus also conveyed to Cydones the complaints of Manuel that Cydones was behind in his correspondence: Letter 318, 5-7.

the final blow had struck; Manuel had sailed away. "They say he is not going on an embassy on behalf of the city or to the barbarian to request him to lighten the siege or anything else of the sort" (⁸⁶). Whatever may be the real explanation of Manuel's departure (it is definitely not a reference to his final departure in April 1387), it is clear that an embassy to Khairaddin-Pasha, or to Murad himself was not unexpected and was considered a plausible explanation. Once more, however, for want of sources, nothing further can be said about this incident.

5. Manuel II and King Peter IV of Aragon

Before terminating this chapter, one other episode bearing on the foreign relations of Manuel during this period should be mentioned. In 1385 John de Guilaniu, a Catalan merchant, sailed into the harbor of Thessalonica with some other merchants on the small ship of James de Furno (⁸⁷). On arrival or soon afterwards they found themselves arrested and imprisoned by order of Manuel, who also had their merchandise as well as their ship confiscated. John de Guilaniu, of course, protested to his sovereign, Peter IV, King of Aragon and Count of Barcelona. In a letter to the King, Manuel himself explained his action: other Catalans, Guillem Ponç and En Canyelles, had failed to fulfill certain promises they had made to him in Pera and he intended to reimburse himself by seizing the goods of their fellow citizens, de Guilaniu and associates: the King could then make restitution to de Guilaniu from the possessions of Ponç and Canyelles. These last two had encountered trouble in Byzantine waters before this, for during the civil war of 1379-1381, while they were in Constantinople, they had suffered the confiscation of their merchandise on the charge that it was Genoese — and consequently enemy — property (⁸⁸). Guillem Ponç, however, declared that among the

(⁸⁶) CYDONES, Letter 335, 17-24, written to Rhadenos in 1386.

(⁸⁷) These details are found in the letter of King Peter of Aragon to Manuel II, *imperatorum Romeorum Paleologos*, dated 18 October 1386 from Barcelona: *D. O. C.* 598, p. 634-635.

(⁸⁸) Letter of Peter IV of Aragon to John V dated 23 December 1383: *D. O. C.* 557, p. 600-601.

expropriated wares was a large quantity of cloth belonging not to the Genoese but to himself. John V ordered an investigation which revealed that this was true and, in a letter to Peter IV of 26 August 1383, he promised to restore the goods or their cash equivalent, if he could discover who had absconded with the cloth. In any case, according to King Peter, Ponç and Canyelles denied Manuel's accusation that they had not carried out their promises to him; the King also reminded the Greek Emperor of the cloth that had previously been taken from them *in vestro imperio*. There is, unfortunately, no way of specifying Manuel's charges against the two Catalan merchants, since the incident in Pera could have occurred at any time during the civil war or even later while Manuel was in Thessalonica. Whatever the incident and whenever it took place, it had not been forgotten by Manuel and, at any rate, it provided him with a pretext for replenishing his depleted exchequer.

In his letter to Manuel, King Peter expressed his astonishment at the arrest of his subjects in Thessalonica particularly at a time when peace and friendship reigned between Aragon and Byzantium. This would indicate that Manuel had taken no part in the anti-Catalan phase of the alliance with Nerio Acciajuoli or, if he had, either he had already withdrawn or else the King of Aragon was not well informed. In fact, the Spanish Monarch appeared very slow in understanding what was happening in Romania; as late as August 1386 he seemed to regard the capture of the lower city of Athens simply as an incursion of Greek and Turkish pirates, without any reference to Acciajuoli⁽⁸⁹⁾. In any case, Peter denied the accusations of Manuel against Ponç and Canyelles, rejected his excuses, demanded restitution of the confiscated goods to de Guilaniu, and, if this were not made, declared that he would reluctantly be obliged to take stronger measures. Actually, nothing further seems to have come of the incident, for within the year Peter IV died, and his successor, John I, was so ill that it was not until mid-March 1387 that he was pronounced to be out of danger. By that time, Manuel was preparing to leave the doomed city of Thessalonica, but not before he had explored one other avenue of obtaining assistance in his struggle.

(89) SETTON, *Catalan Domination*, 175.

CHAPTER VI

MANUEL II AND POPE URBAN VI

The endeavors of Pope Gregory XI to secure western aid for Byzantium against the Turks and to bring about, if possible, a union of the Greek and Roman Churches came to a halt early in 1376 ⁽¹⁾. In fact, a few years earlier, the news of the alliance between the Byzantine Emperor John V and the Turkish Emir Murad I had already damped his enthusiasm considerably. In any case, during the years 1376 to 1382 it became virtually impossible to carry on any negotiations at all with the Greeks, both because of the series of civil wars which convulsed Constantinople and because of the bitter struggle between Venice and Genoa which rendered the sea lanes insecure and almost unusable. With the treaty of Turin, however, and the relative stability it brought to the eastern Mediterranean, the brusquely interrupted relations between the papal court and Byzantium could have been resumed in 1382, were it not for one event which, by splitting the Western Church into two bitterly opposed camps, relegated any thought of union with the Eastern Church to a very secondary place. The Great Western Schism began in 1378 when a group of Cardinals rejected the election of Urban VI (Bartolomeo Prignano, Archbishop of Bari, elected Pope on 8 April 1378) and in his stead chose Cardinal Robert of Geneva, who took the name of Clement VII. The resultant turmoil in western Europe as the various nations aligned themselves under one or other of the two 'obediencies' and the scarcity of documents make it extremely difficult to trace the Byzantine policy of the Popes during the first decades of the schism ⁽²⁾. Particularly is this true of the pontificate of

⁽¹⁾ Cf. HALECKI, *Un Empereur*, 289 ss.

⁽²⁾ The most detailed and useful account of papal-Byzantine relations during the Schism (up to 1406) is that of O. HALECKI, "Rome et Byzance

Urban VI (1378-1389) who necessarily had to expend much of his energy in combating his rival, Clement VII, and in trying to win over the European princes to his cause. Furthermore, almost half of his eleven year reign was spent away from Rome, in journeys up and down Italy (from July 1383 to September 1388), so that it is not astonishing that he achieved little in the way of ecclesiastical union and the ever-connected question of military aid to Byzantium. Yet, he was by no means disinterested in the plight of the Eastern Christians and, although much of his attention was concentrated on collecting taxes from the Latin dioceses and in suppressing the *foyers clementins* in Romania, he sent an envoy to the Patriarch of Constantinople to discuss the prospect of union and, towards the end of his pontificate, he did his best to obtain ships to aid in the struggle against the Turks. More important, however, and more pertinent to this history is the fact that he exchanged embassies with Manuel II and that he concluded — if only for a very brief period — union between the Roman Church and the Greek Church in Thessalonica.

The first contacts of the Roman Pope with the Church in Greece were of a fiscal nature, for, not only did the Catholic world suffer from the scandal of a divided Church, but the Apostolic Camera also suffered from the loss of its revenues, disputed between the two rival curias. Since many countries of western Europe had given their allegiance to Clement VII in Avignon, Urban VI needed all the support he could find, including that of the Latin Churches scattered throughout Romania. In fact, with few exceptions, these churches remained loyal to Pope Urban⁽³⁾. To collect the routine ecclesiastical taxes as well as to confiscate the possessions belonging to adherents of Clement VII in those regions, he relied heavily on Nicholas de Mercatellis (or de Merca-

au temps du grand schisme d'Occident", *Collectanea Theologica* (Lwów) 18 (1937), 477-532. On the wide gaps in the Registers of Urban VI, Cf. above, p. 10.

(3) Early in 1379 the Bishop of Cordova wrote to the King of Aragon: "et credo quod noveritis etiam, quod tota Alemannia, et tota Hungaria, Polonia, Flandria, et Anglia, et quod est bene mirabile, cum non fuerit a multis annis citra, etiam Graccia cum eo firmiter stant, sibi que obediunt; et inde de redditibus Ecclesiae, et proventibus Camerae Apostolicae continue pecunias recipit." : RAYNALDUS, 1379, no. 44.

dantibus), Canon and later Dean, of the Church of Patras. For at least seven years (1381-1388) the devoted Canon, collector for the Apostolic Camera and Nuncio of the Apostolic See, travelled continuously through Greece and the islands gathering the funds that belonged to Pope Urban and taking action against the partisans of the Avignonese Pope (4).

Obviously, these missions of Nicholas de Mercatellis had little or nothing to do with the twofold problem of ecclesiastical union and military aid to Byzantium. But these had not been completely lost sight of. On 29 May 1383 Pope Urban VI issued a safe-conduct to Simon Atumano, Archbishop of Thebes, authorizing him to proceed *ad partes Constantinopolitanas* (5). Actually, nothing in this document specifies the motives of Simon's voyage, but the role played by the Archbishop of Thebes in previous papal negotiations with the Greeks permits one to suspect that he sailed to Constantinople, not merely for personal reasons, but as an official or unofficial emissary of the Pope (6), a supposition supported by the fact that another papal mission arrived in the Greek capital the following year. This legation, headed by another Latin Bishop of Greece, William of Davalia, was received by the Patriarch Nilus in (or shortly before) September 1384 (7).

(4) Cf. HALECKI, "Rome et Byzance", 481 ss. Venice also appreciated the services of the Canon of Patras and on 22 January 1383 the Senate decided to commend him to the Pope: Venice, *Archivio di Stato, Senato, Misti* 38, fol. 1:

"Capta. Cum venerabilis Pater, dominus Nicolaus de Mercatellis, subcollector sanctissimi domini Pape in partibus Romanie et Crete se bene gessit pro honore Domini, vadit pars, attento quod fuit et est optime dispositus ad nostrum honorem, quod possint scribi domino Pape ac dominis Cardinalibus quod fecit officium suum cum diligentia et sollicitudine, in illa forma quae videbitur Dominio." This has been overlooked by Thiriet in his *Régestes*.

(5) Edited by G. MERCATI, *Se la versione dall'Ebraico del Codice Veneto Greco VII sia di Simone Atumano Arcivescovo di Tebe* (= *Studi e Testi* 30; Rome, 1916), 50-51.

(6) Cf. HALECKI, "Rome et Byzance", 482-484.

(7) The mission of William is known only from the response of the Patriarch sent to Pope Urban: ed. *M. M.*, II, no. 379, p. 86-87; reprinted in *D. O. C.*, 571, p. 609. Apart from this document there is no other reference to William of Davalia. Cf. R. J. LOENERTZ, "Athènes et Néopatras,

Since Bishop William presented no written documents from Pope Urban, the Patriarch declared that he would await the arrival of duly accredited legates with official papal letters before replying in full to the propositions of the Pope. In the meantime, however, Nilus dissipated one misunderstanding, which explains why William carried no written message (and perhaps why the safe-conduct of Simon Atumano had not specified his mission of the previous year). "It is not true that whatever letters come to us must first be shown to the Turk; we do indeed suffer from the Turks by God's permission because of our sins, but we enjoy complete freedom both to receive letters and to reply, as well as to designate, ordain and send bishops wherever we wish, and to carry on all ecclesiastical business without hindrance, even in the very territory of the infidel" (8). That William's mission had to do with ecclesiastical union is clear from the Patriarch's insistence on his desire for "peace and union of the Churches", provided that it be achieved "as God wills and as it was before the schism". He also denied "that we wish to have the first place ourselves, and because of this we do not welcome the union. This is not true: for we confess that you hold the first place according to the canons of the holy Fathers." Undoubtedly these words of the Greek Patriarch envisaged no more than a primacy of honor. Whatever the Patriarch's real sentiments were, however, no further negotiations could have been held for about a year. For from 31 January until 7 July 1385 the Pope was besieged in his castle of Nocera by the forces of Charles of Durazzo, King of Naples; his escape from there was followed by a couple of months' wandering about in southern Italy and Sicily before he eventually made his way to Genoa, arriving there on 23 September (9). During this period it is unlikely that he could have exchanged further legations with the Greeks.

Regestes et Documents". *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 28 (1958), p. 25.

(8) *M. M.*, II, no. 379, p. 86-87.

(9) Cf. the itinerary of Urban VI given in M. ROTHBARTH, *Urban VI und Neapel* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1913), 89-92.

1. An Embassy of Manuel II to the Pope

During all this time Thessalonica was invested by the Turks. In order to obtain the help he needed to drive off the enemy, Manuel had concluded an alliance with his brother Theodore and with Nerio Acciajuoli, and he was (early in 1385) planning to ask Venice for weapons and soldiers. At the same time, he did not overlook the principal source of western aid, that source to which his predecessors had often appealed, the pope — spiritual head of western Christendom. That there were now two Popes, each claiming to be the head of Christendom, did not deter Manuel, and about the end of winter 1385 he began to prepare an embassy to the Pope, almost certainly the Roman Pope, Urban VI⁽¹⁰⁾. This embassy of Manuel as well as the sending of a papal legate to Thessalonica and the conclusion of an ecclesiastical union has not been discussed in any historical work to date. Such a discussion, in fact, would have been impossible before the publication of the letters of Cydones, our only source for these negotiations. For, as has been mentioned in Chapter I, the Registers of Pope Urban VI are missing for the period from 8 April 1383 to 22 September 1386, and it was precisely during this time that the exchange of legations took place. The rest of this chapter, therefore, must rely to a very large extent on the meager details furnished by the letters of Cydones.

Towards the end of winter 1385 Manuel made known his intention of sending an embassy to the Pope and designated his

⁽¹⁰⁾ No reference to negotiations of Manuel II with Pope Clement VII has thus far been found in the Avignonese Registers for this period (which are abundant), and the Registers of Urban VI for these years are missing. That Manuel's dealings were with the Roman Pope is indicated (but not conclusively proved) by the following facts: the references of Cydones to 'Rome', meaning either the city or the Papal Curia, which he had visited; during this decade the only known contacts of Constantinople with a pope were with Urban VI; the Latin Church in Greece, the natural intermediary between Byzantium and the papal court, was almost solidly on the side of the Roman Pope; the most influential western powers in Romania, Venice and Genoa, were adherents of Urban VI and, if any legation were to be exchanged or aid sent from the West, it would very likely come on their ships.

ambassadors, of whom Euthymius is the only one known by name; they were also accompanied by a Latin theologian whom Cydones refers to simply as "the Master" ⁽¹¹⁾. The first of these, Euthymius, would not seem to have been the best choice for an envoy to Rome, for he was strongly anti-Latin, although he was a good friend of Cydones, who describes him as an intelligent and religious man. On hearing of his nomination as one of the ambassadors to the Pope, Cydones could not refrain from making some ironic remarks to a friend of his in Thessalonica.

I have heard that many men, and what is more, excellent and good men at that, have been chosen as ambassadors from the Emperor to the Pope, one of whom is also the good Euthymius. I marvelled at Aristotle, who, among so many other truths, has also stated that necessity is invincible, since under its pressure even the Thessalonians have submitted to send envoys to Rome. But let us not talk of the Emperor's decision, for everyone concedes emperors the right to dare all in order to save the realm. Actually, many here, even those honored by him, do not hesitate to criticize this peak of audacity. For among the evils lying in wait for us, they say, none ought to have seemed to him so frightening that, to ward it off, he makes mention of pacts with the treaty-breakers. Regarding Euthymius, one would never have thought him so courageous as to rush into an affair which holds danger for his soul, but one would expect that he would first resign himself to suffer everything so as not to betray the ideas of fatherland and of his companions, in whose ranks he formerly warred against those to whom he now goes as ambassador. For there he will be forced to do and to say many things opposed to the ideas with which both he and his companions have lived. How, then, will he address the Pope, either on first seeing him or during the daily discussions about the embassy? It is clear that if he remains attached to his ideas and makes his salutations accord with these,

⁽¹¹⁾ These details are provided by Cydones in the letters cited on the following pages. The dates of these letters are given by the editor, who has based his conclusions chiefly on two points: the references to the last rebellion of Andronicus in spring or early summer 1385 (before his death on 28 June) and the references to Cydones' projected departure from Constantinople. These as well as cross-references to other letters are found in the notes to the edition. The letters which are of some relevance here (written between the end of summer 1384 and summer 1386) should be read in the following order: 310, 311, 314, 302 to 306, 308, 309, 313, 315, 316, 318, 322, 334, 335, 327.

Perhaps Euthymius was the priest to whom Manuel wrote four letters (39, 40, 51, 55), and who was later Patriarch of Constantinople (1410-1416); cf. G. MERCATI, *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone ed altri appunti* (= *Studi e Testi* 56; Città del Vaticano, 1931), 516-517.

he will be lost; on the other hand, if he gives in to necessity and wishes to make the embassy a success, he must say, "Your Beatitude" and "Your Holiness", "Common Pastor and Father" and "Vicar". This is a betrayal of the faith, the destruction of the creed; this means the two causes [of the Holy Spirit] and the azymes of the Jews, the culmination of evils. But I am afraid that in the course of frequent disputes with those men and unable to answer their arguments, he may, without noticing it, have honored the Son as equal to the Father and have confessed that the Spirit is common to them, and he may return to us full of praises for those who hold these opinions. I myself know that many who have encountered those men have been affected in this way. And we may suffer the ultimate disgrace, that he whom we sent there to speak on our behalf should come back saying the opposite of what we think. To guard against this both you and I must take common counsel — for he is a friend of us both — so that he should not fall victim to anything that might cause sorrow to us also. For because of all his qualities I am certain that he will receive honors and gifts, since he is intelligent and his understanding is greatly enhanced by his virtue; no less than these is his rhetorical ability; in a word, he will appear equal to those who are admired there⁽¹²⁾.

Cydones added that, perhaps, he himself would be able to assist the perplexed Euthymius, for he intended to sail to Italy "in the spring when the sea is calm". At about the same time (end of winter 1385), he also wrote a long letter to Manuel, which began with an interpretation of some lines of the poet Theognis. He then praised the efforts of Manuel against almost insuperable odds to obtain the greatest of benefits for his subjects.

The greatest thing is freedom and for a person not to submit to those inferior to himself. On behalf of freedom, either so as to gain it when it is not present or when present to preserve it, all plans are set in motion, all funds expended, many bodies fall in battle, all write encomia of the victors and reproaches of the defeated. Thus, considering that living in freedom is preferable to all else and anxious to preserve this for yourself and your subjects, you endeavor both to govern and to command, to call allies and to face danger now by land now by sea, to send embassies, to make expenditures and to omit nothing of the possible means"⁽¹³⁾.

After expressing his hopes that Manuel's endeavors would be crowned with success, Cydones spoke of his own reaction to

(12) Letter 314, 1-35, written to a friend in Thessalonica at the end of winter 1385.

(13) Letter 302, 14-24.

the news of the embassy to Rome. He took particular delight in picturing the discomfort of the fanatically anti-Latin hesychasts.

I laughed heartily when I heard of the embassy and Pothos, bearing in mind what sort of things they will say who think to serve God only in fasting, paleness and sitting in a corner, and who make ignorance the symbol of virtue ... You will forever be seeking some way to make excuses to them but you will always be at a loss, since you have clearly performed an act contrary to their hidden exhortations and warnings and to your own promises ⁽¹⁴⁾.

A few more lines in this vein are followed by more serious considerations: Manuel ought not to be the least bit disturbed by such narrow-minded monks, for it is the duty of an emperor to seek to accomplish God's will and to procure the common good: Cydones is overjoyed that the Emperor has decided to carry out a plan which he himself had long advocated. Still, he was disappointed that Manuel had not informed him of his decision beforehand, since he could have contributed a great deal to the success of the mission. "For letters from me to friends in Rome would have preceded the embassy, thus facilitating the task of the ambassadors, for a certain respect and confidence are accorded to my letters by those of importance there". Nonetheless, although somewhat belatedly, Cydones did acquaint the Pope and the Cardinals with Manuel's good intentions as well as with his other virtues; and he recommended the Greek ambassador to them ⁽¹⁵⁾. But since he had never met one of the envoys, "the Master", he did not feel qualified to speak about him and, in any case, he was already known at the papal court. Cydones was certain, moreover, that he was capable and virtuous, otherwise Manuel would not have entrusted him with such an important mission. He regretted, however, that he had been unable to assist at the conversations between "the Master" and Manuel concerning the embassy, for, although the primary aim of the negotiations was to obtain military help, a large part of the discussion must have touched upon theological problems.

⁽¹⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, 34-40. The identity of Pothos, which was a common Greek name, cannot be established with certainty.

⁽¹⁵⁾ "τὸν τε κορυφαῖον καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν λόγον ἐδιδάξαμεν": Letter 302, 58-59.

For religious questions are always interwoven in the negotiations with Rome; either the discussion is chiefly about these or, in order to appear more persuasive, the ambassadors bring forward precisely this point, aware that without mention of this they might not receive a gracious hearing, because neither for money nor marriages nor any other worldly goods would those of the church concede the alliance; only discussions about dogmas beguile them and draw them to agree to the proposals⁽¹⁶⁾.

Cydones was also a trifle chagrined that Manuel had not written to him about those conversations, for he felt sure that "many and beautiful things were said", owing to the Emperor's eloquence and love of debate and the fact that "the Master" was a professor of theology as well as a good speaker; in fact, it was precisely on such an occasion that Cydones' services as an interpreter would have been most useful.

To this lengthy letter of Cydones Manuel wrote a brief reply, which began with a compliment on his friend's enlightening remarks about Theognis. He then continued:

Moreover, I thought it necessary, according to the saying, to sow rocks and to cast seed haphazardly on the sand, and to expect a crop of grain as from rich earth. For the present time forces me to this. So for example, with good hopes of success, I placed my trust in that man whom you know, that one who prefers to speak deceit rather than speak truth. Still, I have often been cheated of my hopes even though trusting in the right people. May God grant, at any rate, that I do not now fail to achieve what I am hoping for. For all should prophecy this; rather it should be the belief of all those who trust in Him who said, "Whatever you ask for, believe and you will receive". For if I did not believe that I should attain my goal, it is clear that I should not be spending so much on the embassy. And that one to whom I have sent the embassy would with reason be then considered the undoubted vicar of the Savior when he fails to fulfill nothing of what has been promised by the Lord⁽¹⁷⁾.

There was no doubt about the purpose of the embassy to the Pope: Manuel wanted western military aid against the Turks besieging Thessalonica. Even Cydones, who sincerely desired religious union for its own sake, recognized this. Before granting such assistance, however, Rome would probably insist on the advisability of at least discussing ecclesiastical union, since the

⁽¹⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, 69-75.

⁽¹⁷⁾ MANUEL, Letter 8, 8-24 (LEGRAND, p. 11-12).

western powers would more willingly come to the aid of fellow-Catholics than of schismatics. And so desperate did Manuel feel his position to be, that he was willing to agree. The question immediately arises: was he sincere? To this no answer can be given, but, in any case, he did discuss the theological problems involved with "the Master", undoubtedly a Latin theologian about whom, unfortunately, nothing is known, not even his name⁽¹⁸⁾. That the Master did not succeed in convincing Manuel of the truth of the Latin doctrines is implied by his actions and his writings some time later when he was sole Emperor. For example, during his visit to Paris (1400-1402) in search of military aid against the Turks he composed a long polemical tract against the Latin teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit. At any rate, whatever Manuel's real views were, his situation in Thessalonica in 1385 to 1387 was so precarious that he did not scruple to agree to ecclesiastical union in order to obtain the western support he needed.

The ambassadors must have set sail for Italy in February or March of 1385, for the letters of Cydones which mention the embassy were written about that time. Perhaps the same group also made up Manuel's embassy to Venice, which appeared before the Signoria early in April. Nothing at all is known about their activity in Italy or when they finally managed to present themselves to the Pope. Since it would have been extremely difficult for them to reach him while he was besieged in Nocera (until 7 July) or during his flight from the Neapolitan army, it was most probably after his arrival in Genoa on 23 September that they were first able to make contact.

(18) The Greek uses the Latin term, *Magister*, i. e. a Master of Theology (perhaps a Dominican) and, since Cydones notes that he was a professor, he must have taught theology in one of the western, probably Italian, universities. That he was not a Greek is clear from the remark of Cydones that he could have served as interpreter in the conversations between the Master and Manuel. However, there is no way of knowing what he was doing in Thessalonica at this time.

2. A Papal Legate in Thessalonica

Somehow or other Euthymius and his companions found their way to the papal court (probably in Genoa where Urban VI resided from 23 September 1385 to mid-December 1386) and presented the proposals of their Emperor, for in spring or summer of 1386 a papal legate was on his way to Thessalonica. The only sources, however, to record this legation are three letters of Cydones, which will be quoted below (Letters 334, 335 and 327, written in that order). That we have to do with a duly accredited legate of the Holy See is clear from Cydones' use of precisely that word, legate, for, apart from having spent some time in Rome, he had been imperial chancellor for thirty years and could thus be expected to know the exact meaning of papal diplomatic nomenclature⁽¹⁹⁾. Who was this legate? Cydones does not give his name, and the Registers of Urban VI, where such a legation would surely be noted, are lacking for these years. The Pope could have designated a legate expressly for these negotiations with Manuel II, but it is also possible, and perhaps more likely, that he simply assigned this new mission to his permanent legate in Romania, Paul Foscari, Archbishop of Patras.

Paul Foscari, member of a prominent Venetian family (his nephew Francesco was later elected Doge) and a Doctor of Law, had first been named Bishop of Coron, then of Castello (Venice) and finally in 1375 he was promoted to the see of Patras⁽²⁰⁾. A year or two later Queen Joanna of Naples designated him as Bailie, that is, governor in her name, of the Principality of Achaia⁽²¹⁾. During this period the Archbishop was also the temporal lord of Patras and was, therefore, embroiled in the intrigues and conflicts among the various Latin powers in the area, as well

(19) The term *legatos* is used in Letter 335, 12 and 327, 4 and 29; in Letter 334 the word 'ambassador' is used.

(20) C. EUBEL, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi*, I, ed. 2 (Münster, 1913), 212, 171, 394. Cf. E. GERLAND, *Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Erzbistums Patras* (Leipzig, 1903), 42-49.

(21) *Libro de los Fechos et Conquistas del Principado de la Morea*, ed. A. MOREL-FATIO (Publications de la Société de l'Orient Latin; Geneva, 1885), p. 159, no. 723.

as with the Greeks and the Turks⁽²²⁾. In particular, he had to defend his commercially important territory from the attacks of Turkish and Catalan pirates, and for this he relied heavily on military aid from his native Venice⁽²³⁾. An influential and powerful feudal lord, Foscari was also a loyal partisan of Pope Urban VI, who sometime before September 1384 appointed him Apostolic Legate in Romania⁽²⁴⁾. On 6 September 1387, after Joanna's death, he was named papal vicar general and governor *in temporibus* of the Principality of Achaia⁽²⁵⁾. Prominent, therefore, in both spiritual and temporal affairs in Latin Greece, he was the sort of man whom Urban would be likely to entrust with the difficult mission to Manuel in Thessalonica⁽²⁶⁾. Of course, this does not

(22) Cf. GERLAND, *loc. cit.*

(23) GERLAND, *Neue Quellen*, 43, n. 3 and 44, n. 5. A number of Venetian documents regarding Foscari are edited by R. J. LOENERTZ, *Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance*, II, Appendix D.

(24) The date is known from a letter of Clement VII of 26 September 1384 appointing a successor to Foscari whom he had declared deposed because of his adherence to Urban VI: *Archivio Segreto Vaticano*, Reg. Aven. 237, fol. 431v.

"... Postmodum vero ecclesia Patracensis ex eo apud dictam Sedem vacante, quod nos iniquitatis filium Paulum, olim archiepiscopum Patracensem, pro eo quod scelerato et nequissimo viro Bartholomeo, olim archiepiscopo Barensi, qui Sedem Apostolicam per impressionem et violenciam notarias presumptione dampnabili nititur occupare ... publice et notorie adheserat et adherebat prout adheret de presenti, dando ei in occupationem huiusmodi auxilium, consilium et favorem, legationis ipsius officium dampnabile exercendo, fidelesque nostros et ecclesie Romane graviter persequendo, et quosdam ex ipsis diris carceribus mancipando ac aliis diversis exigentibus suis demeritis, regimine et administratione predictae Patracensis ecclesie cui tunc preerat auctoritate apostolica privavimus perpetuo ab eisdem".

(25) RAYNALDUS, 1387, no. 8; republished by GERLAND, *Neue Quellen*, 132-134. Four days earlier the Pope had asked him for twenty thousand florins to be consigned to Nicholas de Mercatellis: *Archivio Segreto Vaticano*, Reg. Vat. 311, fol. 99-100. In both documents he is addressed as *Apostolice Sedis Legato*.

(26) On 6 September 1387 he received the following tribute from the Pope: "Probate fidei constancia, litterarum eminens sciencia, vite integritas, morum decor, providentia circumspecta et rerum experientia in multis et arduis comprobata alieque virtutes quibus personam tuam illarum largitor Dominus insignivit, nobis spem indubiam pollicentur quod illa que tibi commiserimus exequeris fideliter, sollicite ac prudenter": *Archivio Se-*

conclusively prove that Foscari actually was the legate mentioned by Cydones⁽²⁷⁾, but, unless further documents are adduced, it seems the most probable supposition.

In the spring or summer of 1386 the Papal Legate set sail for Thessalonica⁽²⁸⁾ but, owing to an unexpected change in plans, he arrived in Constantinople instead, where, it is true, his instructions ordered him to go, but only after carrying out his mission to Manuel II. At any rate, he was received in the Byzantine capital with undisguised displeasure — but perhaps it is better to listen to the report of Cydones, who was an eye-witness of these events.

Owing to a stroke of ill fortune, the ambassador of the Pope has altered his arrangements and has come first to us, to whom he was supposed to have come afterwards, and later he is coming to you to whom he was originally sent. He has, therefore, made no small reparation to us for this change in plans. Of those who had summoned him by letter⁽²⁹⁾, some did not even suffer to see him; others saw him indeed, but with unpleasantness and conversed not at all. And they completely forgot what they had written, and they thought so much of the union for which they were begging, that they mocked at the Pope for having hoped to achieve it and called his striving for union sheer folly. In order also to render his readiness for

greto Vaticano, Reg. Vat. 311, fol. 107. These lines have been omitted in the edition of this document by Raynaldus and Gerland; cf. preceding note.

(²⁷) In a letter of 2 September 1387, Francesco Falieri, Bishop of Modon, is also mentioned as Legate of the Apostolic See; *Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Reg. Vat. 311, fol. 100*: "Item in ea forma ut in iam proxima scribitur episcopo Francisco, episcopo Motonensi, Apostolice Sedis Legato, quod concedat camere apostolice decem milia florenorum et recipiat N. de Mercadantibus".

There is, however, no other reference to Falieri as Apostolic Legate, and it is not impossible that his designation as such here is a copyist's error. Falieri was named Bishop of Modon on 26 January 1368 (EUBEL, *Hierarchia Catholica*, 351) and on 21 November 1390 was transferred to the see of Castello (*Ibid.*, 171).

(²⁸) That the legation took place in spring or summer 1386 is gathered from the fact that the relevant letters of Cydones were written at this time. Furthermore, it must have been before 22 September when the Registers of Urban VI, which would certainly contain some reference to the legation, resume.

(²⁹) In his letter to Urban VI of September 1384 (*M. M.*, II, no 379, p. 87), the Patriarch Nilus had written: "When we should receive precise information, both by letters and legates (*apocrisiarii*) of Your Beatitude, ... then we intend to give a fitting answer".

it completely impracticable, they began to demand of the Pope that, unless he first removed this and that from the creed, they would have no further discussion with him at all. With a solemn air they also added other considerations, both showing by their way of acting that they needed nothing from him and, moreover, that it was not necessary to trouble him.

So it is, therefore, that the ambassador left here, and he is now on his way to you, hoping that he will not receive a similar response also from you. But I have dispelled this fear of his to no small degree by acquainting him with the firmness of the Emperor's intention and by persuading him that he will receive him with good will and kindness, and that he will strive to implement what has been negotiated, for he is the type of man, I added, who adheres to his decisions and who completes words with deeds. He, then, is coming, convinced that he will fare better with you.

In God's name, therefore, if you enjoy any liberty with the Emperor to give advice, persuade him to receive the man kindly and to honor him properly. For he is worthy of this, not only because of the one who has sent him — and in the matter of an embassy honor must be shown to the person who has sent it — but also because of himself he would be rightly honored even by the Scythians, for he is a meek and reasonable man. You should also try to give him answers which are not unseemly, but, as far as possible, in agreement with what the ambassadors declared, so that, if we gain nothing else from the embassy, at least we may be commended for truth and reasonableness. I would wish that the Emperor show the same treatment also to Fra Garcia, who is an old friend and well-disposed to him, especially now that he has received the episcopate and adorned it by his seemly behavior⁽³⁰⁾. At any rate, to such men the Emperor was accustomed to show much honor. And if you wish to learn anything about my affairs, you will not be left in ignorance if you ask him⁽³¹⁾.

After this check to his mission in Constantinople, the Legate prepared to sail to Thessalonica where Cydones assured him of receiving better treatment. At the last minute, however, he

(30) Fra Garcia (or Garsias) was a Spanish Religious (probably a Dominican), who is mentioned by Cydones in Letters 221, 7; 260, 16 and 22; 266, 4; 310, 15: this last states that he was in Naples with the papal curia in summer 1384. He is undoubtedly the same person who was named Archbishop of Thebes sometime before 1 June 1387, the date on which the new prelate undertook to pay the customary taxes to the Apostolic Camera: *Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Oblig. et Sol.* 48, fol. 36v (51v), ed. LOENERTZ, *Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance*, II, Appendix C. It was formerly published in *D. O. C.*, with the erroneous indication of Avignon; actually the papal court (of Urban VI) was in Lucca at the time, whither Archbishop Garcia had come to absolve his fiscal obligation, *personaliter promisit*. His actual nomination to the see of Thebes could have been made a year or so before this.

(31) Letter 334, written to Rhadenos in Thessalonica.

was unable to depart. "You have read", wrote Cydones to Rhadenos, "the letter about the Legate, which I wrote just as he was leaving here, but a certain fortune has held him back" (32). Perhaps the reason why the Legate could not leave as planned was the pestilence which raged among the crews of the ships at about this time (33). In any event, he could not have been detained very long, for that same year (1386), perhaps in summer or autumn, he embarked for Thessalonica. Shortly after his arrival there, all sorts of rumors began to drift back to Constantinople, and Cydones, not knowing what to think, wrote to Manuel for more exact information.

We are thirsting to learn, as you can imagine, the news about the Legate, and there is nobody who will give us accurate information. But many people wander about fabricating all sorts of rumors; each one reports what he likes, and they do not agree with one another, nor are their assertions able to convince me. On this, though, all agree: both from the Emperor and the city much honor was shown to the ambassador, and there were gifts befitting the honor, as well as lengthy conversations, very like those between friends, some in the presence of many witnesses and others which escaped everyone's notice. There were also other indications that both the Church and the one who had sent the embassy would seem to have been honored. Moreover, they say that the Legate has cheered all, both by what he promised and by his success in the declarations he made to the enthusiasm of all. And now our city is persuaded to render the same honors to the Son as to the Father and to hold this teaching both in the common holy places and in the assemblies everywhere.

But others, wishing to stir up the people here, add remarks about the Keys and their superiority over the imperial standard, and they say that this has resulted in adulteration not only of the faith but also in great dishonor to the imperial majesty. They insist, therefore, that those responsible for all this should pay the penalty both to God and to the Emperor. Then, all those who seriously desire to preserve the true faith themselves and who pray that it be preserved by others regard those men who are convinced as right-minded and say that they made the agreement on behalf of freedom with reason. Those, on the other hand, who prefer the abominable lawgiver [Mohammed] to Christ and who exchange freedom among Christians for his yoke, are grieved because of what the rumors say. They bewail the city as though it had denied the faith of their fathers, and they prophesy that it will be mercilessly subjected to the enemy as punishment for its audacious deeds. Then, right away, the mouths of all are opened against me and, because of the accusations they make against you, they angrily

(32) Letter 335, 12-14, written to Rhadenos in 1386.

(33) CYDONES, Letters 331, 32; 337, 38; 345, 65.

turn on me for having persuaded the Legate when he was here to demand this new faith in return for the alliance and for having counselled you there to accede to the demands he would make as being good. This has led to a great deal of warfare about me, for I am considered the real instigator of these acts, and everyone loudly proclaims that the counsellor must be punished for the way in which he has deceived the city.

Nonetheless, it is possible to propitiate the others in some way, but who could bear or even enumerate the comedies produced by the excellent hesychasts or the arrows from that quarter? They discharge them so abundantly and they penetrate deeply. For me the only remedy for these blows is that I share the reproaches with you and with our fatherland. For the men who say these things spare not even your person, but in their accusations against me they also include you and they accuse us of making an exchange which is hopeless. For God's sake, therefore, be kind enough to reveal to me what is going on. If I know that the accusers tell the truth, I will bear the reproaches in silence since I should be responsible, or should I learn that the goddess of Hesiod [Rumor] is lying, I will have something to answer, both on your behalf and on my own, to these insolent people who spare nobody⁽³⁴⁾.

The Papal Legate, therefore, had been received with honor and had successfully accomplished his mission to Manuel II in Thessalonica: on this point all the reports reaching Cydones in Constantinople agreed. They also agreed on the fact that long and friendly discussions took place between Manuel and the Pope's representative and that an agreement was reached between the two: the Legate promised military aid to the beleaguered city; Manuel II accepted union with the Roman Church, including the profession of the doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit from both Father and Son, and imposed this union on the Greek Church in Thessalonica. (The phrase in the letter just cited, "And now our city is persuaded to render the same honors to the Son as to the Father", allows of no doubt.) How was this union received in Thessalonica and what effect did it have? According to Cydones, the Legate was accorded full honors, as were the Roman Church and the Pope who had sent him, and what he had to say was eagerly listened to. Yet the enthusiastic hearing he received was undoubtedly given chiefly when he made his promises of military assistance, for in a city in imminent peril of Turkish capture declarations of this sort would be far more

(34) Letter 327.

welcome than discussions about dogmas. Then, too, those who were heartened by the prospect of a military alliance and who, at least externally, accepted the union would have been the members of Manuel's court, the municipal authorities and some of the educated class. Among these there were certainly some who shared the views of Cydones in favor of union ⁽³⁵⁾. Furthermore, a large number of those who would have formed the core of any opposition to union, the clergy, including the Archbishop, and the monks, had already left the city. On the other hand, it would be surprising if there were no resistance to the union among the mass of the population, particularly among those who could not appreciate — or cared little for — the theological niceties involved and, perhaps, the union only served to increase the discontent of the inhabitants and to harden them in their antagonism to Manuel. However, in the account of this union in Thessalonica, there are more questions than answers: how was the union proclaimed? How many members of the clergy accepted it? Did Manuel himself adhere to the union? What measures were taken to promulgate it? To these and similar questions no definite reply can be made. It can be presumed, however, that when, in April 1387, Thessalonica fell to the Turks, the union, or what was left of it, came to an end.

Although Cydones has very little to say about the reception of the union in Thessalonica, he has recorded the reaction of the people of Constantinople to the news. That there were some besides himself who believed that the union was well made is clear from his letter, but that there were others, apparently the majority, who severely condemned it is even clearer. The unyielding center of opposition to the Thessalonian (or any) *rapprochement* with Rome was found — as it would be after the Council of Florence — in the clergy and the monks, particularly the violently anti-Latin hesychasts; on a smaller scale it was an anticipation of the reception of the Union of Florence in the Byzantine capital a half century or so later ⁽³⁶⁾. Union with

⁽³⁵⁾ For example, the addressee of his Letter 314. At this time Manuel himself may have been better disposed towards union than in his later life; in any event, he shared Cydones' contempt for the hesychasts.

⁽³⁶⁾ Cf. J. GILL. *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge, 1959), 348 ss.

Rome, it was maintained, meant the subjection of the Empire to the Pope ("the Keys and their superiority over the imperial standard"); it meant the acceptance of all the Latin doctrines and a betrayal of their ancestral faith; God would punish the Thessalonians for their boldness by handing them over to the Turks. There were those who preferred Ottoman domination to an alliance with the western Christians — a sentiment said to have been expressed by Luke Notaras on the eve of the fall of Constantinople⁽³⁷⁾. In particular, the opponents of union centered their fire on Cydones, who was noted for his Catholicism, and with whom the Legate had conferred during his ill-fated visit in Constantinople. Cydones, so they said, must have advised him to insist on union with Rome as the preliminary condition of any military aid, and he must have written to Manuel in Thessalonica bidding him give in to all the papal demands. The anti-Latin circles did not even refrain from criticizing the Emperor Manuel II for his unforgivable action.

The promises made by the Papal Legate in Thessalonica were certainly promises of military aid: this was the avowed object of the embassy Manuel had sent to the Pope and it is clearly referred to in the above letters of Cydones (e. g. "this new faith in return for the alliance"). Yet, as far as our sources go, Urban VI did nothing to implement this "alliance" or to furnish military aid to the embattled Thessalonians. Indeed, there was very little he could do except to appeal to the western powers for assistance, and most of these were either hostile to him or busily engaged in conflicts of their own. The Papal Legate, however, must have had some grounds for making his promises, so that it is most probable that the Pope, despite his straitened circumstances, at least intended to send some military support. Perhaps his appeals for aid fell upon deaf ears or, if a force was actually organized it was probably not ready to embark for Greece until the spring of 1387, when Thessalonica capitulated, thus rendering any military aid useless. But, once again, the wide gaps in the Papal Registers prevent the historian from coming to any

⁽³⁷⁾ "Better to see the turban of the Turk ruling in the midst of the city than the Latin mitre": DUCAS, ch. 37, 10: p. 329, 10-12 (Grecu): 264 (Bonn). Cf. GILL, *op. cit.*, 375-376.

conclusions. All that is known with certainty of Pope Urban's actual efforts to assist the Greeks against the Turks is found in a letter he addressed to Angelo Correr, Bishop of Castello (later Pope Gregory XII), on 9 April 1388, a year after the fall of Thessalonica⁽³⁸⁾. The Pope ordered that two galleys be armed in Venice for service against the Turks and that volunteers and funds for this project be gathered from the territory of Venice and of Ferrara. There is, however, no record that anything was accomplished in this regard and, in any case, it had nothing to do with Thessalonica, already in Turkish hands.

⁽³⁸⁾ *Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Reg. Vat. 311, fol. 173-175*; published in part by Raynaldus, 1388, no. 4. Cf. HALECKI, "Rome et Byzance", 491-493

THE FALL OF THESSALONICA, APRIL 1387

Although the promises of the Papal Legate may have been encouraging, they provided the defenders of Thessalonica with no immediate tangible support, and in the winter of 1386/87 the situation in the city, already besieged for more than three years, must have been desperate. While the Turkish conquests in Macedonia continued unabated, Manuel II had no more victories to his credit; he was disillusioned by the alliance he had made with his brother and Nerio Acciajuoli; his treasury was exhausted; and, above all, the inhabitants of the city had turned against him. Weary of the continual fighting and worn out by the hardships imposed by the long siege, they were ready for peace at any price: for most of them subjection to the Turks could be no worse than the repressive measures and, as they claimed, the 'tyranny' of the Emperor. Faced by the prospect of rebellion within the city, Manuel could hardly hope to continue the struggle against the more formidable foe outside the walls. He had gambled — and he had lost.

When Manuel realized that further resistance was useless and that he had to leave Thessalonica, he wrote to Cydones for advice (which, incidentally, speaks volumes about the esteem he had for his former teacher). Three choices lay before him: to return to Constantinople, to establish himself in the Peloponnesus with his brother Theodore, or to seek refuge in foreign lands, that is, in the West. The problem would have been easy to solve were it not for the company of loyal and resolute soldiers, a real personal army, which accompanied Manuel and which he did not want to abandon. This element should not be lost sight of in reading Letters 332 and 342 of Cydones and in trying to understand the attitude of John V and the Lord of Lesbos with regard to receiving Manuel. But in the case of the Emperor, his father, the

question is further complicated, owing to our lack of precise information about some incident which rendered worse the already strained relations between father and son — and consequently, between John V and Cydones ⁽¹⁾. When a meeting of the Council was convoked to deliberate on Manuel's fate, Cydones was excluded, even though lesser dignitaries ordinarily not admitted to such sessions took part. The Emperor was also thinking of expressing his irritation in an official document of reproach against his son ⁽²⁾.

Cydones began his reply to Manuel's questions by declaring that, even if he were a prophet, he would not know what advice to give him.

For first of all what could I devise that you had not thought of; furthermore, in the present situation which demands a decision the balance is not inclined more to one side than to the other ... And since I am almost in complete ignorance of what is going on there and of what is happening here, I should with reason be hesitant to give advice. For between you and me there are 'many shadowy mountains and the roaring sea', which prevent me from knowing, even by messengers, the situation in which you find yourself. At such a distance, what could I know about you? I am also kept completely out of what is going on here, for not only was I not present at the meeting of the senate which met to determine your lot — indeed, not only were the nine archons present, but also those who had never yet taken part in the council were summoned for this session — but it was also ordered that the doors be closed to me, as the holy places are forbidden to murderers. They did not even want me to hear, if it were possible, what was being bruited about in the market places, so that I know less about events here than about those at the Antipodes. In such great darkness, then, what could I say that would be helpful? ⁽³⁾.

But, since he had been asked for his advice, Cydones continued, he would dutifully offer his opinion to his lord. In any event, it was impossible for Manuel to remain in Thessalonica, and of the three possibilities that lay before him Cydones first ruled out that of seeking refuge in the West, for, in addition to the long and difficult journey, there was danger that among strange peoples his rank would be ignored and he might be treated with

⁽¹⁾ Cf. above, p. 112-113.

⁽²⁾ CYDONES, Letter 346, 4 ss.

⁽³⁾ Letter 342, 7-23.

insolence as a common vagabond. Furthermore, how would his followers support a long separation from their families and their country? Secondly, as far as Manuel's idea of finding a haven with his brother Theodore was concerned, Cydones objected: "How could the Peloponnesus, which has few resources, and those not sufficient for its own inhabitants, receive you if you migrate there with so many people?"⁽⁴⁾ This could easily lead to armed conflict between Manuel's followers and the citizens of the region. There was also another consideration: "I myself have heard that your passage to the Peloponnesus would exceedingly displease those who now endeavor to destroy us, but once you were there, they would send men to harass you, making it worse there than it was in Thessalonica"⁽⁵⁾.

The third possibility was what Cydones recommended: despite previous unpleasant incidents, Manuel should return to his father in Constantinople. For there his support would be assured; he would again see his mother, who ardently desired his presence; and he would be restored to his position as heir to the throne. All that John V insisted on was an indication of his son's future obedience, and in this regard he would be satisfied if Manuel returned with only a small group of followers and, in particular, if he purged his entourage of certain men who, so John V thought, had led Manuel to disobey him. Moreover, wrote Cydones, the Emperor was old and sick and would soon need the assistance of his son.

Probably the same day Cydones wrote a similar letter to Rhadenos⁽⁶⁾: as he had frequently done during the past three or four years, he once more advised him to leave Thessalonica.

(4) *Ibid.*, lines 53-55. That Manuel was seriously considering going to the Peloponnesus and that he may have advised Venice of his intention to do so are clear from a deliberation of the Venetian Senate of 1 June 1387 regarding the equipping of two ships for the voyage to the Black Sea: Venice, *Archivio di Stato, Senato, Misti* 40, fol. 71: "Propterea ordinetur quod si galee predictae reperient in partibus Amoree dominum Imperatorem Chiermanuli, qui peteret levare super ipsis galeis, quod teneantur ipsum levare cum personis viginti apud eum et conducere Constantinopolim sine aliquo nabulo, honorando personam suam secundum quod excellentie sue et honori nostro conveniet".

(5) Letter 342, 58-60.

(6) Letter 332.

"It is excusable if some of the common people should wish to remain there and to endure slavery, for they have long been subjected to masters and accustomed to misery: at the same time their ignorance prevents them from foreseeing the evils about to fall upon them. But you, what reasons will you allege for still dwelling in the city?" (7). After recalling the horrors sure to accompany the imminent Turkish capture of Thessalonica, he besought Rhadenos to take thought for his own safety.

Since, therefore, the story of Thessalonica has finished as I often predicted to you, and the most beautiful of cities, alas, has become the slave of the foulest of men, and the Emperor cannot easily find a place to which he should flee, it is the moment, at least for you, to make some decision about your own safety which will both keep you from destroying yourself and enable you to continue in your duty to him. If, therefore, it is true that the Emperor is preparing to sail here — for as far as your group is concerned, there is reason to hope that the father [John V] will not bear a lasting grudge against his son, but that he will pardon him and call him to himself — with good fortune you, too, come with your companions (8).

Cydones then advised him strongly against going to the Peloponnesus and, reminding him of the fate of the sons of Oedipus, implied that he should endeavor to dissuade Manuel from seeking refuge there. As in his letter to Manuel, he also exhorted Rhadenos not to think of journeying to western Europe, but rather to return to Constantinople. He then repeated what he had written to Manuel about the conditions laid down by John V if his son were to come back to the capital. "And do not be disturbed if the Emperor orders his son to return with only the most indispensable followers, for you could very well be numbered among them. You should not think, then, that it is without any good reason that the Emperor has made this rule applicable to everybody; what he wants to do is to separate his son from men whom all accuse and whom all hold responsible for the evils which have befallen him and the city" (9).

The counsel of Cydones, however, was not followed, for Manuel did not return directly to Constantinople. Perhaps he thought that the conditions laid down by his father were too severe.

(7) Letter 332, 29-33.

(8) Letter 332, 67-75.

(9) *Ibid.*, lines 93-97.

or it may be that Cydones had been overly optimistic and that John V — either out of fear of Murad or for other motives — had categorically forbidden his son to sail to the capital⁽¹⁰⁾. Whatever the real reason was, Manuel finished by adopting a completely new plan which he had not envisaged in his letter to Cydones. He decided to sail with his followers to Lesbos, where his cousin Francesco II Gattilusio ruled, perhaps still under the regency of his uncle Nicholas, Lord of Ainos. Before departing, Manuel or one of his companions sent notice to Cydones, who had time to send a letter to Lesbos recommending the fugitives.

Finally, in April 1387, all the preparations had been made — although perhaps somewhat hastily — and Manuel with his loyal band of followers set sail from the city which had been his capital during what were probably the most memorable years of his life. At this point the reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica was finished, and here this history could end. But the reader might well wish to know what new information is provided by the sources utilized for the first time in these pages (the Letters of Cydones) on the destinies of Thessalonica and on those of Manuel II in the years immediately following his departure.

On the first point the response is simple: the Letters of Cydones do not furnish any new details about Thessalonica under Turkish domination. It suffices, therefore, to recall briefly the following facts. In April 1387, probably very soon after Manuel's ship weighed anchor and set its course for Lesbos, the municipal authorities opened the gates of the city to Khairaddin-Pasha⁽¹¹⁾.

⁽¹⁰⁾ According to Chalcocandyles (I, 42, 18-21 and 48, 17-18), John V, fearing Murad's reaction, opposed a pure and simple veto to Manuel's plan to sail to Constantinople.

⁽¹¹⁾ There is no doubt regarding the date of the Turkish capture, which is attested to by several sources: the chronological notice of the *cod. Marcian.* gr. 408 (*cf. above*, p. 6-8); the Life of St Athanasius of the Meteora (ed. N. VEIS, Βυζαντινὰ 1 (1909), 237-260) has the saint, who died in 1383, prophesy the capture of the city by the Turks three years later (p. 259). These notices are confirmed by a Deliberation of the Venetian Senate of 22 July 1387, which notes that Thessalonica is in the possession of Murad: ed. *Appendix*, doc. B (this item has been overlooked by Thiriet in his *Régestes*).

According to Chalcocandyles (I, 44, 1-2), Khairaddin enslaved the inhabitants of the captured city. He did not, however, enjoy his triumph for long, for within the year (789 Heg. = 22 Jan. 1387 - 10 Jan. 1388) he

On learning of this news, the Metropolitan Isidore Glabas, who was still residing in Constantinople, wrote a pastoral letter to the Thessalonians expressing his compassion for them in their sufferings, exhorting them to remain unshaken in their faith and, according to the precept of St Paul, to obey and reverence their new masters⁽¹²⁾. He then promised to return to his flock in the company of the civic authorities (the archons), then on their way to the Ottoman Emir, presumably to offer him their city's allegiance and to request more favorable conditions⁽¹³⁾. Thessalonica remained under the Ottoman yoke until 1404, when, after the battle of Ankara (28 July 1402), Suleiman, the son of Bajezid I and the ruler of European Turkey, restored it to the Byzantine Empire in virtue of the treaty signed with John VII in summer 1403⁽¹⁴⁾. When Manuel II returned from his long voyage in the West (1399-1404), John VII retired to Lesbos and with the aid of its ruler, Francesco Gattilusio, his father-in-law, tried to gain control of Thessalonica⁽¹⁵⁾. In any case, Manuel II ceded the city to him and he reigned there until his death in 1408, enjoying all the rights and privileges of an independent emperor⁽¹⁶⁾.

As far as the personal destinies of Manuel after his flight from Thessalonica are concerned, the correspondence of Cydones is far richer in details, and enables the historian to correct many points in the account of Chalcocondyles. On arriving in Lesbos Manuel was received by his young cousin Francesco Gattilusio,

died in Serres: from notice inscribed on his tomb in Iznik: TAESCHNER-WITTEK, "Die Vezirfamilie", 61.

(12) Ed. LAMPROS, "Ἰσιδώρα ... ἐπιστολαί", no. 8, p. 387-391.

(13) "We are only awaiting the archons, who will be going to the Great Lord, so that, when they come back, we may, if God wills, return with them": *Ibid.*, p. 388, 9-11. However, Isidore remained in Constantinople until at least summer 1389; cf. above, p. 17.

(14) Ed. N. IORGA, "Privilegiul lui Mohammed al II-lea pentru Pera", *Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, ser. II (1913-1914), 69-92; text: 85-88.

(15) Ruy Gonzales DE CLAVIJO, *Historia del Gran Tamerlan*, cited by R. J. LOENERTZ, "Fragment d'une Lettre de Jean V Paléologue à la commune de Gênes 1387-1391", *B. Z.* 51 (1958), 39, n. 5.

(16) F. DÖLGER, "Johannes VII., Kaiser der Rhomäer", *B. Z.* (1931), 34-36.

but was not permitted to enter into the walled city of Mytilene, perhaps because of the number of the refugees accompanying him, perhaps also in order not to irritate Murad⁽¹⁷⁾. After Manuel's followers had established themselves as best they could on Lesbos, Rhadenos wrote a very brief letter to Cydones, so brief, in fact, that the latter replied with a very long one reproaching him for "that small note brought by Asanes", which, moreover, contained nothing that was not already known in Constantinople⁽¹⁸⁾. Rhadenos had mentioned that he had fled from Thessalonica before it fell to the Turks and had found refuge on Lesbos. To this Cydones replied that the whole world knew the tragic fate of their native city and, as far as Lesbos was concerned, he added: "How should I be ignorant of your going down to Lesbos and of the kindness shown to you by the inhabitants? ... Indeed, it was I who wrote to the Lord of the Island, praising you highly, and I persuaded him to show you hospitality and kindness"⁽¹⁹⁾. Rhadenos, wrote Cydones, was deceived in his hopes of soon returning to Constantinople in the company of Manuel, for John V, who had heard every possible argument in favor of the refugees, "has declared flatly that his own salvation and that of the city lies in this one point, never to receive his son"⁽²⁰⁾.

During his sojourn on Lesbos Manuel composed his essay in epistolary form to Cabasilas, the only one of his writings (apart from the few letters cited in the preceding pages) in which he alludes to the events of 1382-1387 and to the conflict with his father⁽²¹⁾. Together with his followers he remained on the barren, rocky island through the suffocating heat of mid-summer in a small cluster of tents outside the walls of Mytilene⁽²²⁾. Meanwhile, Murad, continuing in his policy of opposing one rival emperor to the other and having no desire to see Manuel take refuge

(17) According to Chalcocondyles (I, 48, 18-20) Francesco simply forbade Manuel to land on Lesbos. In this he is mistaken, for not only did Manuel and his followers come ashore, but they also remained there some months.

(18) Letter 350, 33-35.

(19) *Ibid.*, lines 49-53.

(20) *Ibid.*, lines 63-68.

(21) Ed. R. J. LOENERTZ "Manuel Paléologue, épître à Cabasilas", *Μακεδονικά* 4 (1956), 35-46.

(22) *Ibid.*, lines 1-17.

in the West where he might arouse Christian opinion against him, held out the olive branch to the unfortunate prince. His envoys persuaded Manuel to move to a deserted island closer to Murad — undoubtedly Tenedos, depopulated as a result of the treaty of Turin (1381) — and there further negotiations were conducted between the dispossessed Emperor and the Emir⁽²³⁾. Finally, when Manuel had been assured of his own safety, he and a part of his company went to the Sublime Porte in Brusa, where he made his peace with Murad⁽²⁴⁾.

The principal obstacle to Manuel's return to Constantinople was now eliminated, and he once more entered the capital which he had left in haste and in secret some five years earlier. His father, however, had not fully forgiven him and, as a sort of penance, imposed upon him a sojourn on the Island of Lemnos⁽²⁵⁾. He was still there when Murad met his death on the battlefield of Kossovo Polje (15 June 1389)⁽²⁶⁾.

Later that same summer Manuel was completely reconciled with his father and once more took his place in Constantinople as the future successor of John V⁽²⁷⁾. It is not impossible that

(23) According to Cydones (Letter 352), Rhadenos and his companions (i. e. Manuel's entourage) had settled on a small island which the pirates considered their home and where, like Ulysses, they could not even find a branch to cover their nakedness. But the dangers lying in wait for them from the mainland (Turkey) were worse and, although the Emir had provided them with money and grain and had sent an embassy to offer peace to Manuel, the Turks could not be trusted. Also in Letters 354 and 355 Cydones advised Rhadenos strongly against accompanying the Emperor to the court of Murad, for, once the Turks held the Greeks in their power, their language would be considerably different from that which their envoys now used in discussing terms of peace.

(24) CYDONES, Letters 363, 365, 370. The submission of Manuel to the Emir was not, therefore, made without previous negotiations and in so abject a manner as one would gather from Chalcocondyles (I, 42, 21-44, 1; 48, 20-22). At this time, apparently during Manuel's sojourn in Brusa, Rhadenos died unexpectedly; CYDONES, Letter 363, 28 ss.

(25) Cf. CYDONES, Letters 370, 368, 372-374. During Manuel's exile on Lemnos he received a number of letters from Cydones, which are found in Books XXXV-XXXVI of the *Correspondance*.

(26) CYDONES, Letter 396.

(27) Letter of Theodore, Despot in the Morea, to Amedeo of Savoy, dated 21 October 1389: R. CESSI, "Amedeo di Acaia e la rivendicazione

this reconciliation touched off the enterprise of John VII, who seized power in Byzantium for a few months in 1390, before Manuel was able to regain control of the city on behalf of his father. On friendly terms with the Turkish ruler and with his father, Manuel was obliged to follow the policy which John V had pursued since 1373, that of friendship with the Ottoman Emir, or, more exactly, subservience to him. In accord with this policy, he had to accompany Bajezid, the successor of Murad, on an expedition to Asia Minor, where word came to him of his father's death on 16 February 1391. Immediately he rode back to Constantinople and assumed power as sole Emperor. For the next three years he carried on his father's policy of collaboration with the Turks until the treachery and brutality of Bajezid rendered this impossible, and he was forced to turn against the Ottoman Emir. This then led to Bajezid's siege of Constantinople and the well known journey of Manuel throughout western Europe in search of aid.

dei domini Sabaudi in Oriente", *Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, ser. nuova, 37 (1919), 5-64; text: 18-19.

EPILOGUE

The history related in the preceding pages serves to fill a gap in our knowledge of the story of the Byzantine Empire; it brings to light several facts hitherto unnoticed and places them in their proper chronological framework. The story, however, is far from complete, but it is hoped that it will stimulate further research on this little known period. The significance of this brief reign in Thessalonica for our understanding of Manuel himself and of the late Byzantine Empire in general will not escape the reader and he will undoubtedly discover a number of points deserving of his consideration. On one point in particular, though, he might reasonably expect further clarification; he might wish to know more about the motives that led Manuel to establish himself in Thessalonica. Although it is always a risky undertaking to assess a person's motives, especially when all of the factors involved are not clear, nonetheless, an opinion based on the available facts can be hazarded.

While the Turkish policy followed by John V was one of appeasement or 'coexistence', Manuel chose to take up arms and do battle against the Turks. In taking this drastic step was he impelled solely by the desire of freeing the Empire from 'barbarian' control? That, at any rate, is the recurrent theme in the letters of Cydones all during this period, and Manuel himself gave expression to similar sentiments in some of his letters and in his *Discourse to the Thessalonians*. It would, however, be somewhat naive to take all these declarations at their face value and to believe that these motives of the purest patriotism were completely unalloyed with baser metal. That such motives existed is clear enough, and Manuel's opposition to the philo-Turkish clause of the treaty with Genoa of November 1382 undoubtedly played some part in shaping his decision and, in fact, his first known act in Thessalonica was to attack the Turks. But was this anti-Turkish policy the determining factor behind his dramatic choice?

Perhaps it is best to begin our reply with another question : did Manuel actually have a chance of winning the war against the Turks and of solidly establishing his own rule over Macedonia ? For if he himself realized that he had no chance of victory, it would indicate that the desire to drive the Turks from Byzantine soil was not his guiding motive. Although a final answer to this question is rendered impossible by the scarcity of sources, it is difficult to see how he could have succeeded in such an ambitious project. Moreover, Manuel was no fool and must have been fully aware of the almost insuperable difficulties involved in any attempt to stem the Ottoman tide. It would seem, rather, that his plans were not quite as ambitious as one would gather from the letters of Cydones. For these letters leave one with the impression that the "New Empire" in Thessalonica was to be the rallying point for all those who wanted to rid their country of Ottoman domination and that, somehow, this spirit of freedom would spread to Constantinople. Manuel's actual plans, however, were probably more modest. Perhaps he thought that a show of force and a few swift victories would compel Murad to recognize his authority over Macedonia and this may well have been the burden of the negotiations he conducted with the Emir during the siege. Possibly, too, he wished to gain time in order to prepare for a more extensive campaign later on. In any event, there is good reason to doubt that Manuel, unless he had made an extremely serious and rather unlikely error in judgement, established himself in Thessalonica solely because he desired to wage war against the Turks.

Certain it is that Manuel could appeal to abundant personal reasons to justify his action. For one thing, he must have regarded his father's rejection of him as an act of deep ingratitude. Furthermore, his pride was undoubtedly dealt a severe blow when he suddenly found himself deprived of the rights and honors he had held for almost ten years, particularly his right of succeeding to the throne. That he resented his father's attitude is clear from a few remarks in his letter to Cabasilas written in 1387⁽¹⁾, although it is uncertain whether this refers to earlier difficulties with John V or to those existing at the time. It is not impos-

(1) Ed. LOENERTZ, *Μακεδονικά* 4 (1956), p. 46, 314-319.

sible that the relations between father and son had become strained as far back as 1381 and that they may have influenced John in depriving Manuel of his previous honors, thus precipitating his son's decision to leave Constantinople. Unfortunately, however, this conflict between the two which certainly existed in 1387 is obscure and we do not know whether it was based on personal reasons or on differences about state policy. Manuel's actual departure from Constantinople was completely unexpected and was strongly criticized even by his close friend, Cydones, so that one has the impression that it was more or less hastily improvised, as though, after a quarrel with his father, Manuel had immediately decided to give vent to his anger by setting out on his own. It would seem, therefore, that Manuel sailed off to Thessalonica, moved more by injured pride than anything else, but once there he and his supporters soon came to look upon his Thessalonian venture as an effort to free Byzantium from subservience to the Turks.

A final remark on the wisdom of Manuel's policy may not be out of place. Was Manuel wiser in fighting the Turks than his father was in allying himself with them? Obviously, if Manuel had won the war, his course would have been acknowledged as the better one. As a matter of fact he lost, and the second city of the Empire fell to the enemy. (That Byzantium later regained Thessalonica ought not to enter into the discussion, for neither John V nor Manuel foresaw this.) Certainly the policy followed by John V enabled Byzantium to preserve a semblance of freedom, but in reality the Empire was dependent on the Ottoman Emir who skillfully exploited the internal divisions in Constantinople. Both courses, then, led to ruin, the one more swiftly, the other more gradually, but just as surely. If Manuel had been victorious in Macedonia, however, he might well have succeeded in arresting the slow decline of the Empire. Whatever one may think about Manuel's original motives, it cannot be denied that his ill-fated enterprise in Thessalonica had its noble aspects, and it is difficult not to share the sentiments of Cydones: "The Emperor, valiant as he is, has not been able to accomplish what he chose to do. Still, he should be praised for his decision, for he has frankly thrown the dice on behalf of all, and he wished to purchase the safety of others at the price of personal dangers ⁽²⁾."

(²) Letter 273, 16-19.

DELIBERATIONS OF THE VENETIAN SENATE

A.

Venice, *Archivio di Stato, Senato, Misti* 39, fol. 65.

Die 18 aprilis 1385.

Sapientes ordinum. — Capta.

Cum comparuerit coram nostro Dominio quidam ambaxiator domini Imperatoris Chiermanuli cum suis litteris credulitatis, exponens ultra salutationem ex parte predicti domini Imperatoris quod nostre Dominationi placeat complacere eidem pro evidentissima necessitate sua de duobus uyeriis et ducentis armaturis et veretonorum xx^m et de lxx ballisteriis solvendis pro tribus mensibus, de quibus omnibus ipse ambaxiator dicit quod solventur nobis precium in Nigroponte; item petit quod per viam mutuam vellemus sibi complacere de ducatis vi^m vel de illa quantitate que videatur nostro Dominio, et pro hoc dominus Imperator est contentus dare nobis pro pignore de locis et fortificiis suis; item petit quod fiat una liga inter galeam nostram Nigropontis et galeam suam, ita quod galea nostra possit ire in subsidium insule Nigropontis; item quod, quia eius frater Theodorus, Despoti Amoree, est ibi potens, si Dominatio nostra vult ei subvenire apud suum posse, ita quod recuperare possit de suis terris et locis que occupantur per Navarrenses, ipse Theodorus complaceret nobis de locis suis aquirendis que facerent pro nostro Dominio; item idem Imperator petit quod propter novitates et guerram quas habet cum Admorato placeat interponere nos inter ipsum et Moratum ut concordia sequi possit.

Ad primum capitulum de concedendo sibi duos uyerios, illas cc armaturas et miliorum xx veretonorum respondeatur essemus contenti semper in cunctis possibilibus complacere domino Imperatori predicto, verum quia posset occurrere quod, si isti uyerii, arma et veretoni conductorerentur Nigropontem et predictae res non forent tunc necessarie dicto domino Imperatori, predictae res remanerent cum maximo damno nostro, sed si placeat domino Imperatori mittere pecuniam Venetias pro rebus predictis nos complaceremus ei alacriter et libenter, de balistariis vero nullo modo possemus complacere sibi, quia sumus pro armando hoc anno multas galeas et pro aliis arduis factis nostris, ita quod poterit habere nos merito excusatos.

Ad secundum capitulum de mutuando sibi ducatorum vi^m vel illam partem que videretur nostro Dominio, respondeatur quod ipse ambaxiator

non habet syndicatum ad recipiendum aliquam pecuniam neque ad promittendum pro pignore aliquem locum predicti domini Imperatoris, sed quando predictus dominus Imperator mitteret syndicatum ad plenum, et quod nobis daretur de locis suis sicut idem ambaxiator dicit, nos faciemus quicquid boni poterimus.

Ad tertium quod galea nostra Nigropontis possit ire cum galea sua et e converso in subsidium partium quod omnino istud esset impossibile, quia necessario expedit quod dicta galea maneat semper et omni tempore ad custodiam nostre insule Nigropontis et pro aliis negociis nostris sicut omnibus est manifestum.

Ad quartum capitulum de subveniundo et adiuvando eius fratrem Chier-teodorum, Despotum Amoree, etc., respondeatur quod informabimus nos cum rectoribus nostris illarum partium Coroni et Mothono et providebimus super inde sicut nobis videbitur expedire.

Ad quintum capitulum de interponendo nos inter ipsum dominum Imperatorem et Moratum, quod novit Deus quod omnem quietem et bonum statum ipsius domini Imperatoris summopere optamus et ideo, quia forsitan mitemus ad illas partes nuntium nostrum, nos commitemus et faciemus omnia premissa, quicquid boni poterimus.

B.

Venice, *Archivio di Stato, Senato, Misti* 40, fol. 82v.

Die 22 iulii 1387.

Sapientes ordinum. — Capta.

Quia facit pro honore nostro et bono galearum nostrarum viaggii Romanie habere provisionem ad securitatem earum, consideratis dubiis et casibus qui possent facilius occurrere, presertim habito respectu ad negotia Morati, qui habet Christopolim et Salonichi, ubi sunt parata quam plura corpora galearum et lignorum cum quibus posset inferre damnum galeis predictis, de quo non est minus timendum quam de aliis nationibus. Ita quod necessario oportet matura provisione vigilare ad hoc,

Vadit pars in bona gratia quod precipiatur Capitaneo nostro Culfi, quod cum predictis duabus galeis nostris Romanie, mittere debeat unam de galeis nostris Culfi, armatis in Venetiis, que sit bene armata et bene in ordine et que debeat sotiare galeas nostras predictas usque ad bucham de l'Argiro.

Regimini nostro Nigropontis mandetur quod nisi fuerit cum magno sinistro illarum partium debeat mittere galeam nostram Nigropontis cum galeis predictis usque ad bucham de l'Argiro, et intratis galeis nostris Romanie in bucha debeant iste galee Culphi et Nigropontis redire ad custodiam suam, de omnibus novis illarum partium plenissime informate, que nova scribant nobis quam celleriter esse poterit.

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